연구논문 : 감사파트너 산업전문성과 보수주의

권수영(제1저자,교신저자) ( Soo Young Kwon ),정문기(공동저자) ( Moonki Chung ),황유선(공동저자) ( Yoo Sun Hwang ) 한국회계학회 2015 회계저널 Vol.24 No.3

본 논문은 감사파트너 (audit partner)의 산업전문성이 피감사회사의 재무제표에 반영된 보수주의 정도로 측정된 감사품질 사이에 미치는 정도를 분석하였다. 또한 감사파트너의 산업전문성이 피감사회사에 대한 이해부족을 보완하는지 여부와 감사파트너의 경험이 감사파트너의 전문성과 같은 역할을 하는지를 검증하였다. 보수주의 회계처리는 비용은 발생이 예상될 때 즉시 인식하고, 수익은 높은 수준의 검증가능성을 요구하여 인식을 이연시키는 것을 말한다. 파트너의 산업전문성이 감사품질을 제고시킨다면 산업전문성이 있는 파트너가 감사를 담당할 때 보수주의의 정도는 증가할 것이다. 본 논문은 이러한 예측을 2002년부터 2012년까지의 4,999개 기업-연도 자료를 이용하여 실증적으로 분석하였다. Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006)가 개발한 모형을 확장하여 CF 모형, DD 모형 그리고 Jones 모형으로 보수주의 정도를 측정하였다. 분석결과 첫째, 감사파트너의 산업전문성이 있는 경우 피감사회사의 보수주의 정도가 증가하는 것으로 관찰되었다. 둘째, 감사수임기간이 짧을 때 감사파트너의 산업전문성이 있는 경우 더 보수적인 회계처리를 하는 것으로 나타났다. 셋째, 파트너의 경력 그 자체로서는 피감사회사의 보수주의에 영향을 미치지 못하며 산업전문성과 결합되었을 때 피감사회사의 보수주의 정도가 증가하는 것으로 나타났다. 종합하면, 파트너의 산업전문성은 피감사회사의 보수주의 정도를 증가시킬 뿐만 아니라 감사수임기간이 짧아도 감사실패의 위험을 완화시켜주는 것으로 보인다. 또한 감사파트너의 경력만으로는 피감사회사에 대한 이해부족을 메꾸지 못하며, 감사파트너의 전문성이 함께 갖추어질 때 보수주의의 정도가 강화되어 감사파트너의 경험이 산업전문성에 보완적인 것으로 보인다. 이와 같이 파트너의 산업전문성과 보수주의 정도와의 연관성을 보여준 결과는 규제당국과 실무업계는 물론 투자자와 학계에 많은 시사점을 제공해주고 있다. This study explores the relationship between the industry expertise of the audit engagement partner and the audit quality, measured by the conservatism reflected on the audited financial statements. The conservatism (or prudence) states that if doubt exists between two acceptable alternatives, the accountant should choose the alternative that will result in a lesser asset amount and/or a lesser profit. It is expected that the conservatism of the audited financial statements would increase by the industry expertise of the audit engagement partner if it could improve audit quality. This study tries to explore the effects of the industry expertise of the audit engagement partner on audit quality, using 4,999 firm-year data for the period from 2002 to 2012. The conservatism as the proxy of audit quality, is measured based on the research model presented by Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006); cashflow model, Dechow & Dichev model and Jones model. The results show that the conservatism of the financial statements increased by the audit engagement partner-level industry expertise, as expected. Moreover, in case of short audit tenure, the audit quality was mitigated by partner-level industry expertise, while firm-level industry expertise did not work. Also, the audit quality was improved by the experience of the engagement partner where it was collaborated with partner-level industry expertise, while it did not work by itself. In summary, the industry expertise of the audit engagement partner raised the conservatism of the audited financial statements, mitigated audit quality in case of short tenure, and triggered positive effects on audit quality collaborated with audit experience. This study has made contributions academically as the first study of its kind in Korea on the effects of partner-level industry expertise on audit quality. This study tries to explore the effects of the industry expertise of the audit engagement partner on audit quality, using 4,999 firm-year data for the period from 2002 to 2012. The conservatism as the proxy of audit quality, is measured based on the research model presented by Ball and Shivakumar (2005, 2006); cashflow model, Dechow & Dichev model and Jones model. The results show that the conservatism of the financial statements increased by the audit engagement partner-level industry expertise, as expected. Moreover, in case of short audit tenure, the audit quality was mitigated by partner-level industry expertise, while firm-level industry expertise did not work. Also, the audit quality was improved by the experience of the engagement partner where it was collaborated with partner-level industry expertise, while it did not work by itself. In summary, the industry expertise of the audit engagement partner raised the conservatism of the audited financial statements, mitigated audit quality in case of short tenure, and triggered positive effects on audit quality collaborated with audit experience. This study has made contributions academically as the first study of its kind in Korea on the effects of partner-level industry expertise on audit quality. Ithas its implications to investors and academicians as well as regulatory authorities and practitioners.

로우볼링 결정요인

권수영 ( Soo Young Kwon ),정경철(교신저자) ( Kyoung Chol Jung ),허진숙(공동저자) ( Jin Suk Heo ) 한국회계학회 2016 회계학연구 Vol.41 No.2

본 연구는 감사보수 모형으로 추정한 감사보수 수준보다 20% 이상 낮은 감사보수로 체결한 경우 로우볼링 (low-balling)으로 정의하고 로우볼링의 결정요인을 살펴본다. 국내대형회계법인의 사업보고서상의 원가분석을 통해 20%의 감사보수 할인을 로우볼링의 기준으로 제시하였다. 2003년부터 2014년까지의 초도감사기업을 대상으로 감사인의 산업내집중도, 비감사서비스의 제공여부, 감사인의 산업전문성, 감사인 교체유형, 전임 감사인의 서비스 제공기간, 피감사회사의 수익성과 위험 그리고 감사인의 특정고객에 대한 경제적의존도가 로우볼링 현상을 설명하는지를 분석하였다. 또한 회사의 규모의 차이, 금융위기전후의 시기적 차이, 감사인 교체 유형의 차이가 로우볼링 현상과 관련이 있는지 추가로 분석하였다. 주요 실증분석 결과는 다음과 같다. 첫째, 로우볼링 현상은 피감사회사의 규모가 큰 경우에 더 발생하였다. 둘째, 피감사회사에 대한 경제적 의존도가 높은 경우와 기업의 위험이 높은 경우, 그리고 회사가 감사인을 자주 교체할수록 로우볼링이 덜 발생하였다. 셋째, 감사인의 교체유형이 수평교체보다 상하향교체 시 로우볼링이 더 발생하는 것으로 관찰되었다. 넷째, 감사인의 산업전문성이 로우볼링에 미치는 영향은 로우볼링을 정의하기 위해 사용하는 기준치인 감사보수추정모형 대비감사보수 할인비율에 따라 결과가 달라지는데 이는 산업전문성과 로우볼링의 관계는 비선형관계이기 때문인 것으로 보인다. 다섯째, 감사인의 산업집중도, 비감사서비스의 제공여부, 전임 감사인의 서비스제공기간 그리고 금융위기 전·후 기간 차이는 로우볼링과 유의한 관계가 나타나지 않았다. 로우볼링 결정요인에 대한 이해는 감사수임과 관련하여 감사보수를 책정하고 더 나아가 감사품질 그리고 감사인의 독립성에 시사하는 바가 크다는 점에서 규제당국과 회계사 업계는 물론 정보이용자에게도 유용할 것으로 기대된다. Low-balling is the loss-leading practice of setting audit fees below total current costs during initial audit engagements to better compete for large and prestigious clients (DeAngelo 1981). Legislators, regulators and practitioners have raised concerns about low balling for a long time due to the prevalence of auditors’ initial-year audit fee cutting practices in Korea to obtain new audit engagements. For example, Hyundai Mipo Dockyard Company and Hyundai Samho Heavy Industries Company switched their new auditors in 2014 and paid lower audit fees lower than those they previously paid to old auditors by around 43%. While an auditor incurs a loss in the initial audit engagement due to the discounted audit fees, the auditor may view the client primarily as a future income stream. Thus, the concern is the combination of pricing and tenure where an auditor must retain a client to recoup costs and ultimately achieve profitability. Korean regulatory authorities can designate external auditors for firms with quite low audit fees because of auditor independence concerns. But none of the two companies’ auditors have been designated for the practices of aggressive audit fee cutting. The purpose of this paper is to understand the determinants of low-balling, defined as audit pricing below audit cost in the first-year. Prior research has focused on initial-year audit fee cutting rather than low balling because audit cost data is not available. We analyze annual reports of Big 4 accounting firms in Korea and find that operating income over sales is around 2.91% on average and net income over sales is around 1.36%. We also break labor costs into fixed and variable costs because low-balling decision by auditors can be made based on variable costs. Through these analyses, we assume that the average percentage of contribution margin is around 18%. Based on this estimate, we operationalize low-balling by assuming that low-balling exists if an audit fee is less than the expected audit fee by 20 percent or more. We also employ alternative cutoffs such as 15% and 25% to define low-balling as sensitivity checks. And then, we consider the economic factors of low-balling, such as auditor concentration ratio, auditor industry specialization, auditor turnover, non-audit service fees, auditees’ risk and client importance. Based on panel datasets of audit fee disclosures from 2003 to 2014, our empirical results provide evidence that auditors tend to low-ball if clients are large. This result could be due to the fact that an auditor has no room for audit fee discounts for small clients companies since the auditor still has to follow mandatory audit procedures even for small firms Or an auditor is willing to provide audit fee discounts for large clients since they are in general less riskier than small clients. In contrast, auditors are less likely to low-ball if client importance is high, client business risk is high, or auditor turnover is high. These results show that non-price competition becomes important when a client is important, risky and has high auditor turnover history. We also find that auditors are more likely to low-ball for downward auditor changes, not horizontal changes. Upward auditor changes are related with low-balling when it is only compared to changes from a non-Big 4 auditor to a non-Big 4 auditor. The effect of auditor’s industry specialization on low-balling decisions depend on the cutoff points employed to define low-balling, indicating that the relationship between auditor specialization and low-balling may not be linear. We do not find evidence on the effects of auditor concentration, non-audit services and previous auditor tenure on low-balling. In additional analyses, we conduct the analyses by splitting the sample based on the type of auditor change. Low-balling is pronounced for the downward auditor change, while low-balling is observed only for the horizontal change between non-big auditors. We also show that the low-balling measures based on the cutoff percentages from prior-year audit fees may lead to the misclassification of low-balling engagements since audit fees can be affected by various factors such as client size, risk, and complexity. Our findings remain unchanged even after controlling the number of CPAs and listed companies and the ratio of the two numbers to ensure that the results of low balling determinants are not driven by the increase in the number of CPAs in Korea. We suggest that understanding low-balling determinants may provide useful information to regulators, practitioners, and financial statement users since low-balling is driven by auditors’ economic incentives, which may eventually affect audit quality.