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CLIFTON W. SHERRILL 이화여자대학교 국제통상협력연구소 2017 Asian International Studies Review Vol.18 No.1
Why have nuclear weapons not been used since 1945? Cold War studies of mutual deterrence have been challenged in recent years by constructivist notions of an evolutionary norm of nuclear non-use. Most famously characterized as the “nuclear taboo,” this argument asserts that the norm has become a constitutive component of civilized international society. Herein, I consider the underlying causal logic behind nuclear non-use, finding that it is more a product of rationalist security calculations (deterrence) and respect for the traditional norms of Just War Theory than it is an internalized redefinition of interest. With a new age of proliferation dawning, marked by both state and transnational actors who see value in shock for the sake of shock, I conclude that the norm of nuclear nonuse is under renewed threat.
Neoclassical Realism and South Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Policy
CLIFTON W. SHERRILL 이화여자대학교 국제통상협력연구소 2015 Asian International Studies Review Vol.16 No.1
This article develops a neoclassical realist model of decisionmaking that starts with the realist foundation of power, then layers on additional variables at both the domestic and individual levels. Based on a psychological conception of power, and differentiating the state, the regime, and the government, the model integrates prior neoclassical studies that emphasize elite perceptions, state structure, and strategic culture. As an illustrative example, the model is applied to South Korea’s current policymaking regarding potential acquisition of nuclear arms. While South Korea is assessed to have sufficient power to pursue nuclear weapons, the lack of military utility coupled with likely harm to economic and reputational interests suggest continued rejection of such a policy.