Threat Information Collection and Analysis Method for Developing Cyber Security Threat Assessment Report

Seungmin Kim,Kookheui Kwon 한국방사성폐기물학회 2022 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.20 No.1

KINAC (Korea Institute of Nuclear Non-proliferation and Control) is entrusted with the NSSC (Nuclear Safety And Security Commission) to conduct threat assessments for nuclear facilities. As part of the threat assessment, DBT (Design Basis Threat) must be established every three years, and a threat assessment report must be developed for DBT establishment. This paper suggests a method for collecting and analyzing cyber threat information for the development of a cyber security threat assessment report. Recently, cyber threats not only in the IT (Information Technology) field but also in the ICS (Industrial Control System) field are rapidly increasing. As cyber threats increase, threat information including related attack techniques is also increasing. Although KINAC is conducting a threat assessment on cyber security at nuclear facilities, it cannot collect and analyze all cyber threat information. Therefore, it is necessary to determine a reliable source of threat information for threat assessment, and establish a strategy for collecting and analyzing threat information for DBT establishment. The first method for collecting and analyzing threat information is to first collect threat information on industrial fields with high similarity to nuclear facilities. Most of the disclosed cyber threat information is in the IT field, and most of this information is not suitable for closed-network nuclear facilities. Therefore, it is necessary to first collect and analyze threat information on facilities that use networks similar to nuclear facilities such as energy and financial sector. The second method is to analyze the attack technique for the collected threat information. The biggest factor in DBT reset is whether there is a new threat and how much it has increased compared to the existing threat. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze which attack technique was used in the collected threat information, and as part of the analysis, a cyber attack analysis model such as a kill chain can be used. The last method is to collect and manage the disclosed vulnerability information. In order to manage vulnerabilities, it is necessary to analyze what assets are in the nuclear facility first. By matching the reported vulnerability with the CDA (Critical Digital Asset) in the facility, it is possible to analyze whether the CDA can be affected by a cyber attack.As cyber threats continue to increase, it is necessary to analyze threat cases of similar facilities, attack techniques using attack models, and vulnerability analysis through asset identification in order to develop a threat assessments report.

A Study on the Analysis of Accident Scenarios at Spent Fuel Storage Facilities and Evaluation of the Protective Performance of Spent Fuel Storage Facilities Against Design Basis Threat

Sundo Choi,Minho Kang,Jihwan Cha,Kihaeng Nam 한국방사성폐기물학회 2023 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.21 No.1

In the wake of the Fukushima NPP accident, research on the safety evaluation of spent fuel storage facilities for natural disasters such as earthquakes and tsunamis has been continuously conducted, but research on the protection integrity of spent fuel storage facilities is insufficient in terms of physical protection. In this study, accident scenarios that may occur structurally and thermally for spent fuel storage facilities were investigated and safety assessment cases for such scenarios were analyzed. Major domestic and international institutions and research institutes such as IAEA, NEA, and NRC provide 13 accident scenario types for Spent Fuel Pool, including loss-of-coolant accidents, aircraft collisions, fires, earthquakes. And 10 accident scenario types for Dry Storage Cask System, including transportation cask drop accidents, aircraft collisions, earthquakes. In the case of Spent Fuel Pool, the impact of the cooling function loss accident scenario was mainly evaluated through empirical experiments, and simulations were performed on the dropping of spent nuclear fuel assembly using simulation codes such as ABAQUS. For Dry Storage Cask System, accident scenarios involving structural behavior, such as degradation and fracture, and experimental and structural accident analyses were performed for storage cask drop and aircraft collision accidents. To evaluate the safety of storage container drop accidents, an empirical test on the container was conducted and the simulation was conducted using the limited element analysis software. Among the accident scenarios for spent fuel storage facilities, aircraft and missile collisions, fires, and explosions are representative accidents that can be caused by malicious external threats. In terms of physical protection, it is necessary to analyze various accident scenarios that may occur due to malicious external threats. Additionally, through the analysis of design basis threats and the protection level of nuclear facilities, it is necessary to derive the probability of aircraft and missile collision and the threat success probability of fire and explosion, and to perform protection integrity evaluation studies, such as for the walls and structures, for spent fuel storage facilities considering safety evaluation methods when a terrorist attack occurs with the derived probability.

A Review on the DBT and Nuclear Damage Compensation Act

Sangcheol Hyung,Jaeyeong Jang 한국방사성폐기물학회 2022 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.20 No.2

It is still questionable if the Nuclear Damage Compensation Act can be applied to security accidents on nuclear facilities caused by hacking or drone attacks. If the Act is applied, the nuclear operator shall be liable for compensation for the damage even if there is no negligence, and no other person shall be liable. If it is not, victims must prove the negligence of nuclear operators and not only nuclear operators but also suppliers must be responsible. According to Article 5 of this Act, a nuclear operator cannot operate a reactor before signing liability insurance contract or a compensation contract or depositing in order to compensate for nuclear damage. The liability insurance contract includes the hacking accident, but it is not applied to drone attacks since only hacking accident is included in design basis accidents. However, Article 2 of this Act defines a nuclear accident as an event that may cause nuclear damage so it can be said that the ‘event’ includes intentional attacks. Article 3 stipulates that nuclear operators are not liable for compensation for damages caused by armed conflicts, hostile acts between countries, or civil war or rebellion. Therefore, if nuclear power plant is attacked by missiles from North Korea, the nuclear operator is not liable for compensation. And, it can be interpreted that the nuclear operator is liable for compensation for damages caused by actions of a third party that do not fall under this category. According to the Act on Indemnity Agreement For Nuclear Damage Compensation, nuclear damage caused during normal operation is included in the scope of compensation, but damage caused by actions of third parties is excluded. In the end, damage caused by actions of third parties is included in the scope of nuclear damage, but not included in the loss compensated by the government. According to the Act on Physical Protection, the Nuclear Safety & Security Commission is required to establish a design basis threat that is the standard for designing and evaluating physical protection systems. Therefore, it is reasonable to include the contents of design basis threats in liability insurance, or to apply the principle of no negligence liability and focus of responsibility to protect victims, if not.

A Study on the Threat Assessment of Domestic Nuclear Facilities by Establishing Peer Groups Using OECD Member States

Inseon Back,Seungsik Yu 한국방사성폐기물학회 2021 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.2021 No.06

THE APPLICATION OF PSA TECHNIQUES TO THE VITAL AREA IDENTIFICATION OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

HA JAEJOO,JUNG WOO SIK,PARK CHANG-KUE Korean Nuclear Society 2005 Nuclear Engineering and Technology Vol.37 No.3

This paper presents a vital area identification (VAI) method based on the current fault tree analysis (FTA) and probabilistic safety assessment (PSA) techniques for the physical protection of nuclear power plants. A structured framework of a top event prevention set analysis (TEPA) application to the VAI of nuclear power plants is also delineated. One of the important processes for physical protection in a nuclear power plant is VAI that is a process for identifying areas containing nuclear materials, structures, systems or components (SSCs) to be protected from sabotage, which could directly or indirectly lead to core damage and unacceptable radiological consequences. A software VIP (Vital area Identification Package based on the PSA method) is being developed by KAERI for the VAI of nuclear power plants. Furthermore, the KAERI fault tree solver FTREX (Fault Tree Reliability Evaluation eXpert) is specialized for the VIP to generate the candidates of the vital areas. FTREX can generate numerous MCSs for a huge fault tree with the lowest truncation limit and all possible prevention sets.