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From Scorned to Loved? The Political Economy of the Development of the Stock Market in China
SONIA WONG MAN LAI,Yong Yang 연세대학교 동서문제연구원 2009 Global economic review Vol.38 No.4
This paper explains how and why the stock market, which is regarded as the embodiment of capitalism, has been allowed to develop and gain a prominent place among China’s financial markets. That development has been consistent with the changing vested interests of the central government in its attempts to collect quasi-fiscal revenue from the financial sector, reflecting the stock market’s growing importance as a tax-collection venue.
Sales Maximization or Profit Maximization? How State Shareholders Discipline theirCEOs in China
Sonia Wong,Sonja Opper,Yong Yang 한국증권학회 2012 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.41 No.3
This study examines the determinants of Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover in Chinese state-owned firms. Based on a sample of 1 555 turnover cases among listed firms in China during the period 1999–2003, we obtain three main results. First, CEO turnover is negatively related to the sales performance but not the profitability of the core business. Second, the negative relationship between CEO turnover and sales is stronger for firms with excessive employment and higher organizational slack. Third, there is a significant post-turnover increase in sales but a decline in profitability of the core business. Overall, our evidence suggests that state shareholders put a greater emphasis on sales generation than on profitability when they monitor their CEOs.
Post-Takeover Financing Activities under Financial Repression: Evidence from China
Oliver M. Rui,Julan Du,Sonia M. L. Wong 한국증권학회 2012 Asia-Pacific Journal of Financial Studies Vol.41 No.3
In China’s state-dominated financial system, many firms, especially non-state-owned or private organizations, face serious restrictions in gaining access to bank and equity market financing. This kind of highly discriminatory financial repression policy has induced some unique post-takeover financing activities, which are consistent with the desire to acquire firms in order to capitalize on their privileges in getting access to external finance. Specifically,takeovers by acquirers facing more serious financing obstacles (private acquirers) tend to show less salient symptoms of tunneling and display patterns of more efficient investment than takeovers by acquirers suffering less serious financing obstacles (state acquirers). Market reaction analysis suggests that these takeovers pose different implications for acquirers’ shareholder value, with takeovers by private acquirers being viewed as value enhancing but takeovers by state acquirers being viewed as value reducing.