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Bank Regulation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations
Charles Goodhart,Boris Hofmann,Miguel Segoviano 서울대학교 경제연구소 2006 Seoul journal of economics Vol.19 No.1
Over the last two decades, macroeconomic cycles were frequently associated with boom-bust cycles in bank lending and asset prices, often followed by financial instability. In this paper we argue that (i) the new pattern of macroeconomic cycles is partly the result of banking-sector liberalization since the early/mid-1970s, which has increased the procyclicality of the financial system; (ii) the regulation of bank capital in the form of capital adequacy requirements is itself inherently pro cyclical and may therefore amplify business-cycle fluctuations; (iii) the new Basel II Accord may considerably accentuate the procyclicality of the regulatory system.
Minsky`s Financial Instability Hypothesis and the Leverage Cycle
( Dimitrios Tsomocos ),( Sudipto Bhattacharya ),( Charles A. E. Goodhart ),( Alexandros P. Vardoulakis ) 한국금융연구원 2012 금융리포트 Vol.2012 No.2
Busts after periods of prolonged prosperity have been found to be catastrophic. Financial institutions increase their leverage and shift their portfolios towards projects that were previously considered too risky. This results from institutions rationally updating their expectations and becoming more optimistic about the future prospects of the economy. Default is inevitably harsher when a bad shock occurs after periods of good news. Commonly used measures to forecast risk in the system, such as VIX, fail to capture this phenomenon, as they are also biased by optimistic expectations. Competition among financial institutions for better relative performance exacerbates the boom-bust cycle. We explore the relative advantages of alternative regulations in reducing financial fragility, and suggest a novel criterion for improvement of aggregate welfare.