The Case of Banking Reform in Thailand

Joseph J. Norton 東國大學校 大學院 法學科 商事法專攻 2005 商事法 세미나 Vol.19 No.-

THE KOREAN FINANCIAL CRISIS, REFORM AND POSITIVE TRANSFORMATION: IS A SECOND 'HAN RIVER MIRACLE' POSSIBLE?

Norton.Joseph J The Institute of East and West Studies 1998 Global economic review Vol.27 No.2

There is general agreement that the initial onset of the East Asian Financial crisis was made possible by fundamental economic, political and financial market errors and weaknesses, but also that the market reaction to these vulnerabilities (as their extent was revealed) was exaggerated and disproportionate. This is based on a model of "self-fulfilling" crises, under which existing vulnerabilities make a crisis a possibility but not a certainty. Unfortunately, the analyses to date (whether from public or private, domestic or international sources) do not suggest at what point underlying vulnerablilties will move from being the potential for a crisis and the point at which a crisis is a certainty. This article suggests that in the face of potential self-fulfilling crises, countries should act in advance (i.e., to take pre-emptive action) to reduce their potential vulnerabilities, both to an initial crisis and to contagion resulting from the onset of a crisis elsewhere, whether through panic, fundamental problems or the unpredictable potentialities of vulnerabilities. In effect, a main emphasis of this presentation concerns the importance of ongoing and meaningful ("bottom-up") economic, financial and commercial law reform throughout the East Asian region(or other emerging regions) and the related enhancement of legal education in these subject matter areas. In this sense, this article further suggests that, in looking forward, these emerging countries need to consider the critical importance of a law-based, "building block" approach in addressing the long-term implications of the current East Asian financial crisis. "The global financial system has been evolving rapidly in recent years. New technology has radically reduced the costs of borrowing and lending across national borders, facilitating the development of new instruments and drawing in new players. One result has been a massive increase in capital flows... This burgeoning global system has been demonstrated to be a highly efficient structure that has significantly facilitated cross-border trade in goods and services and, accordingly, has made a substantial contribution to standards of living world-wide. Its efficiency exposes and punishes underlying economic weaknesses swiftly and decisively. Regrettably, it also appears to have facilitated the transmission of financial disturbances far more effectively that ever before." -Testimony of Chaiman Alan Greenspan before the Committee on Banking and Financial Services, US House of Representatives, 30 January 1998 Financial sector crises are not a new phenomenon. Examples can be cited with respect to developing countries during the 19th century (Kindleberger 1989), and the Third World Debt Crises of the 1980s (Watson and Regling 1992) and the more recent 1994 Mexican "peso crises" (Norton 1998: Ch. 12; Arner 1996) are 20th century examples involving developing economies. But the realm of financial sector crises are not the sole domain of developing economies: the late 1920s and 1930s Great Depression (Davis 1995), the 1970s United Kingdom "secondary banking crisis"(Hadjiemmanuil 1996: Ch. 1), the 1980s United States savings and loan and bank crisis (Ibid.), and the current and ongoing Japanese financial sector dilemma (Gart 1994) make clear that even developed financial sys For the past two decades, the author and his colleagues at their SMU Institute of International Banking, Finance and development Law (associated with the Centre for Commercial Law Studies at the University of London) have studied financial sector dysfunctions in Latin America, the United States. Central and Eastern Europe, the Peoples Republic of China, and Southern Africa. In this context, the recent Indonesian situation was predictable and perhaps even so was the Thailand situation. However, what was not readily predictable was: (i) financial sector collapse of Korea, an Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) member and the world's 11th most developed economies with relatively sound macro-economic indications, and(ii) the broad financial contagion impact and the international dimension of the East Asian financial crisis. During the latter half of 1997, the author spent considerable time in East Asia trying to "get at the roots" of those expanding crises. In December 1997, he had the opportunity to be in Korea and had the privilege to have a personal meeting with then presidential candidate (and now President) Kim Dae-jung. Without violating any confidences, the author found this a most impressive meeting. Here was a person who undoubtedly would be remembered as one of the great 20th century leaders (along with Mandela in South Africa and Havel in Czechoslovakia) who survived years of persecution in order to struggle for democracy and human rights. But here also was a man who (most probable) would not only be the last leader of Korea in the 20th century, but would also be Korea's first leader in the 21st century. As a presidential candidate, Kim Dae-jung was the first candidate to recognise the seriousness of Korea's financial situation, calling for International Monetary Fund (IMF) discussions. Yet, he was also the only major presidential candidate who did not meet the IMF's demand for signing a pre-election declaration unequivocally committing to the IMF proposed "rescue package". He was willing "to agree in principle", but (rightfully) reserved the post-election right to seek "ongoing consultation" with the IMF. Quite clearly, the President-to-be was not to be "browbeaten" by the overreactions of the short-term markets, by singular self-interests of the international financial community, by the mixed and uncertain agendas of an intenational bureaucracy (i.e., the IMF) seeking its own "raison d'etre", and by the U.S. and Japan seeking various trade and other economic advantages. He realised very clearly that tough reform measures needed to be implemented, but he appeared ready "to stay the course" in devising a long-term "korean solution" for the transformation of the Korean economy and financial markets into a more open, transparent and globally competitive environment-thus, setting the stage for Korea to become a "Top Five" world economy in the first part of the 21st century. Even more remarkably, he saw such major economic reform as a potential galvanising forces for further promoting his long-neglected need for a sound social safety net for all Korean citizens, of greater economic opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses, of the reopening of South Korea-North Korea dialogue, and of broader and deeper regional economic and political cooperation. Here was an individual with both a special historical perspective of the Korean situation and a special vision for Korea in the 21st century. On the basis of this meeting, the author wrote an editorial in the Korea Times on "IMF Package Could be Catalyst for Positive Change in Korea"(Norton 1997). In this editorial, the author proffered certain observations: ●"Crises invariably entail not only challenges but opportunities"; ●"In a real sense, Korea has the opportunity to take the lead and to assert leadership, on a regional basis": ●"The new Korean government ... should shift the emphasis of the IMF financial assistance package not as an end to an era of impressive economic growth, but as a catalyst for a new beginning of positive change for Korea"; ● "Korea should not despair. The longer-term economic fundamentals of Korea remain strong..."; ● "[Ⅰ]t is incumbent upon Korea to develop a 'Korean solution'; ● "[Ⅰ]f true reform is promptly effected... the changes should lead, long-systems for Korea, as Korea prepares to take its rightful place as a major Asian leader in the 21st century"; and ● "In all event, a sound and fresh Korean position should be taken respecting the ultimate implementation of the IMF package and of other possible, sustainable solutions to these fundamental economic issues facing Korea and other asian economies". It is within this backdrop that the author presents this article.