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박준용,이우현,남창우 한국계량경제학회 2003 계량경제학보 Vol.14 No.1
본고는 부동산요인(공급: 건축허가면적, 수요: 25-29세 인구비율), Fama and French(1992, 1993)가 제시한 주식요인(시장요인, SMB(규모요인), HML(가치요인)), 채권요인, 박준용·이우현·남창우(2001)의 방법에 따른 거시요인 중 어느 것이 아파트시장 규모별 초과수익률을 잘 설명하는가를 시계열상에서 분석하였다. 분석결과 주식요인을 제외한 채권요인, 부동산요인, 거시요인이 각각 통계적으로 유의한 설명력을 가짐을 발견하였다. 또한 거시변수 1% 포인트 변화에 대한 아파트시장 초과수익률의 % 포인트 민감도 분석을 실시한 결과 아파트시장 초과수익률은 무엇보다도 3년만기 회사채수익률로 대표되는 금리변화에 대해 통계적으로 유의하게 음의 반응을 보인다는 사실을 발견하였다.
박준용 부산정치학회 1996 부산정치학회보 Vol.6 No.1
It is widely known that the American diplomatic efforts to freeze North Korea's suspected nuclear capability, which started in June 1993 after the latter's withdrawal from NPT on March 12, 1993, has resulted in the Geneva accord concluded between the U.S. and North Korea (N. Korea) on October 21,1994. It is also known that this accord is quite favorable to N. Korea because she receives 2 light-water reactors and an half-million tons of heavy oil every year until those 2 reactors will have been built according to the Geneva accord, while she was successful in concealing her history of the nuclear development achieved in the past. This means that Korean-American diplomatic cooperation on the one hand, and South Korea's system of international cooperation in deterring N. Korea's nuclear ambitions on the other, have resulted in failure. However, as widely known, South Korea (S. Korea) was totally excluded from the whole process of the political negotiations between the U.S. and N. Korea. Therefore, it seems safe to say that there decisions were made by Americans for their own interests, not for others. The Clinton Administration has alternated often between hard-line (hawks) and soft-line (doves) strategies. In critical moment of decision, one group supports a political compromise, while the others often reject such a compromise. This situation develops into a conflict between polarized positions. Especially in a government where different perspectives compete fiercely each other like in the Clinton Administration, the policy outcome in many instances was not based upon rational and consistent calculation, but resulted from changing balances of power in different groups with different policy orientations. For example, the high-level officials in both the CIA and the Pentagon consistently presented pessmistic interpretation with regard to the nuclear capabilities and intentions of N. Korea. Therefore, they often showed great skepticism about the utility of negotiation with N. Korea, while the Secretary of State Warren Christopher almost consistently expressed less concern with the nuclear threats by N. Korea, and optimism about the possibilities of fruitful negotiation with N. Korea. The first political meeting between the U.S. and N. Korea held in New York in June 1993 already signals doves' victory, which finally continued from New York to Geneva mainly due to the following reasons: first, the Clinton Administration's policy orientation is far closer to liberal jnternationalism than conservative realist one. The Clinton Administration is, in a sense, an atavistic successor to the Carter Administration, which intially experimented human-right (liberal) foreign policies. second, China appeared implicitly reluctant to join the U.N. sanction against N. Korea. third, while carefully exploiting the N Korean nuclear issue as an opportunity to justify her move toward greater military and political role in Asia-Pacific region, Japan feared potentially inimical effects to her security and economy which might result from a real confrontation on the Korean peninsula. fourth, Russia made a public statement, when the U.S. moved to propose a U.N. resolution to sanction against N. Korea, that she does not believe N. Korea has developed any nuclear weapon. It is no exaggeration to say that many of the S. Koreans are fearful of the American way of dealing, hitherto, with N. Korea in her efforts to prevent N. Korea from developing a nuclear arsenal, regardless of the heavy financial burden the Geneva accord imposes upon the S. Koreans. First of all, N. Korea's nuclear capability developed in the past is by no means clearly disclosed. The U.S. speaks one thing, but IAEA quite another with regard to the possibility to freeze N. Korea's nuclear program. The optimism expounded by the relevant U.S. officials omits the concrete way of how to arrive at the final goal. In retrospect, South-North Korean Joint Agreement To Keep the Peninsula De-Nuclearized (S-N Korean Agreement) had already been violated far before it was given birth. N. Korea recognized before the IAEA inspection team that she had reprocessed a small amount of plutonium. It also seems cleat that N. Korea, from the outset, had no intention to observe this Agreement which prescribed 'mutual inspection' between the two Koreas in order to confirm each other's transparency. It is nowhere necessary for N. Korea to inspect S. Korea because S. Korea has been strictly under the U.S. surveillance for that purpose. Therefore, S-N Korean Agreement is a scrap of paper to N. Korea, while it is a heavy burden to S. Korea. Now, N. Korea seems to aim at replacing the armistice agreement concluded in July 1953 with a new peace treaty with the U.S. following a diplomatic victory against the U.S. and S. Korea. N. Korea repeatedly refuses S-N Korean dialogue which was a precondition of every political negotiation the U.S. had with N. Korea, and even that of the Geneva accord. Meanwhile, a fruitful result was brought about at Geneva without any S-N Korean dialogue. This means that N. Korea has nothing to fear of S. Korea's military power which has been too heavily dependent upon the U.S. Therefore, now it is a proper time for the S. Korean leadership of civilian control to seek a way which will eventually force N. Korea to propose a dialogue from her own necessity. Unless S. Korea's strong self-defense system more or less independent of the American prowess is well organized, N. Korea always looks for Washington, never for Seoul.