1940년 5월 말 처칠과 협상을 통한 평화의 문제

홍성곤 ( Seonggon Hong ) 한국서양사연구회(구 서울대학교 서양사연구회) 2019 서양사연구 Vol.0 No.61

Churchill announced for the first time his view towards a negotiated peace with Germany that included Malta and Gibraltar and some African colony at the War Cabinet on 26 May. As a result, on 5 p.m. 26 May the War Cabinet decided that Halifax must draw up the suggestion of Italy’s mediation. But while Halifax considered positively the position of France at the negotiation, Churchill and Chamberlain expressed the tendency to ignore France. But considering the desert of France, Churchill expressed the will of fighting on at the War Cabinet on 4:30 p.m. 27 May. Then Halifax attacked Churchill’s view by pointing out Churchill’s statement at the previous War Cabinet. Because of Halifax’s criticism, if Hitler demand the restoration of the German colony and the supremacy of the central Europe, Churchill expressed the will to accept Germany’s terms. But Churchill did not think that Hitler would suggest the terms corresponding to the British interests. Churchill’s doubts were about whether Hitler wanted a general settlement, which is what Halifax thought possible, or whether it was more likely that he would demand a peace reflecting German military conquests. But the War Cabinet accepted Chamberlain’s view. Though Italy’s mediation might be ineffective, Chamberlain argued that we did not ignore the France’s suggestion and waited the result of Roosevelt approach. But Mussolini rejected the Roosevelt’s mediation, Halifax’s ‘peace now’ was unconvincing at the War Cabinet on 4 p.m. 28 May. In this situation, Churchill accepted Chamberlain’s argument. Now was not the right time to approach Mussolini. If Britain held out she would later be able to obtain terms which did not affect our independence. According to this position, Churchill informed the British position to Reynaud. Thus Chamberlain’s ‘war now, peace later’ line defeated Halifax’s ‘peace now’ line. In this respect, not Churchill but Chamberlain took the lead of the debate of the War Cabinet. Thus considering the result of this study, Ponting’s assesment is correct. There are two significant points about these long debates, held over three days, about whether Britain should ask for peace terms. First, Churchill did not advocate a policy of absolute resistance and fighting on to the end. He favoured fighting on for a few months. Second, Churchill accepted that it might well be necessary to make peace. But Churchill felt that Britain ought to be able to obtain better terms at that stage than when France was collapsing. And in order to obtain that peace Churchill was quite prepared to trade British territory to Germany and Italy.

1938년 체코슬로바키아 위기 시 베네슈와 소련

홍성곤 ( Seonggon Hong ) 한국서양사연구회 2017 서양사연구 Vol.0 No.57

In the face of the threat of Nazi Germany the national security of the Czechoslovakia was crucially in danger. But France that concluded the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Czechoslovakia in fact gave up the Czechoslovakia because France followed the appeasement policy of Britain. In this situation the attitude of the Soviet Union which concluded the Treaty of Mutual Assistance with the Czechoslovakia on the 16th day of May 1935 was very important. But the Soviet- Czechoslovakia Treaty will operate between them only if assistance will be rendered by France to the Czechoslovakia which is a victim of the aggression. In spite of the such condition, the Soviet Union definitely expressed the intention of aid to the Czechoslovakia before the Munich Crisis in September 1938. Litvinov confirmed the intention of the Soviet Union’s unilateral aid to the American Ambassador in Moscow, Joseph Davies on March 17, 1938. In particular Stalin also informed the Soviet Unions’s unilateral aid to Benes through Gottwald in the middle of May 1938. In this background Benes who acted initiatively during the May Crisis showed the possibility of the grand alliance that brought about the collective security policy against German aggression. But Benes took the defeatist attitude during the Munich Crisis because of the threat of Britain and France. Stalin once again informed the unilateral aid on September 2, 1938. But Benes secretly informed to Daladier through Necas the intention of concession of territory to the Germany on September 17, 1938. And Benes who received the ultimatum of Britain and France on September 19 immediately inquired that the Soviet Union would keep the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the aid according to the Covenant of the League of Nations. According to the Soviet Union’s instructions the Soviet Ambassador in Prague, Alexandrovsky immediately informed the intention of aid to the Czechoslovakia at 7:00 p.m. on September 20. But asserting that he took the answer of the Soviet Union immediately after the acceptance of the ultimatum of Britain and France at 5:00 p.m. on September 21 in his own book, Benes distorted the exact date and time of the reply of the Soviet Union. In addition asserting that the problem which he raised to the Soviet Union on September 19 was not the aid according to the Covenant of the League of Nations but the unilateral aid of the Soviet Union, Benes distorted the fact. In spite of Benes’s defeatist attitude Stalin and Litvinov respectively informed the Soviet Union’s unilateral aid on September 18 and 21. In this situation Chamberlain and Halifax took the different attitude to the possibility of the grand alliance owing to the Godesberg talks. Thus Benes had the opportunity to exploit the division of English leadership in order to form the grand alliance including the Soviet Union. Also in this crucial period the Soviet Union informed the situation of arrangement of the Red Army to France on September 25. But Benes who passively followed the situation lost the opportunity that could hold back the aggression of Nazi Germany. The important reason for which Benes did not request the unilateral aid of the Soviet Union in this crucial time was the fear of civil war that would follow the Soviet-Czechoslovakia alliance against Nazi Germany. (Korea University/kssgh@hanmail.net)

소련·핀란드 겨울전쟁과 영국의 정책

홍성곤 ( Seonggon Hong ) 한국서양사연구회(구 서울대학교 서양사연구회) 2020 서양사연구 Vol.0 No.63

Before the outbreak of the Soviet-Finnish Winter War on 30 November 1939, the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office argued positively the intervention of the Finnish problem. Though the Northern Department estimated that the Finnish intransigence towards the Soviet Union was folly, it inspired Finnish resistance for British national interest. Besides on 28 November, Churchill suggested to the War Cabinet the torpedo of the Russian ice-breaker. The French Prime Minister Daladier held the initiative in Allied policy towards Finland by Finnish strong resistance and expelling the Soviet Union from the League of Nations on 14 December. The Geneva resolution of the League of Nations intensified the British intervention towards the Soviet-Finnish War. In these circumstances. the British Chiefs of Staff that have opposed the intervention towards Finland before the Winter War endorsed the Scandinavian expedition at the cost of war with the Soviet Union by the end of December. Ironside influenced strongly a change of attitude of the Chiefs of Staff. But the influence of Churchill and Daladier was decisive. In the course of the development of British anti-Soviet intervention plans, Ling’s Report in the middle of January was the turning point of British intervention policy towards Finland. The middle of January thus must be regarded as the turning-point of the Winter War. The War Cabinet began to regard the assistance to Finland as an end. Furthermore, Daladier that suggested a plan of an expedition to Petsamo argued to expand the anti-Soviet front through an attack on Baku and Batum. Also, Churchill argued the strong anti-Soviet line through the speech of the light of freedom on 20 January. Thus by late January Churchill and Daladier began to see the Soviet Union as the main enemy. In the circumstances of the reinforcement of British intervention, on 29 January 1940, the Soviet Union responded to the peace fellers of the Ryti-Tanner government. In particular, on 12 February the Mannerheim Line was broken for the first time in the war. As a result, the Finnish military situation was aggravated severely. In the face of aggravated military situation and Finnish peace feelers, the Supreme War Council decided to send the allied regular army on 5 February. After this decision, in view of the comprehensive anti- Soviet plan Churchill pursued the military intervention to Finland at the risk of the war with the Soviet Union. Even Churchill suggested the military operation in Baku and the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Furthermore, the appeasers of France argued to change the declared but unfought war with Germany into an undeclared but fighting against the Soviet Union. But on 29 February the Finnish government accepted in principle the peace terms of the Soviet Union. In the face of this situation, Churchill and Daladier tried to coerce the appeal of the aid of Finland through a threat of aid in order to prevent the termination of the Winter War. (Korea University / kssgh@hanmail.net)

군산풍력발전소의 풍력터빈 출력 분석

송기석(Kiseok Song),홍성곤(Seonggon Hong),최홍준(Hongjun Choi),최재호(Jaeho Choi),이장호(Jangho Lee) 한국신재생에너지학회 2014 한국신재생에너지학회 학술대회논문집 Vol.2014 No.11