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IUU어업과 조직범죄 집단에 의한 노동학대에 관한 연구
김은채,이진우 한국해양비즈니스학회 2019 해양비즈니스 Vol.- No.44
This paper first of all investigates Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated(IUU) fishing has profits from using forced labors which are illegal migrants supplied by international organized crimes, And they are also profits from engaging human trafficking to make use of their illegal status, which are accused worldwide them of these illegal activities. Secondly we have shown the example, especially in Thailand's fisheries industries. Thirdly to combat labor abuse or IUU fishing we have also shown that Port State Measures are through the examples more effective instruments than those of Trade and Market Measures. Finally we notifies the Regional Fisheries Management Organizations are more important roles anything else, and the weaknesses of Port State Measures at which can be solved forward researches.
EEZ 확대의 정치경제 : 렌트 추구의 경제적효과 Economic Effect of Rent-seeking
김은채,박명섭 한국국제통상학회 2004 국제통상연구 Vol.9 No.2
연안국의 EEZ의 확대는 연안국의 어장이 사유화됨을 의미한다. 원양어업국은 연안국수역에서 조업을 함에 있어 입어료부과, 어획쿼터 배정 등 제한을 받게 된다. 그 결과 원양어업국의 이윤의 일부가 연안국으로 이전되며 따라서 연안국은 EEZ를 더욱 확대하려는 인센티브(incentive)를 갖는다. 만약 연안국의 EEZ확대가 이해집단이 정치적 과정(political process)을 통해 렌트 추구가 이루어지면, 다시 말하면 이해집단이 그들의 의도를 관철시키는데 소요된 비용(rent seeking cost)을 보상받기 위해 과도한 어업자원을 채취하는 경우 이로 인한 사회적 비용(social cost)이 원양 어업국으로부터 벌어들일 수 있는 이윤(rent shift gains)을 능가하면 EEZ의 확대는 연안국후생을 오히려 감소시킬 수 있다. 미국의 알래스카 어장의 경우 EEZ시행이후 당해 수산업체의 과잉진입(over entry)을 초래하여 심각한 자원고갈현상을 보여주었다. Since 1970, as fishing technology has been developed, the living marine animals that have lived in the high seas have largely depleted. To manage effective marine resource conservation and management, the coastal countries proclaimed the Exclusive Economic Zone(EEZ) must be expanded and they have become the center of expanded EEZ. As consequence, UNCLOS have been effected since 1995. Thus these countries often perceive themselves as being in competition with each distant-water country for profitable for the expansion of the vested EEZ. In such a situation, EEZ expansion can appear as attractive policy tools in a coastal fishing firms in a noncooperative rivalries with a distant-water countries, enable them to expand their fishing share and earn more profits. In reality, the coastal countries' strategic EEZ expansion changes the initial condition of the game that both countries' fishing firms play. In this case, the coastal countries on the one hand have played as leader, the distant-water countries played as followers on the other hand. Thus it becomes so called stackel-berger leader-followers game. As a result, the coastal countries' welfare is improved due to the profits(=rents) shift from distant-water countries. The paper shows that coastal countries' strategic expansion of the EEZ that involved the interested group may not improved their welfare or rather result in resource depletion if the shifting profits or rent from distant-water countries are dominated by the coastal countries' direct lobby costs and related resource depletion.