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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : Marquez-Padilla, Fernanda (검색결과 2 건)
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Essays on health economics and wellbeing
Marquez-Padilla, Fernanda Princeton University 2016 해외박사(DDOD)
소속기관이 구독 중이 아닌 경우 오후 4시부터 익일 오전 9시까지 원문보기가 가능합니다.
The essays of this dissertation are concerned with different topics that affect individuals' health and wellbeing. Chapter 1 analyzes the effect of a policy which reduced the frequency of prescription renewals from 30 to 90 days on patients' behavior and health outcomes. I find that stable hypertensive patients on the 90 day regime improved medication adherence, by reducing the number of days in which they were out of antihypertensive medication by 2.6 days (35%), and experienced no drawbacks in health outcomes. Patients appear to value being on this low-frequency regime, as they positively modified their adherence in order to remain on it. I also find evidence of positive spillovers in patients' adherence, as clinic congestion was reduced. Chapter 2 studies the effects on human capital accumulation of the sharp increase in violence experienced in Mexico after 2006, known as "The War on Drugs". The upsurge in violence is expected to have direct effects on individuals' schooling decisions, but not indirect effects, as there was no severe destruction of infrastructure. This chapter finds evidence that there were no significant effects on human capital accumulation. My analysis shows that, at most, there are very small effects on total enrollment, and that they may be driven by some students migrating. These minimal effects on human capital accumulation today should have little to no adverse effects on long-term growth outcomes in Mexico. This chapter is coauthored with Francisco Perez-Arce and Carlos Rodriguez-Castelan. Chapter 3 analyzes the sensitivity of self-reported measures of subjective wellbeing to country-specific factors that affect the interpretation of questions and scales without affecting wellbeing itself. I find evidence that arbitrary differences in grading systems affect the distribution and mean of wellbeing measures. Since the choice of grading systems is unlikely to be correlated with variables affecting wellbeing, the chapter concludes that grading systems affect the interpretation of wellbeing scales---probably by providing different reference points that anchor individuals' responses. In particular, I find that countries with a higher threshold for passing grades tend to report higher levels of happiness. This chapter is coauthored with Jorge Alvarez.
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Voting with the Enemy: A Theory of Democratic Support for Subnational Authoritarians
Robelledo, Juan Marquez Padilla Yale University 2012 해외박사(DDOD)
소속기관이 구독 중이 아닌 경우 오후 4시부터 익일 오전 9시까지 원문보기가 가능합니다.
This dissertation examines the puzzle of the persistence, within democratic countries, of subnational regions with authoritarian characteristics. In countries as diverse as India, Brazil, the Philippines, Mexico, Argentina and the United States during the Jim Crow era, regimes with authoritarian characteristics successfully maintain control over subnational units despite national democratization. Thus, enduring subnational authoritarian enclaves result in co-nationals with varying political rights--a strong normative reason to worry about political "regimes" in units smaller than the nation. Often these low-democracy regions where authoritarian practices remain are governed by a different political faction than that of the democratic polity's national government. The very existence of subnational authoritarian regions is puzzling. Even more puzzling is a national democratic government, which once fought authoritarian abuse, appearing to be unwilling or unable to act against these regional autocrats. I propose a political explanation for the endurance of subnational regions that retain authoritarian characteristics. I develop a formal model of strategic interaction between the central government and a regional government in the controlled by an opposing faction or party. I find an equilibrium in which the central government needs policy support while a region governed by an opposing party is willing to offer support to the central government. It can absorb the costs incurred for deviating from its own national party's position in exchange for lower levels of central government intervention in the region. I also show that, contrary to the prediction of a version of minimal-winning coalition theory, highly autocratic regions are more likely to support the central government because they can cope with the costs imposed by their own faction and make a more attractive deal for the central government. The model also illustrates how regions governed by the opposition but supporting the central government are more likely to experience lower levels of central government intervention, thus perpetuating the existence of subnational regions with a high level of authoritarian practices. To test the theory, I rely on a multimethod approach using both quantitative and qualitative evidence taken from cases in Mexico. Using a panel dataset of all 32 states in Mexico with a time frame covering three presidential administrations, I demonstrate that opposition-controlled regions with low levels of democracy are more likely to support the central government in policy decisions despite their national party's position. In addition, regions that defect from party lines suffer less central government intervention during the next electoral cycle. I complement the quantitative evidence with in-depth case studies of four Mexican states: Puebla, Oaxaca, Chihuahua and Veracruz. I make use of archival materials, interviews with political elites, and analyses of each state's political history to trace within-region variation over time and conduct cross-regional comparisons by analyzing the 2003 fiscal reform attempt and the subsequent regional elections of 2004. I present evidence to support the assumptions of the model as well as to illustrate the mechanism by which the central government and the regional autocrat come to peaceful coexistence. Finally I offer evidence indicating that the mechanism is at work in other Latin American countries like Argentina and explore how the theory can be used to explain cross-factional alliances within parties.
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