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Neighbors, Friends and Allies : From the Outside Looking In
Lee, Chung Min Yonsei University Press 1999 Kim Dae-jung Government and Sunshine Policy Vol.- No.1
South Korea's sunshine policy has generated more than its fair share of criticism and acclaim in its short existence. What the future portends for the policy depends critically on North Korea's behavior rather than on the coordinated strategies and policies of the ROK, the United States, and Japan. For that matter, while China and Russia will continue to exert their own views and priorities on managing outstanding security issues on the Korean peninsula, the litmus test for the sunshine policy ultimately rests on tile policy responses of North Korea. Seen front such a perspective, Seoul's comprehensive engagement has to go beyond the current emphasis on attaining political support from the major powers and attempting to engage the North in a series of confidence building measures. If the ROK, together with the United States, forwards a package deal to the North, Pyongyang has to take into serious consideration the cumulative consequences of rejection If North Korea rejects outright Seoul's initiatives, then there is little doubt that domestic political pressure in South Korea as well as the United States and even Japan will mount in the direction of fundamentally reviewing the basic tenets and principles of the sunshine policy. In what one South Korean analyst has termed as a major calculated risk, it probably stands to reason that so long as the ROK and the United States is committed to maintaining robust deterrence and defense assets, Seoul and Washington can probably afford to entire the North one last time. The core assumption underlying the sunshine policy is the belief that North Korea's exit strategy as currently defined cannot extend the survivability of the regime and that the only rational choice confronting North Korea is to accept a grand compromise with the ROK and the United States. If this strategy works, i.e., if North Korea agrees to sustained, comprehensive, and mutually verifiable engagement with the South it will mean a major breakthrough in inter-Korean relations perhaps for the first time since national partition. On the other hard, if the policy fails to convince the North that the road to mutually assured survival is through engagement, both the ROK and the United States as well as the other major powers will have to deal with an entirely different strategic context oil the Korean peninsula. Changes in North Korea's external polities cannot be divorced from the unique features, designs, and aspirations of the North Korean regime. Perhaps the biggest roadblock to South Korea's sunshine policy lies not in Seoul, Washington, or even Tokyo as North Korea so often implies, but deep within the corridors of the Kim Jong-il regime. The ball is firmly in North Korea's court. If Pyongyang accepts the challenge, an historic opening could be forthcoming in inter-Korean relations. If it doesn't, the so-called "correlation of forces" that have already tilted in South Korea's favor will tilt even more to Seoul's advantage. Based on North Korea's previous actions and its own assessment of its strategic calculus, it remains doubtful whether Pyongyang will "bite the bullet." This is the fundamental challenge confronting South Korea's sunshine policy and corresponding dilemmas for the major powers.