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Corporate Governance and Analyst Behavior: Evidence from an Emerging Market
Vivian W. Tai,Ji-Chai Lin 한국증권학회 2013 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.42 No.2
This study examines how analysts would recommend poorly governed firms to their clients in an emerging market where information asymmetry tends to be high and shareholder rights are not well protected by legal systems. Given that analysts have incentives to access managers and to help their brokerage houses win investment banking deals, we hypothesize that poor corporate governance reveals a firm’s preference for upward-bias recommendations, while good corporate governance reveals its preference for more accurate information, and that analysts are inclined to give what the firm prefers. We examine 55 652 recommendations on firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange and find evidence consistent with our hypothesis. Our study implies that analysts’ buy recommendations on firms with poorer corporate governance are less reliable. Furthermore, improving corporate governance not only can reduce agency problems within firms, but can also enhance information quality produced by analysts and reduce information risk faced by investors.
The Effects of Executive Stock Options and Stock Bonuses on Payout Policies in Taiwan
Chia-Ying Chan,Vivian W. Tai,Chi-Hung Chan,Kuo-An Li 한국증권학회 2012 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.41 No.2
This study investigates how executive stock-based compensation affects the payout policies of a company. Stock bonuses, which are dividend-protected, induce executives to pay out cash dividends. Conversely, stock options, which are not dividend-protected, discourage the payment of dividends. We posit that the structure of executive stock-based compensation plays a crucial role in determining the payout policies of a firm, particularly for those firms with higher percentages of institutional investors and shareholders with ultimate controlling power. We further examine the effects of the 2008 stock option expensing policy reform in Taiwan as well as the repercussions, if any, that this policy had on payout choices in 2009. The empirical results not only indicate that executive stock-based compensation has a conspicuous influence on the payout policies of a firm, but also that there is a positive relation between stock bonuses and cash dividends. Furthermore, in the case of Taiwan, which has a relatively low corporate income tax rate, firms with higher percentages of shareholders with ultimate controlling power have less preference to pay cash dividends and greater preference to retain profits within the company.