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RISS 인기검색어
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- 저자 : Meredith J. Sumpter (검색결과 1 건)
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Washington and the North Korean Nuclear Crisis: From Muddling Multilateralism to Sanctions?
Peter M. Beck,Meredith J. Sumpter 통일연구원 2005 International journal of korean unification studie Vol.14 No.1
The viability of the Six-Party Talks as a medium to resolve the nuclear crisis increasingly is being called into question, particularly as Pyongyang claims to be reprocessing a second batch of spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor and rumors swirl that the North is preparing to test a nuclear device. North Korea is proving adept at finding reasons to refuse to come back to the table, above all waiting for the “right conditions” to be met and now demanding the multilateral talks becomes a broader forum for “nuclear disarmament.” Washington has been trying to nudge the process along in vain, so far failing to convince the other four governments to buy into its North Korea approach. At this point, the only thing China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea seem to agree on is that the Bush Administration should be more “flexible.” Indeed Washington seems to be in a difficult position these days, together with its fraying relations with South Korea, a key ally in the region and one whose favorable relations are crucial to a constructive resolution of the nuclear issue. Clearly, the present North Korea policy of the second Bush Administration is in need of some serious adjustments if it is to have any hope of stopping the North’s nuclear breakout. After examining the second Bush Administration’s North Korea team, this paper explores the divergences within the Six-Party framework and considers the United States’ role in the multilateral talks. The paper concludes with suggestions for attempting a breakthrough, including the activation of a special envoy or third country to help bridge the deep mistrust between Washington and Pyongyang. The viability of the Six-Party Talks as a medium to resolve the nuclear crisis increasingly is being called into question, particularly as Pyongyang claims to be reprocessing a second batch of spent fuel rods from its Yongbyon reactor and rumors swirl that the North is preparing to test a nuclear device. North Korea is proving adept at finding reasons to refuse to come back to the table, above all waiting for the “right conditions” to be met and now demanding the multilateral talks becomes a broader forum for “nuclear disarmament.” Washington has been trying to nudge the process along in vain, so far failing to convince the other four governments to buy into its North Korea approach. At this point, the only thing China, Japan, Russia, and South Korea seem to agree on is that the Bush Administration should be more “flexible.” Indeed Washington seems to be in a difficult position these days, together with its fraying relations with South Korea, a key ally in the region and one whose favorable relations are crucial to a constructive resolution of the nuclear issue. Clearly, the present North Korea policy of the second Bush Administration is in need of some serious adjustments if it is to have any hope of stopping the North’s nuclear breakout. After examining the second Bush Administration’s North Korea team, this paper explores the divergences within the Six-Party framework and considers the United States’ role in the multilateral talks. The paper concludes with suggestions for attempting a breakthrough, including the activation of a special envoy or third country to help bridge the deep mistrust between Washington and Pyongyang.
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