轉換社債에 관한 法的 考察 : 不公正發行에 대한 司法的 統制 및 改善方案을 중심으로 = (A) legal study on the convertible bonds : focusing on the judicial control over unfair issuing

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The convertible bonds, special bonds on Korean Commercial Law, can be converted into common stocks of the same corporation under specified terms and conditions at the option of the holder. Convertible bonds combine features of both debt and stock in a single, hybrid securities. Therefore, although some conflicts of opinions about the basic nature of them, because the capital increase happens by issuing of them, I think it is reasonable convertible bonds are deal with stocks equally on the economical aspects. Already, the developed countries, for example Germany, England, U.S., and Japan have regulated stocks and convertible bonds in the same way on their commercial law regarding preemptive right of them.
In Samsung Electronics' case relating to issuing of convertible bonds in the way of private subscription, Korean Supreme Court applied the U.S. and Japanese "Primary Purpose Test" in judging private subscription's legitimacy under the assumption that shareholders' preemptive rights to convertible bonds are essentially negated. However, because on the Korean Commercial Law, stockholders have preemptive rights basically such as Germany's Stock Law, it is absurd Korean Supreme Court adopt "Primary Purpose Test" established regarding company's defensive tactics against hostile M&A by judicial cases in the U.S. and Japan which deny stockholders' preemptive rights on their security-related law. Therefore, I think it is reasonable besides the U.S. and Japanese "Primary Purpose Test", namely "Stockholder's Equality Principle", "The Corporation Interest Test" established judicial cases as legitimacy rule in occasion of denying or limiting the stockholders' preemptive rights in the Germany should be applied in judging legitimacy of private subscription of convertible bonds.
In current Korean Commercial Law, as direct control means over illegitimacy of convertible bonds' private subscription, a demand for injunction on issuing of convertible bonds, for pay up the balance against person underwrite at a low price remarkably is possible and nullification suit of issuing of convertible bonds is possible if by unfair private subscription of convertible bonds, stockholders' preemptive rights are infringed substantially, and by such unfair issuing, company's governing power is changed.
Also, as indirect control means, a claim for damages against the directors involved unfair issuing of convertible bonds. If the board of directors' decision on the private subscription of convertible bonds breach the article of incorporation regulate the procedures of issuing of convertible bonds, violate "Primary Purpose Test", "Stockholder's Equality Principle" and "The Corporation Interest Test", because such decision breaches the duty of loyalty of the directors obviously, the directors have responsibility for damages on the Korean Commercial Law and for the breaching of business trust on the Korean Criminal Law.
In conclusion, I tried to propose improvement plan of convertible bonds in aspect of both constructive and legislative study on this thesis.
First, I propose Korea should adopt "Corporation Value Report" and "The Guide to Defensive Tactics against M&A" made recently in Japan as criterion in judging legitimacy of private subscription of convertible bonds. Because actually private subscription of convertible bonds is made use of one of means of defensive tactics against M&A, "The Guide to Defensive Tactics against M&A" made recently in Japan will be useful criterion in judging legitimacy of private subscription of convertible bonds in the judicature. It is worthy of notice the most important condition is the will of whole of stockholder at the time of the adoption and withdrawal of defensive tactics against M&A in "Corporation Value Report" and "The Guide to Defensive Tactics against M&A".
Second, as legislative study on convertible bonds,
1) I propose stockholders should have preemptive rights to not only new shares but also convertible bonds on the Korean Commercial Law because the point of view of existing Korean Commercial Law, that is to say, Korean Commercial Law's situation not acknowledge stockholders' preemptive rights to convertible bonds, is improper in comparison with the legislative attitude of the developed countries treating convertible bonds as new shares in aspect of preemptive rights.
2) in case of private subscription of convertible bonds, it is necessary the procedure notify existing stockholders of the fact of private subscription is secured on the Korean Commercial Law because notifying procedure of private subscription will ensure injunction on issuing of convertible bonds to existing stockholders.
3) on the one hand, I propose the stocks issued by exercising the option of stockholders should be limited to them have no right to vote, on the other hand, I insist the underwriter of convertible bonds should be limited person has not special relation with a big stockholder or the directors. I think the above-mentioned actions could be contribute to prevention of illegitimacy of private subscription of convertible bonds.
Some scholars assert convertible bonds must be utilized as defensive means against M&A because positive legislation on defensive means against M&A is absent in Korea. But, the intent of convertible bonds on the Korean Commercial Law is raising the capital of company, I think it is reasonable means of defensive tactics against M&A should be acknowledged through special legislation or adding to the Korean Commercial Code clauses relating to defensive means against M&A.
Recently, revision bill of the Korean Commercial Code including acknowledgment of various kinds of stocks was announced for hearing the opinion of the people and groups, I think it is pretty desirable revision bill in aspect of both the heightening of legitimacy of private subscription of convertible bonds and the adoption of defensive means against M&A.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 目 次
• 第1章 서 론
• 第1節 연구의 목적 1
• 第2節 연구의 범위와 방법 2
• 第2章 전환사채제도의 의의
• 第1節 전환사채의 의의 6
• Ⅰ. 전환사채의 개념 6
• 1. 전환사채의 정의 6
• 2. 전환사채와 자금조달 6
• Ⅱ. 전환사채제도의 연혁 7
• 1. 외국 입법례 7
• 2. 우리나라의 도입경과 17
• 第2節 전환사채의 법적 성격 21
• Ⅰ. 학설과 판례 21
• 1. 학 설 21
• 2. 판 례 22
• 3. 소 결 23
• Ⅱ. 구별 개념 23
• 1. 신주인수권부사채 23
• 2. 교환사채 27
• 第3節 전환사채의 발행 29
• Ⅰ. 전환사채 발행의 결정 29
• 1. 발행기관 29
• (1) 입법례 29
• (2) 상법의 처지 32
• 2. 발행에 관한 결정사항 35
• (1) 전환사채의 총액 35
• (2) 전환조건 36
• (3) 전환으로 발행할 주식의 내용 39
• (4) 전환청구기간 40
• Ⅱ. 전환사채의 발행절차 41
• 1. 주주에게 발행하는 경우 43
• 2. 주주 외의 제3자에게 발행하는 경우 44
• 3. 미발행 수권주식의 유보 50
• 4. 전환사채의 등기 50
• Ⅲ. 전환사채의 전환 51
• 1. 전환권과 그 법적 성질 51
• 2. 전환청구의 절차 51
• 3. 전환의 효과 52
• 第3章 전환사채 발행의 불공정성
• 第1節 서 설 54
• 第2節 전환사채 발행의 절차적 요건의 구체성 55
• 1. 주주 외의 자에 대한 전환사채 발행 55
• 2. 학설 및 판례 56
• 3. 소 결 58
• 第3節 전환사채의 불공정 발행의 사례 60
• Ⅰ. 외국의 사례 60
• 1. 독일의 경우 61
• 2. 미국의 경우 65
• 3. 일본의 경우 70
• Ⅱ. 국내의 사례 74
• 1. 경영권 방어 목적의 발행 74
• (1) 한화종금(주) 사례 75
• (2) 미도파(주) 사례 78
• 2. 지배권 승계ㆍ유지 목적 발행 80
• (1) 삼성에버랜드(주) 사모전환사채 저가발행 사례 80
• (2) 삼성전자(주) 사모전환사채 발행 사례 84
• 第4節 불공정 발행의 여부에 관한 판단기준 95
• Ⅰ. 사례에서의 판단기준 95
• 1. 외국 사례의 경우 97
• (1) 독 일 97
• (2) 미국과 일본 97
• 2. 국내 사례의 경우 98
• (1) 주요목적 기준 98
• (2) 주요목적 기준의 확장 99
• Ⅱ. 불공정 발행의 판단기준의 정립 100
• 第4章 전환사채의 불공정 발행에 대한 구제
• 第1節 서 설 103
• 第2節 불공정 발행에 대한 직접적 통제 103
• Ⅰ. 전환사채 발행의 유지청구 103
• 1. 청구의 의의 103
• 2. 청구의 요건 104
• 3. 청구의 효과 105
• Ⅱ. 불공정가액 인수인의 책임 106
• 1. 인수인 책임의 의의 106
• 2. 책임의 요건 106
• 3. 책임의 내용 108
• Ⅲ. 전환사채발행의 무효와 무효의 소 108
• 1. 무효원인의 판단 109
• 2. 불공정 발행과 무효원인 109
• 3. 주주의 전환사채인수권의 인정여부 115
• 4. 전환사채발행 무효확인의 소의 인정여부 119
• 第3節 불공정 발행에 대한 간접적 통제 121
• Ⅰ. 이사 등의 손해배상책임 122
• 1. 이사의 책임 122
• 2. 업무집행지시자의 책임 125
• 3. 증권관련집단소송법에 의한 책임 125
• Ⅱ. 이사 등의 형사책임 126
• 1. 배임죄 인정의 특수성 126
• 2. 업무상 배임죄의 죄책 127
• 第5章 전환사채의 불공정 발행에 대한 대책
• 第1節 서 설 129
• 第2節 문제해결을 위한 해석론 131
• 1. 불공정성과 경영권 방어행위 간의 관계 131
• 2. 일본 회사법상 경영권방어 수단의 기준 135
• (1) 「기업가치보고서」의 경우 136
• (2) 「매수방어책지침」의 경우 137
• 3. 소 결 139
• 第3節 입법론적인 대책 140
• 1. 주주의 전환사채인수권의 법정 140
• 2. 제3자배정의 경우 주주에 대한 통지ㆍ공고 제도의 도입 141
• 3. 전환예정주식의 개선과 전환사채인수의 제한 142
• 4. 행정적 단속규정의 정비 143
• 5. 경영권 방어수단의 도입 144
• 第6章 결 론 147
• 참고 문헌 151
• ABSTRACT 164