說一切有部의 三世實有說 硏究 : 三世實有說에 대한 世親의 批判과 衆賢의 反論을 중심으로 = (A)study on the theory that the three time periods exist in real of Sarvāstivādin : mainy on the Vasubandhu's criticism on the real existence of the three processes of time and Sanghabhadra's counter-argument

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The first chapter of this dissertation, mainly dealing with the original terminology of the actual existence of the three time periods, that is, the past, the present, and the future(三世實有), examines the difference between Vasubandhu and Sarvāstivādin in their exegetical position of the issue: Vasubandhu interpreted it as '[conditioned factors] actually existing in the three time periods' or 'The three time periods exist in reality'(savam dravyato 'sti), criticizing time and existence from the ontological viewpoint just as that of Vaiśeṣika; Sarvāstivādin, contrarily, discussed the issue of the three time periods based on their activities, that is, the differences depending on existential aspects(adhvatrayam asti).
Vasubandhu's criticism of Sarvāstivādin's understanding of time carries an intention of pointing out the permanence of the factor(法體恒有, svabhāvaḥ sarvadā asti). More precisely speaking, if the actual existence of the three time periods is accepted, the classification of the periods cannot be accomplished because only the present factors can be invoked as long as the factors(svabhāva) are said to exist (in present tense). According to Vasubandhu's philosophical point of view, only the present exists as real in the temporal sense, and the present factors arise and pass away only at the very present moment. Consequently, Sarvāstivādin's assertion of the real existence of the factors in the three time periods is criticized since it determines the past and the future as the same as the present, which would not make the classification of the three time periods possible. However, this criticism is merely out of Vasubandhu's intention. Sarvāstivādin, also, did not actually accept the substantiality of time, and denounced that the three time periods only represent the differing existential aspects of discrete factors(dharma) corresponding to their activities, which proves that there was a philosophical dissension between Vasubandhu and Sarvāstivādin school.
Next, I made an attempt to discuss the methods of exegesis adopted by modern scholars in interpreting the reality of the three time periods and the permanence of the factors. In fact, whether to explain that the factors are permanent because of the reality of three time periods, or that the three time periods exist in reality because of the permanence of the factors, the resulting meanings are the same. However, there is a clear distinction concerning the process of philosophical development. In other words, the meanings are significantly different in accordance with what kind of thought Sarvāstivādin depended upon to develop its own philosophy.
The examples of some Japanese scholars' understanding on this issue are referred to as follows: some scholars including Ui-Hakuju(宇井伯壽) seem to understand the reality of the three time periods and the permanence of the factors from the perspective that is based on the result. The insistence on that if the real existence being is accepted in the three periods of time, with the factors then being permanent presupposes the temporal concern to begin with. On the other hand, the other scholars with Sasaki Genjun(佐佐木現順) as a central figure discuss the reality of the three time periods and the permanence of the factors separately through the more refined approach. They do not determine that the logical correlation bridges the gap between the reality of the three time periods and the permanence of the factors from the beginning; they assume that the logical relation between the two was a later establishment of Vasumitra(世友), who proposed the theory of activity utilizing the classification of the three time periods. Even though the factors are permanent, there is no confusion of the three time periods since they are activated only at the present moment. They contend that though the three time periods exist in reality and the factors are permanent, not all factors occur in the three time periods; though the factors are permanent, the confusion of the three time periods does not necessarily occur since the factors operate only at the single present moment. The latter opinion is assumed to be more persuasive in the sense of logical development.
In Chapter 2, I focused on investigating the logical ground of denouncing the reality of the three time periods. First of all, Sarvāstivādin bases its argument on 1 and 2 of sūtra(經證) as well as 1 and 2 of yukti(理證, the reasoned argument). In those sutras, it was asserted that 'the past actions(過去業)' actually exist, and that 'to be an object-field that produces cognition is the true characteristic of existence(識有必境)'; the existence of the present actions proves the existence of the past ones, and because the past and the future exist, there is a perceptual consciousness of the past and the future. On the other hand, Vasubandhu expounds that 'the past actions' are merely the ones that had already existed, and the past does not substantially exist any longer. He also denounces 'perceptual consciousness without an object(無所緣心),’ that implies the possibility of the perception without the object. Hence, while Sarvāstivādin asserts the reality of the three time periods and the permanence of the factors, Vasubandhu contends that a factor 'exists not having existed(本無今有, abhūtvā bhavati)' based on the premise that 'past and future factors cannot exist as real entities(過未無体)'.
Chapter 3 mainly deals with the theory of activity (kāritra) of Sarvāstivādin. Sarvāstivādin claims the validity of the reality of the three time periods based on activity, explaining that the reason there is no confusion in the three time periods is because only in the single present moment can the state of functional activity be reached reach the state of functioning activity. Contrarily, Vasubandhu points out the inconsistency of the theory of activity by raising an issue of the eye and the visual organ of 彼同分(tat-sabhāgatā). The essence of the criticism is the issue of causes of the same type(同類因, sabhāga-hetu) and the result of the same flow(等流果, niṣyanda-phala); if there were the causes of the same type in the past, then the past also contains the activities because the causes imply the activities. Therefore, the confusion of the three time periods cannot be avoided. However, Sarvāstivādin brings forth the counter-argument through the distinction between the activity and its capability(功能, samārthya); the causes of the same type in the past only perform their capability(與果作用=功能, samārthya) which is different from the activity.
Considering the ontological view of Sarvāstivādin so far discussed above, it seems that Sarvāstivādin examines all factors as being grounded upon some type of organic relation. It is no doubt that all factors cannot stay more than a single moment and pass away at the very next moment. It seems to be maintained, however, that the existing factors are in some type of relationship with one another at the very extinguishing moment or at the state of having gone into the past. The discussion of the relational disposition is the six causes, four conditions, and five effects(6因4緣5果) - the unique perspective on dependent origination of Sarvāstivādin. Therefore, what Sarvāstivādin implies by activity is assumed to be the state of some factors related to the six causes, four conditions, and five effects(6因4緣5果), yet being interrelated with the four conditioned characteristics that take real effects - that is, the state of all causal relationships fully completed.
In Chapter 4, along with the summary of the key argument points presented above, I investigated the system of thought that enables Saṅghabhadra to register such a disagreement. Specifically, I paid refined attention to what type of philosophical foundation Saṅghabhadra depends upon to unfold his objection, such as the issue of the functions of the factors and the characteristics. I attempted to understand the ontological philosophy of Saṅghabhadra in a multi-dimensional way, mainly inspecting the philosophical foundation he based his argument upon to understand and develop the previously established Sarvāstivādin philosophy.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 目 次
• 序論 = 1
• 1. 硏究의 主題와 意義 = 1
• 2. 硏究方法과 範圍 = 8
• Ⅰ. 三世實有說의 起源과 發達 = 11
• 1. 三世實有說의 展開 = 11
• 1) 學派의 成立 = 11
• 2) 文獻史的 展開 = 14
• 2. 三世實有의 原語 = 18
• 1) 三世 = 18
• 2) 實有 = 22
• 3. 三世實有에 관한 몇 가지 觀點 = 27
• 1) 三世實有의 解釋 = 27
• 2) 三世實有·法體恒有 = 30
• Ⅱ. 三世實有說의 根據 = 40
• 1. 三世實有說의 經證 = 40
• 1) 過去·未來色의 實有 = 40
• 2) 有所緣心 = 54
• 2. 三世實有說의 理證 = 63
• 1) 識有必境 = 63
• 2) 過去·未來業의 實有 = 72
• 3. 四大 論師의 三世 구분에 대한 批判과 反論 = 83
• 1) 法救의 類不同說 = 83
• 2) 妙音의 相不同說 = 88
• 3) 世友의 位不同說 = 91
• 4) 覺天의 待不同說 = 93
• Ⅲ. 三世實有說과 作用論 = 95
• 1. 『俱舍論』 이전의 作用論 = 97
• 2. 作用論에 대한 批判과 反論 = 106
• 1) 彼同分의 眼根 및 同類因 = 106
• 2) 法과 作用의 同體 = 113
• 3) 法과 作用의 別體 = 123
• 4) 法과 有爲相 = 128
• 3. 有爲의 4相에 관한 論爭 = 132
• 1) 世親과 衆賢의 刹那觀 比較 = 132
• 2) 有爲의 4相에 대한 批判과 反論 = 136
• (1) 生相 = 136
• (2) 住相·異相·滅相 = 140
• (3) 髓相 = 144
• (4) 有爲의 4相과 相續說 = 148
• Ⅳ. 衆賢의 實有思想 = 155
• 1. 作用과 功能 = 158
• 2. 引果와 取果 = 162
• 3. 法體과 性類 = 168
• 結論 = 172
• 略號와 參考文獻 = 179
• ABSTRACT = 190