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( Ronald D. Fischer ),( Leonard J. Mirman ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 1994 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.9 No.2
We study the effects of uncertainty about the intensity of enforcement of antidumping regulations. The desire to avoid penalties alters the foreign firm`s behavior. In the first period of a two period model, domestic and foreign firms have common beliefs that the government is a strong enforcer of antidumping regulations. After observing whether a penalty has occurred, firms update their subjective probabilities and adjust their behavior. In the first period firms act strategically to manipulate the information received by the foreign firm. The effect of this information on the choice variables depends on second order properties of the second period value junction.
Learning about Enforcement : A Model of Dumping
Fischer, Ronald D.,Mirman, Leonard J. 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1994 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.9 No.2
We study the effects of uncertainty about the intensity of enforcement of antidumping regulation. The desire to avoid penalties alters the foreign firm's behavior. In the first period of a two period model. domestic and foreign firms have common beliefs that the government is a strong enforcer of antidumping regulations. After observing whether a penalty has occurred, firms update their subjective probabilities and adjust their behavior. In the first period firms act strategically to manipulate the information received by the foreign firm. The effect of this information on the choice variables depends on second order properties of the second period value function.
Ethier, Wilfred J.,Fischer, Ronald D. 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1987 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.2 No.2
THE NEW PROTECTIONISM demands a new theory of protection. The traditional theory of protection is preoccupied with the consequences of a once-and-for-all change in the general level of protection in a competitive environment. More recent work focuses upon the consequences of such once-and-for-all changes in imperfectly competitive environments. Neither comes to grips with prominent features of contemporary experience. As a result a new theory is beginning to emerge. This paper discusses the distinctive properties of the new protectionism and contrasts these with the central concerns of the traditional theory of tariffs and of the newer imperfectly competitive theories. A sketch of a theory of antidumping laws provides an illustration.