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안재욱 ( Jaewook An ) 경희대학교 사회과학연구원 2017 社會科學硏究 Vol.43 No.1
한국에서 은행의 소유가 정부 규제에 의해 오랫동안 제한되어 왔다. 정부가 은행소유제한의 규제를 유지하는 진정한 이유는 금융 산업을 계속 지배하고 통제하려는 것이다. 은행들을 지배주주 혹은 민간의 실질적인 주인이 없는 기관으로 만들어 정부 관료들과 정치인들이 은행의 CEO들을 임면하고 은행경영에 개입하기 위함이다. 이러한 관치금융은 비효율적이고 무책임한 은행경영을 초래하고 있다. 그러므로 은행의 효율적 운영과 책임 있는 경영을 위하여 은행 소유규제를 완화하여 은행의 지배주주가 출현하도록 해야 한다. Restrictions on bank ownership have made the government de facto owner of banks and virtually manage them. This paper investigates the real reason why the government sticks to the regulation, and argues that the real reason is for the government to continue governing and controlling the financial industry. Based on this argument, the paper recommends the abolishment of the banking ownership restrictions so as to enable a controlling major shareholder of a bank to emerge.
배상근(Jaewook An),안재욱(Sang-Kun Bae) 한국경제연구원 2002 규제연구 Vol.11 No.1
This paper compares the performance of banks with and without effective government control in appointment of chief operating officers in Korea using panel data. A privatization program succeeded in spreading ownership of banks widely among the public. Government retention of an ownership stake in an institution meant de facto control by government, decision-making subject to political objectives, and more severe problems of political loan. A model is presented in which political loans are a constraint on banks subject to strong government influence. It is found that banks strongly influenced by government experienced disproportionately bad loan performance and were inefficient compared to privately controlled banks m terms of levels of employment, total costs, and profits.
배상근(Jaewook An),안재욱(Sang-Kun Bae) 한국경제연구원 2002 규제연구 Vol.11 No.2
This paper compares the performance of banks with and without effective government control in appointment of chief operating officers in Korea using panel data. A privatization program succeeded in spreading ownership of banks widely among the public. Government retention of an ownership stake in an institution meant de facto control by government, decision-making subject to political objectives, and more severe problems of political loan. A model is presented in which political loans are a constraint on banks subject to strong government influence. It is found that banks strongly influenced by government experienced disproportionately bad loan performance and were inefficient compared to privately controlled banks m terms of levels of employment, total costs, and profits.