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      • 去來費用의 效果 : 왈라스 模型과의 比較

        高弼秀 제주대학교 1991 논문집 Vol.33 No.1

        With scarcity of resources and unlimited human want, competition for scarce resources among people is inescapable. A world of scarcity is a world of competition, and conflicts among competing people must be resolved. The means of resolving such conflicts are numerous. Violence, first come first serve, rationing and price mechanism are a few among them. Economics does not say what form of competition is fair, or bes. Economics does not seek how to eliminate competition, either. The main questions in economics are, "what kinds of competition are allowed in our society, how do they operate, and what are their effects?" The most representative model developed in order to answer these questions is the Walrasian system. The major assumption of this system is perfect and costless information(or zero transaction costs). With this assumption, the Walrasian system provides a coherent framework for the rigorous analysis of many major questions. In other words, the Pareto optimal conditions derived from this model are regarded as a paradigm in measuring the efficiency of many economic activities. However, the fact that the production of perfect information itself violates the Pareto optimal condition refutes the Walrasian system and proves one more time that the pareto optimal conditions derived under the precondition of perfect and costless knowledge cannot be satisfied in every economic activity. This is the starting point of this paper. When the information itself is imperfect and scarce resource, the transaction costs in every economic activity including exchange and production are positive. here two major questions arise. They are; 1) what are the main effects of the costs of transacting, and 2) what distinguishes them from other costs. In order to answer them, the model presented here is pitted against the standard (and sophisticated) Walrasian system. the reason is that the "confrontation" makes it easier to isolate some of the unique features of positive costs of transacting. The organization of this paper is as follows. Section Ⅱ provides three of the results derived from the Walrasian model which are relevant to our purpose particularly. Each result is analyzed and compared with respect to the case of positive transaction costs in the following three sections. One thing to mention is that the development of the analysis presented here is based on product homogeneity, which has equivalent meaning of costless product information. The results are as follows. First, the Walrasian system asserts that resources which are used solely to transfer wealth are 'dissipated', since the distribution of income is uniquely and costlessly determined in the process of determining resource allocation under given the ownership of resources. When there exists positive transation costs, however, the distribution of income can be different, depending on how much each transacting party spends resources. In other words, despite the imperfect information the joint wealth can be maximized when each transacting party behaves as he/she should. But when each party realizes that he/she can capture or protect some part of wealth which is placed in the public domain as a form of common property due to the imperfect information, he/she will spend resources as long as the expected gain is greater than the costs. As a result, some wealth is transferred from one party to another party and some wealth is dissipated. This implies that the distribution of income depends on the magnitude of the net value of captured wealth. This also indicates that the transaction costs is not same as the costs which is commonly used. Second, in the Walrasian system a single person's action will not affect the wealth of others. This is not so when the cost of transacting is positive and resources are spent to affect distribution. for example, the more resources a buyer spends on selection, the larger is his gross gain, and the larger he inflicts on the seller. Third, in the Walrasian model, any kinds of imposition of constraints on market activities by the government or any social institutions lowers the social output. On the other hand, with positive cost of transacting certain regulations or social institutions are capable of lowering the transaction costs. As a result, sellers may be able to charge a higher pecuniary price, and consumers may pay a lower full price than when the governement regulation is not imposd.Then output is expected to be higher than in the absence of the regulation. In closing, the Walrasian econmoics has almost no features to qualify it as a social science. The only contact among people is in the market, where cheating will not occur since it can be costlessly detected, and thus the idecntity of transactors there is of no significance. The auctioneer, who is the only social functionary, plays a strictly mechanical role and provides his service free of charge. Individuals' maximizing behavior leads automatically to Pareto optimum. Moreover, since property rights are well defined and contracts are costless to enforce, even a legal systme is not needed. Only in that world the invisible hand is truly supreme. When transacting is costly, people trade with each other because they expect to gain, but each spends resources in attempting to capture greater share of the gain. Traders are not anonymous;their names -their identities- serve to lower the cost of exchange. This is why the notion of socially reprehensible behavior is meaningless in a Walrasian system, but such behavior may become meaningful only with positive transaction costs. This might explain the high moral standing of production activities and the almost universal negative attitude towards trade, speculation, financial activities and the like. Thus the social aspect of trade is of fundamental importance. Social institutions are erected to aid in further facilitating the exchange. The study of the cost of transacting then will enhance the role of economics as a social science.

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