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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : Julia Hyeyong Kim (검색결과 2 건)
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Left-Wing Veto Players and Agenda Setters
Julia Hyeyong Kim 한국라틴아메리카학회 2014 라틴아메리카연구 Vol.27 No.2
Why do some states implement economic liberalization policies while others fail to do so? In this paper, I show that the number and ideological positions of the veto players and their interactions with each other explain differences in economic reform efforts and outcomes. Using several indicators of the veto players and their partisanship, I conduct empirical tests of the effects of the number of veto players and their ideological policy preferences on budget balances, as an indicator of reform effort, using panel data analysis of developing democracies from 1978 to 2000. Also, I test the veto players partisanship against an indicator of reform effort outcomes for Latin American countries. I find that the left-wing partisans hinder economic reform efforts while the right-wing veto players, which usually include the agenda setter in these samples, promote economic reform efforts.
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Why Does the Left Not Act Left?
Julia Hyeyong Kim 동아시아국제정치학회 2014 국제정치연구 Vol.17 No.1
When testing impact of ideology on economic policy, the prominent literature usually regards government as one entity. That is why the current literature usually looks at the percentage of left or right in legislature when looking at ideological tendency of government policies. However, this paper argues that one needs to disintegrate government as at least two entities?executive and majority party or coalition government from legislature?because history has shown that executives often times deviate from their own party position and platform. Some have argued that ideology does not matter in developing countries because ideologically defined parties do not follow their ideologically framed preference when they come to power. For example, President Menem’s drastic economic reform was considered a major deviation from his party, and scholars have identified the occasion as an outlier or as an example of how ideology does not matter in developing democracies. This paper shows that it is not because ideology does not matter but because ideologically preferred policy choice often shits in order to reflect the changing cost and benefit calculations once the party comes to power, and I provide evidence using economic crisis and policy implementation in developing countries from 1978 to 2006.
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