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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : George Pennacchi (검색결과 2 건)
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Preemptive Tools to Mitigate Financial System Risk: Lessons from the Recent Global Financial Crisis
George Pennacchi 예금보험공사 2016 金融安定硏究 Vol.17 No.2
Deposit insurance can protect financially unsophisticated savers and prevent depositor runs, but it creates a need for regulation to control excessive risk-taking by insured banks. Several regulatory flaws were exposed by the 2008-2009 financial crisis. They include: risk-based capital standards that led banks to retain securitization risks; tax policy that dissuaded banks from issuing sufficient equity capital; and the failure of non-equity capital, such as subordinated debt, to absorb the losses of large banks. This paper discusses actual and proposed regulatory reforms in three areas: restrictions on bank assets and activities; required capital; and deposit insurance. While some reforms have been productive, others have been ineffective. Regulatory reforms often focus on large banks’ accounting (book) value regulatory capital ratios whereas investor confidence is based on large banks’ market value capital ratios. Financial stability would be enhanced by more simple regulation that is based on forward-looking market value measures rather than backward-looking accounting value measures.
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Corporate Taxes and Securitization
JoongHo Han,Kwangwoo Park,George Pennacchi 한국재무학회 2010 한국재무학회 학술대회 Vol.2010 No.05
This paper highlights how corporate income taxes create incentives for banks to securitize loans. Most banks are subject to corporate income taxation while special purpose corporations that hold securitized loans are not. We present a model that analyzes different banks’ securitization incentives. The model shows that if a bank has significant loan origination opportunities but limited deposit market power, its incentive to sell loans is an increasing function of its corporate income tax rate. Empirical tests of the model’s predictions are carried out on two different samples of U.S. commercial banks’ loan sales during the period 2001 to 2008: one sample using Call Report data and the other sample based on Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) filings. Consistent with the model’s predictions, both sets of data show that banks having relatively high lending opportunities are more likely to sell mortgages and non-mortgage loans when they operate in states that impose higher corporate income taxes. An implication is that corporate taxation of bank income may have contributed to the recently excessive growth in securitization.
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