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RISS 인기검색어
- 검색키워드
- 저자 : ( Howard J. Wall ) (검색결과 5 건)
- 무료
- 기관 내 무료
- 유료
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EFFICIENT QUALITY SPECIALIZATION AND TARIFFS IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM
WALL, HOWARD J. 한국국제경제학회 1990 International Economic Journal Vol.4 No.4
This paper examines the effect of a tariff which is uniformly applied to a set of quality-differentiated goods. A Ricardian model of two countries in general equilibrium is developed to describe the pattern of specialization in quality ranges. The free trade ease is contrasted with the case where an import tariff is levied uniformly on all qualities. It is shown that such a tariff can expand or contract a country's range of specialization in the quality-differentiated good while unambiguously contracting its range of specialization in non-differentiated goods.
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The Non-Equivalence of Specific and Ad Valorem Tariffs with Quality-Differentiated Goods
( Howard J. Wall ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 1994 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.9 No.1
This paper is an extension of the literature inaugurated by Falvey that examines the effects of tariffs when the affected goods are quality-differentiated. I demonstrate that an ad valorem tariff may actually increase the sales and market shares of some imported qualities, and that the protection offered to the domestic industry may not be spread among all domestically produced qualities. A specific tariff also does not distribute the burden and benefits to all firms in the market. Only those qualities that are closest substitutes for imports will be affected. For either type of tariff, the total sales in the market contract only if the lowest quality is imported.
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The Non-Equivalence of Specific and ad Valorem Tariffs with Quality-Differentiated Goods
Wall, Howard J. 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1994 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.9 No.1
This paper is an extension of the literature inaugurated by Falvey that examinse the effects of tariffs when the affected goods are quality-differentiated. I demonstrate that an ad valorem tariff may actually increase the sales and market shares of some imported qualities, and that the protection offered to the domestic industry may not be spread among all domestically produced qualities. A specific tariff also does not distribute the burden and benefits to all firms in the market. Only those qualities that are closest substitutes for imports will be affected. For either type of tariff, the total sales in the market contract only if the lowest quality is imported.
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Intertemporal Opimization under Threat of VER
Hariharan, Govind,Wall, Howard J. 세종대학교 국제경제연구소 1992 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.7 No.1
The imposition of a commercial policy does not generally come as a complete surprise to the affected parties. Exporting firms have some information about the political climate in their export markets, and thus, can assess the probability of a trade restraint being imposed. In the case of aquantity restriction, it is likely that the volume of trade allowed after the restraint is positively related to the volume of trade before the restraint. Thus, firms have an incentive to increase current production so that the losses they would incur in the event of a restriction are decreased. Such an incentive is referred to in the literature as the 'Yano effect'. This paper used an imperfectly competitive model to develop a different and more direct channel for the Yano effect and to determine its impact on intertemporal welfare.
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Articles : Intertemporal Optimization under Threat of VER
( Govind Hariharan ),( Howard J. Wall ) 세종대학교 경제통합연구소 1992 Journal of Economic Integration Vol.7 No.1
The imposition of a commercial policy does not generally come as a complete surprise to the affected parties. Exporting firms have some information about the political climate in their export markets, and thus, can assess the probability of a trade restraint being imposed. In the case of a quantity restriction, it is likely that the volume of trade allowed after the restraint is positively related to the volume of trade before the restraint. Thus, firms have an incentive to increase current production so that the losses they would incur in the event of a restriction are decreased. Such an incentive is referred to in the literature as the ``Yano effect``. This paper uses an imperfectly competitive model to develop a different and more direct channel for the Yano effect and to determine its impact on intertemporal welfare.
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