새로운 세기의 오래된 불확실성 : 부시행정부와 한국의 안보도전 The Bush Administration and Korean Security Challenges

Hathaway, Robert M. 한국전략문제연구소 2001 전략연구 Vol.8 No.3

지난 l2개월은 남북한 모두에게 즐겁지 못한 시간이었다. 작년 여름의 역사적인 정상회담이 낳은 기대는 무자비하게 깨져버렸다. 북한의 신비로운 지도자 김정일은 아직 서울 답방의 약속을 지키지 않고 있다. 남과 북의 정치적 접촉은 수개월 동안 얼어붙어 있었으며 겨우 최근에 와서야 재개되었다. 조심스럽게 계획되었던 이산가족 상봉은 비무장지대를 넘나드는 더 적극적인 교류로 이어지지 못했다. 그밖에도 지난 해 정상회담에서 약속되었던 무수한 의제들(예컨대 철도 연결, 단일스포츠팀 등)은 교착되거나 실현되지 못하였다. 이와 유사하게 한때는 희망적으로 보이던 북한과 미국의 관계 역시 원한과 비난으로 대체되고 있다. 2001년 1월, 대통령에 취임한 조지 W. 부시는 자신의 신임판리들이 느긋하게 대북정책을 검토하는 동안 평양과의 접촉을 중단시켰다. 6월이 되어서야 비로소 미국은 평양과의 대화재개 의사를 밝혔으나, 북한이 도저히 수용할 수 없는 조건을 내세웠다. 당연 하게 북한은 미국의 대화 제안을 무관심 혹은 적대감으로 대답하였다. 미국과 북한의 험악한 관계로 인하여 남북관계가 얼어붙었다고 생각하는 많은 한국인들(김대중 정부 내의 인사들을 포함하여)은 한국이 분단을 종식시키고 통일의 여정을 시작할 수 있는 반세기만에 찾아온 기회를 미국이 사보타지 하는 것이 아니냐고 비난하게 되였다. 물론, 작년 정상회담에 뒤이었던 무수한 기대들은 남의 객관적인 관찰자가 바라볼 때 터무니없이 과도하였던 것은 사실이다. 그러나 3개의 정부가 이러한 비현실적 기대를 좌절시키지 않은 데는 상이한 이유가 있었다. 김대중 대통령은 "햇볕정책"에 자신의 정당성을 상당부분 의존하고 있었으며 당연히 이러한 낙관적 기대들이 화해과정을 촉진하리라고 생각했다. 빌 클린턴은 대통령 임기가 끝나는 시점에 이르러 50년 동안 신비로움과 두려움의 장벽에 가려있던 북한의 문을 열었던 최초 약 대통령이자 평화의 사도로서 기억되고 싶었던 것이다. 김정일의 속내를 짐작하는 것은 보다 부정확하겠지만, 그가 정상회담의 도취감 속에서 경제적 수혜와 정치적 위상을 제고하려 했다고 이해하는 것도 틀리지는 않을 것이다. 그리하여 오늘날 이 3국은 작년의 과도한 희망과 현재의 냉엄한 현실을 조화시켜는 작업을 떠안게 되었다. 본인은 한-미-북 간의 복잡한 관계를 미국의 입장에서 바라보는 데 상당 지면을 할애하고자 한다. 그렇게 하기 위해서는 미국의 복잡한 국내정치를 살펴보아야 할 것이다. 본인은 미국의 국내 정치에 의하여 세계가 좌지우지된다는 주장을 하는 것은 아니다. 단지, 본인은 미국의 국내정치가 이제껏 그래왔고 앞으로도 그러겠지만 북한 및 동북아의 안보문제를 다루는 데 핵심적 영향을 마친다는 점, 따라서 남북관계에도 어느 정도 영향을 준다는 점을 설명하고자 한다. This essay seeks to shed light on the Washington side of the complex U.S. - DPRK relationship. It argues that American politics have had a central bearing on the manner in which the George W. Bush administration has handled the North Korea issue. This is not to dismiss the importance of the ROK and DPRK sides of this triangle, but perhaps the U.S. story is less well known to Korean audiences. The Republicans entered the White House earlier this year committed to a North Korea policy that was visibly ABC -Anything But Clinton. The specifics of the policy were secondary to the requirement that it represent -and be represented as clear departure from Clinton's emphasis on engagement and the 1994 Agreed Framework - an approach that in many respects paralleled Kim Dae-jung's "sunshine policy". This approach struck many Republicans as defeatist and demeaning. Nearly from the moment the United States and North Korea signed the Agreed Framework, prominent Republicans accused Clinton of "appeasing" the North and succumbing to "extortion" and "blackmail". (There are many similarities between the Republican critique of Clinton's North Korea policy and the criticisms voiced by South Korea's Grand National Party and other opponents of Kim's sunshine policy.) It is worth emphasizing, however, that the Republican-led Congress did not cut off funds for the heavy fuel oil shipments to the DPRK required by the Agreed Framework, or otherwise move to prevent Clinton from limited engagement with the North. Nor, during last year's presidential campaign, did Bush or his chief spokesmen provide many specifics of how their approach would be different from Clinton's. Indeed, their failure to set forth an alternative policy fed suspicions that their opposition to the Clinton administration's handling of North Korea related as much to their distrust of Clinton as to any fundamental opposition to the specifics of the president's policy. This disconnect between the vocal criticisms of the Republicans and their failure to offer a different set of policies helps explain some of the conflicting signals that marked the Bush administration's early months in office. For instance, President Bush publicly voiced a distrust of the North Koreans and ordered the freezing of all contacts with Pyongyang while his secretary of state was almost simultaneously saying that the administration was eager to pick up where Clinton had left off in missile negotiations with the DPRK. In fact, Bush officials rather quickly discovered that the number of attractive alternatives for dealing with North Korea was far fewer than their earlier condemnations of Clinton had suggested. One of the limiting factors that weighed most heavily on those officials conducting the policy review Bush had ordered was Kim Dae-jung's determination to persist with his sunshine policy, and the Republicans' unwillingness to force an open breach with their Seoul ally. Another equally important limitation for the Bush administration was the fragility of the Pyongyang regime. America's great power, Bush's team has begun to understand, does not automatically translate into a U.S. ability to force North Korea to bow to American wishes. To the contrary, U.S. officials needed to be careful not to force the Kim Jong-il regime into a comer, from which it might lash out in a last gasp act of desperation that, while certainly resulting in the elimination of the regime, would also inflict catastrophic costs upon South Korea and the United States. On June 6 the White House unveiled its new North Korean policy - one that was surprisingly like that of the scorned Clinton. Only in its emphasis on the need to make simultaneous progress in defusing the threat posed by the North's conventional forces did the Bush policy diverge in any substantial fashion from that of its predecessor. And it remains to be seen whether this position represents the administration's final stance, or is only an opening gambit for the discussions with the North that Bush assumed would follow. Yet discussions did not follow, as Pyongyang greeted the Bush announcement with indifference or hostility. As the weeks went by, the appeals by Bush officials for North Korea to re-engage with the United States sounded, to neutral ears, remarkably like the Clinton language the Republicans had so roundly condemned. The commitment of the Bush administration to ballistic missile defense has added a complicating factor in Washington's ties with Pyongyang, Beijing, -and Seoul. Kim Dae-jung and his foreign ministry were slow to appreciate how much the political currents in Washington had shifted after Bush's inauguration. Kim's strong support for the ABM Treaty, issued at the time of the Putin visit to Seoul in February, helped ensure that the South Korean president's subsequent visit to Washington would be a chilly one. Unfortunately, missile defense constitutes only one of many frictions and irritants in the U.S. - ROK relationship at present, as each side harbors suspicions about the policies, motives, and judgment of the other. Nonetheless, the alliance has survived far worse strains in the past, and there are many reasons to believe that it can continue to serve the interests of the two countries in the years to come. For one thing, the future of North Korea is not in doubt. Pyongyang is clearly on the losing side of history; all that remains to be determined is the timing and circumstances of its demise. Moreover, the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington earlier this month have underscored the common commitment Washington and Seoul share to defeating the scourge of terrorism, whether emanating from Kabul, Pyongyang, or elsewhere. Complacency about the future of the U.S. - ROK partnership would be dangerous, but pessimism is equally unwarranted.

Omega 3 Fatty Acids and COVID-19: A Comprehensive Review

Donald Hathaway III,Pandav Krunal,Patel Madhusudan,Riva-Moscoso Adrian,Singh Bishnu Mohan,Patel Aayushi,Min Zar Chi,Singh-Makkar Sarabjot,Sana Muhammad Khawar,Sanchez-Dopazo Rafael,Desir Rockeven,Fahe 대한감염학회 2020 Infection and Chemotherapy Vol.52 No.4

The rapid international spread of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 responsible for coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) has posed a global health emergency in 2020. It has affected over 52 million people and led to over 1.29 million deaths worldwide, as of November 13th, 2020. Patients diagnosed with COVID-19 present with symptoms ranging from none to severe and include fever, shortness of breath, dry cough, anosmia, and gastrointestinal abnormalities. Severe complications are largely due to overdrive of the host immune system leading to “cytokine storm”. This results in disseminated intravascular coagulation, acute respiratory distress syndrome, multiple organ dysfunction syndrome, and death. Due to its highly infectious nature and concerning mortality rate, every effort has been focused on prevention and creating new medications or repurposing old treatment options to ameliorate the suffering of COVID-19 patients including the immune dysregulation. Omega-3 fatty acids are known to be incorporated throughout the body into the bi-phospholipid layer of the cell membrane leading to the production of less pro-inflammatory mediators compared to other fatty acids that are more prevalent in the Western diet. In this article, the benefits of omega-3 fatty acids, especially eicosapentaenoic acid and docosahexaenoic acid, including their anti-inflammatory, immunomodulating, and possible antiviral effects have been discussed.

부시행정부와 한국의 안보도전

Robert M. Hathaway 한국전략문제연구소 2001 한국전략문제연구소 정책토론 결과보고서 Vol.- No.-

Magnetic Flux Transport at the Solar Surface

Jiang, J.,Hathaway, D. H.,Cameron, R. H.,Solanki, S. K.,Gizon, L.,Upton, L. Springer Science + Business Media 2014 Space science reviews Vol.186 No.1

Case Series Review of the Safety and Effcacy of Endoscopic Ultrasound-Guided Splenic Mass Core Biopsy

Sammy Saab,Youssef Challita,David Holloman,Kelli Hathaway,Michel Kahaleh,Jose Nieto 대한소화기내시경학회 2018 Clinical Endoscopy Vol.51 No.6

Ruxolitinib and the Mitigation of Severe COVID-19: A Systematic Review and Meta-analysis

Jorge R. Quiros,Jennifer Ross-Comptis,Donald Hathaway,Azza Sarfraz,Zouina Sarfraz,Zhanna Grigoryan,Kimberly Anne Romero,Abubakar Gapizov,Fortunato S Príncipe-Meneses,Manoj Reddy Somagutta,Adrian Riva- 대한감염학회 2021 Infection and Chemotherapy Vol.53 No.3

Background: The cause of end-organ damage and acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) in coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) patients is postulated to be connected to the uncontrolled increase of pro-inflammatory cytokines. The upregulation of many cytokines is dependent on signaling through the Janus kinase 1 (JAK-1) and JAK-2 pathways. Ruxolitinib, a JAK-1 and JAK-2 inhibitor, is documented to have potent anti-inflammatory activity by targeting several cytokines and growth factors with proposed efficacy in the cytokine storm observed in severe COVID-19 patients; therefore, this study examines the efficacy and tolerability of ruxolitinib for adult COVID-19 patients. Materials and Methods: This review was conducted using preferred reporting items for aystematic reviews and meta-analyses (PRISMA) methodology. Six reviewers analyzed 1,120 results. Seven studies were selected and validated. A quantitative meta-analysis was further performed to evaluate clinical improvement at day 28, mortality at day 28, and oxygen requirements comparing treatment and standard of care groups. Results: 168 individuals were involved in the studies selected: 122 in cohort studies, 4 in case reports, and 41 in randomized controlled studies. The ruxolitinib group had a higher likelihood of clinical improvement by the 28th day of treatment when assessed with the standard of care (SOC) group (odds ratio [OR]: 1.48; 95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.53 - 4.16; P = 0.45; I2 = 0%). The SOC group was at a higher risk of experiencing serious adverse events (OR: 0.17; 95% CI: 0.03 - 1.13; P = 0.07). Notably the SOC group had a higher likelihood of death (OR: 0.51; 95% CI: 0.11-2.29; P = 0.07; I2 = 0%). Conclusion: Prior studies on ruxolitinib have demonstrated it is able to decrease inflammatory markers. In recent studies on COVID-19, treatment with ruxolitinib decreased the time on mechanical ventilation, hospitalization time, and the need for vasopressor support. Additionally, ruxolitinib showed decreased mortality and demonstrated improvement in lung congestion as evidenced by computerized tomography imaging. These findings warrant further clinical investigation into Ruxolitinib as a potential treatment approach for severe COVID-19.