RISS 학술연구정보서비스

검색
자동완성 버튼
다국어입력
다국어 입력
あ ぁ か が さ ざ た だ な は ば ぱ ま や ゃ ら わ ゎ ん い ぃ き ぎ し じ ち ぢ に ひ び ぴ み り う ぅ く ぐ す ず つ づ っ ぬ ふ ぶ ぷ む ゆ ゅ る え ぇ け げ せ ぜ て で ね へ べ ぺ め れ お ぉ こ ご そ ぞ と ど の ほ ぼ ぽ も よ ょ ろ を
ア ァ カ サ ザ タ ダ ナ ハ バ パ マ ヤ ャ ラ ワ ヮ ン イ ィ キ ギ シ ジ チ ヂ ニ ヒ ビ ピ ミ リ ウ ゥ ク グ ス ズ ツ ヅ ッ ヌ フ ブ プ ム ユ ュ ル エ ェ ケ ゲ セ ゼ テ デ ヘ ベ ペ メ レ オ ォ コ ゴ ソ ゾ ト ド ノ ホ ボ ポ モ ヨ ョ ロ ヲ ―

http://chineseinput.net/에서 pinyin(병음)방식으로 중국어를 변환할 수 있습니다.

변환된 중국어를 복사하여 사용하시면 됩니다.

예시)
  • 中文 을 입력하시려면 zhongwen을 입력하시고 space를누르시면됩니다.
  • 北京 을 입력하시려면 beijing을 입력하시고 space를 누르시면 됩니다.
ㅥ ㅦ ㅧ ㅨ ㅩ ㅪ ㅫ ㅬ ㅭ ㅮ ㅯ ㅰ ㅱ ㅲ ㅳ ㅴ ㅵ ㅶ ㅷ ㅸ ㅹ ㅺ ㅻ ㅼ ㅽ ㅾ ㅿ ㆀ ㆁ ㆂ ㆃ ㆄ ㆅ ㆆ ㆇ ㆈ ㆉ ㆊ ㆋ ㆌ ㆍ ㆎ
Α Β Γ Δ Ε Ζ Η Θ Ι Κ Λ Μ Ν Ξ Ο Π Ρ Σ Τ Υ Φ Χ Ψ Ω α β γ δ ε ζ η θ ι κ λ μ ν ξ ο π ρ σ τ υ φ χ ψ ω
á à Á À é è É È ç Ç ê
Ä Ö Ü ä ö ü ß
ְ ֳ ֲ ֱ ָ ַ ֵ ֶ ִ ֹ ּ ֻ ׂ ׁ ּ פ ם ן ו ט א ר ק ף ך ל ח י ע כ ג ד ש ץ ת צ מ נ ה ב
‘ ’ “ ” 〔 〕 〈 〉 「 」 『 』 【 】 ＂ （ ） ［ ］ ｛ ｝
± × ÷ ≠ ≤ ≥ ∞ ∴ ♂ ♀ ∠ ⊥ ⌒ ∂ ∇ ≡ ≒ ≪ ≫ √ ∽ ∝ ∵ ∫ ∬ ∈ ∋ ⊆ ⊇ ⊂ ⊃ ∪ ∩ ∧ ∨ ￢ ⇒ ⇔ ∀ ∃ ∮ ∑ ∏ ＋ － ＜ ＝ ＞
、 。 · ‥ … ¨ 〃 ― ∥ ＼ ∼ ´ ～ ˇ ˘ ˝ ˚ ˙ ¸ ˛ ¡ ¿ ː ！ ＇ ， ． ／ ： ； ？ ＾ ＿ ｀ ｜
½ ⅓ ⅔ ¼ ¾ ⅛ ⅜ ⅝ ⅞ ¹ ² ³ ⁴ ⁿ ₁ ₂ ₃ ₄
Æ Ð Ħ IJ Ł Ø Œ Þ Ŧ Ŋ æ đ ð ħ ı ij ĸ ŀ ł ø œ ß þ ŧ ŋ ʼn
А Б В Г Д Е Ё Ж З И Й К Л М Н О П Р С Т У Ф Х Ц Ч Ш Щ Ъ Ы Ь Э Ю Я а б в г д е ё ж з и й к л м н о п р с т у ф х ц ч ш щ ъ ы ь э ю я
′ ″ ℃ Å ￠ ￡ ￥ ¤ ℉ ‰ ＄ ％ Ｆ ￦ ㎕ ㎖ ㎗ ℓ ㎘ ㏄ ㎣ ㎤ ㎥ ㎦ ㎙ ㎚ ㎛ ㎜ ㎝ ㎞ ㎟ ㎠ ㎡ ㎢ ㏊ ㎍ ㎎ ㎏ ㏏ ㎈ ㎉ ㏈ ㎧ ㎨ ㎰ ㎱ ㎲ ㎳ ㎴ ㎵ ㎶ ㎷ ㎸ ㎹ ㎀ ㎁ ㎂ ㎃ ㎄ ㎺ ㎻ ㎽ ㎾ ㎿ ㎐ ㎑ ㎒ ㎓ ㎔ Ω ㏀ ㏁ ㎊ ㎋ ㎌ ㏖ ㏅ ㎭ ㎮ ㎯ ㏛ ㎩ ㎪ ㎫ ㎬ ㏝ ㏐ ㏓ ㏃ ㏉ ㏜ ㏆
§ ※ ☆ ★ ○ ● ◎ ◇ ◆ □ ■ △ ▽ → ← ↑ ↓ ↔ 〓 ◁ ◀ ▷ ▶ ♤ ♠ ♡ ♥ ♧ ♣ ⊙ ◈ ▣ ◐ ◑ ▒ ▤ ▥ ▨ ▧ ▦ ▩ ♨ ☏ ☎ ☜ ☞ † ‡ ↕ ↗ ↙ ↖ ↘ ♭ ♩ ♪ ♬ ㉿ ㈜ № ㏇ ™ ㏂ ㏘ ℡ ＃ ＆ ＊ ＠ ª º
ⅰ ⅱ ⅲ ⅳ ⅴ ⅵ ⅶ ⅷ ⅸ ⅹ Ⅰ Ⅱ Ⅲ Ⅳ Ⅴ Ⅵ Ⅶ Ⅷ Ⅸ Ⅹ
ا ب ت ث ج ح خ د ذ ر ز س ش ص ض ط ظ ع غ ف ق ک ل م ن ه و ی
닫기
    인기검색어 순위 펼치기

    RISS 인기검색어

      검색결과 좁혀 보기

      선택해제

      오늘 본 자료

      • 오늘 본 자료가 없습니다.
      더보기
      검색키워드
      저자 : Panlop Zeephongsekul (검색결과 2 건)
      • 무료
      • 기관 내 무료
      • 유료
      • SCOPUSKCI등재

        Asymmetric Information Supply Chain Models with Credit Option

        Zhang, Xu,Zeephongsekul, Panlop Korean Institute of Industrial Engineers 2013 Industrial Engineeering & Management Systems Vol.12 No.3

        Credit option is a policy that has been studied by many researchers in the area of supply chain management. This policy has been applied in practice to improve the profits of supply chain members. Usually, a credit option policy is proposed by the seller, and often under a symmetric information environment where members have complete information on each others' operations. In this paper, we investigate two scenarios: firstly, the seller offers a credit option to the buyer, and secondly, the buyer attempts to stretch the length of the credit period offered by the seller. The proposed model in both scenarios will be investigated under an asymmetric information structure where some information are private and are only known to the individual who has knowledge of this information. The interactions between buyer and seller will be modeled by non-cooperative Stackelberg games where the buyer and seller take turn as leader and follower. Among some of the numerical results obtained, the seller and buyer's profits obtained from symmetric information games are larger than those obtained from an asymmetric information game in both scenarios. Furthermore, both buyer and seller's profit in the second scenario are better than in the first scenario.

      • KCI등재

        Asymmetric Information Supply Chain Models with Credit Option

        Xu Zhang,Panlop Zeephongsekul 대한산업공학회 2013 Industrial Engineeering & Management Systems Vol.12 No.3

        Credit option is a policy that has been studied by many researchers in the area of supply chain management. This policy has been applied in practice to improve the profits of supply chain members. Usually, a credit option policy is proposed by the seller, and often under a symmetric information environment where members have complete information on each others’ operations. In this paper, we investigate two scenarios: firstly, the seller offers a credit option to the buyer, and secondly, the buyer attempts to stretch the length of the credit period offered by the seller. The proposed model in both scenarios will be investigated under an asymmetric information structure where some information are private and are only known to the individual who has knowledge of this information. The interactions between buyer and seller will be modeled by non-cooperative Stackelberg games where the buyer and seller take turn as leader and follower. Among some of the numerical results obtained, the seller and buyer’s profits obtained from symmetric information games are larger than those obtained from an asymmetric information game in both scenarios. Furthermore, both buyer and seller’s profit in the second scenario are better than in the first scenario.

      맨처음 페이지로1맨끝 페이지로

      연관 검색어 추천

      이 검색어로 많이 본 자료

      활용도 높은 자료

      해외이동버튼