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경영자의 과신성향이 재무보고 방식에 미치는 영향: 보수주의를 중심으로
유혜영(제1저자) ( Hae Young Ryu ),김새로나(교신저자) ( Sae-ro-na Kim ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계학연구 Vol.40 No.6
과신성향이 높은 경영자는 기업투자로부터의 미래 수익률을 높게 예측하고 기업관련호재의 실현가능성 및 기업현금흐름에 대한 파급력을 과대평가한다. 이에, 본 연구에서는 과신성향이 강한 경영자일수록 기업투자관련 손실인식을 연기하고, 자산가치를 과대평가하는 등 덜 보수적인 회계처리를 할 경향이 높을 것이라고 예측하였다. 추가로 경영자 지분율 및 이사회 독립성이 경영자 과신성향에 따른 재무보고 방식에 어떠한 영향을 미치는 지살펴보고자 하였다. 2001년부터 2012년까지 유가증권 시장에 상장된 9,518개 기업-연도 표본을 대상으로 조건부, 비조건부 보수주의 측정치를 사용해 검증한 결과, 경영자 과신성향과 보수주의 측정치 간에 음(-)의 관계가 존재함을 확인하였다. 이러한 관계는 경영자지분율이 높은 기업일수록 보다 강하게, 사외이사를 보유하는 기업일수록 보다 약하게 나타났다. 본 연구는 경영자 과신성향에 대한 선행연구를 확장하였다는데 그 의의가 있다. This paper examines how overconfidence affects accounting policy. Overconfident managers overestimate the returns to their investment projects, and misperceive negative net present value projects as value creating. They also underestimate losses and risks. They overestimate their knowledge and skills and suppose they have control on all problems and events. Because managerial overconfidence could lead to false decisions and impose high costs on firms, investigating the effect of overconfidence on firm decisions is one of the important topics in accounting. Prior studies provide empirical evidence that overconfidence can distort investment, mergers and acquisitions, dividend policy, the probability of misreporting or fraud proxied by SEC Auditing and Auditing Enforcement Releases, managerial earnings forecasts. We try to extend previous research by investigating the effect of managerial overconfidence on firm policies including accounting conservatism. Overconfident managers are defined as managers who overestimate futurereturns from their firms`` projects. They are likely to represent a higher value on properties than actual amount which will result in lower levels ofunconditional conservatism. Overestimation of future returns from projects also cause managers to accelerate gain recognition (or delay recognition of losses) and use less conditionally conservative accounting. Thus, we expect overconfident managers to make more aggressive (or less conservative) financial reporting decisions than other managers.Next, we investigate how the relation between overconfidence and conservatism varies with managerial ownership. Accounting studies indicate that the levels of managerial ownership reflect two agency problems between managers and shareholders: the incentive alignment effect and the management entrenchment effect. It is an empirical question whether these theories on the separation of ownership from management is applicable the relationship between overconfidence and accounting conservatism. Furthermore, we examine whether this relation is affected by governance mechanisms. External monitoring could constrain the negative effect of managerial overconfidence on firm decisions. A strong independent board could reduce the likelihood that an overconfident manager exhibits less conservative accounting. Increased oversight, and the diverse set of view-points, promoted by an independent board help to attenuate the impact of biased managerial beliefs. Thus, the negative relation between managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism will be mitigated by a strong independent board. Our tests are based on a sample of 9,518 firm-years over 2001-2012. Our first proxy for overconfidence is based on the findings of Malmendier and Tate(2005) that overconfident managers tend to overinvest in capital projects. The proxy is one if the capital expenditures deflated by lagged total assets in a given year is greater than the median level of capital expenditures to lagged total assets, otherwise zero. Our second proxy for overconfidence is based on excess asset growth. Overconfident managers tend to overinvest in assets resulting in above-average growth in assets relative to sales growth. Following Schrand and Zechman(2011), we measure the amount of excess investment in assets from the residual of a regression of total asset growth on sales growth run by industry-year. The second proxy equals to one if the residual from the excess investment regression is greater than zero, otherwise zero.We measure unconditional conservatism using the difference between cash flow skewness and earnings skewness developed by Givoly and Hayn(2000), and conditional conservatism using firm-specific C-Scores following Khan and Watts(2009). We use a simple measure of external monitoring based on the percentage of outside directors on the board, and managerial ownership. Consistent with our first hypothesis, overconfidence measures are negatively related to each of the two conservatism measures after controlling for firm-specific determinants of conservatism. The evidence leads us to conclude that firms with overconfident managers make more aggressive (or less conservative) financial reporting decisions than firms with non-overconfidentmanagers. The impact of managerial overconfidence on accounting policy is more pronounced at high levels of managerial ownership. We further find that a negative relation between managerial overconfidence and accounting conservatism weakens for firms with more independent outside directors. Our study is related to a broader literature that examines the impact of managerial overconfidence on firm behavior. We contribute to the literature by showing that overconfidence can explain a firm``s accounting policy.
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