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Safeguards Proposal for Milling Facilities Based on Nuclear Isotopic Ratios in Mill Tailings
Dan Woo Ko,Seung Min Woo 한국방사성폐기물학회 2023 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.21 No.1
Milling facilities, which belong to the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle, are essential steps for utilizing uranium in nuclear power generation. These milling facilities currently provide the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) with the location and annual production capacity of the facility through the Additional Protocol (AP, INFCIRC/540) and grant IAEA inspectors on-site sampling authority to apply safeguards to the facility. However, since milling facilities process a large amount of nuclear material and the product uranium ore concentrate (UOC) is bulk material, the absence of accounting for the facility could pose a potential risk of nuclear proliferation. Therefore, this study proposes technical approach that can be utilized for safeguards in milling facilities. Since the half-life of uranium isotopes is much longer than that of its daughter, they reach the secular equilibrium condition. However, after milling process, the fresh tailing showed the break of that secular equilibrium. As time goes on, they newly reach another secular equilibrium condition. Based on this observation, this study discussed the feasibility of the ratio method in safeguards purpose. The scenario applied in this study was 1% of uranium mill tailing. It was observed that the U-238/Th-234 and U- 238/Pa-234m ratios in fresh milling tails varied as a function of time after discharging, particularly during the first one year. This change can be worked as a significant signature in terms of safeguards. In conclusion, the ratio method in mill tails could be applicable for safeguards of nuclear milling facility.
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Seung-hyo Yang 한국방사성폐기물학회 2022 한국방사성폐기물학회 학술논문요약집 Vol.20 No.2
When exporting nuclear power plants to a third country, the U.S. conditions import countries to join the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Additional Protocol. At the Korea-U.S. summit, Korea also agreed to maintain equal non-proliferation standards. This paper first analyzes how the U.S. applies the conditions for joining additional protocols to export control policies. The U.S. Atomic Energy Act is a general law in the field of nuclear power that governs both civilian and military use of nuclear power. Article 123 stipulates matters related to “cooperation with other countries.” According to Article 123, the United States must conclude a peaceful nuclear cooperation agreement with another country that stipulates nuclear non-proliferation obligations for nuclear cooperation to a “significant” extent. Article 123 of the Nuclear Energy Act presents nine conditions for signing the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, and matters related to safeguards are stipulated in Nos. 1 and 2, and only IAEA’s Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) is specified as requirements under the current law. As a result of analyzing the countries of the nuclear cooperation agreements currently signed by the United States, the United States is evaluating the AP in terms of the policy as an essential item. Among the nuclear agreements with the United States, three countries, Egypt, Brazil, and Argentina do not have AP in effect. Among them, Brazil and Argentina are recognized by the IAEA as replacing the ABACC with the AP, so only Egypt is not a member of the AP. The nuclear agreement between the U.S. and Egypt was signed in 1981 before the AP existed, and all recently signed agreements were identified as AP-effective countries. As a result of reviewing the U.S. export control laws, the U.S. did not legislate the AP as a condition for peaceful nuclear exports. Reflecting the NSG export control guidelines, AP was legislated as an export license requirement only in exporting sensitive nuclear technology (enrichment, reprocessing). However, it is confirmed that the U.S. policy applies AP entry into force as one of the main requirements for determining whether it is harmful to nuclear exports, along with the conclusion of the Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, the application of the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, and military alliance. The appropriate scope of application of the Additional Protocol in Korea and its application plan will be suggested through future research.
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임상시험에서 취약성(vulnerability) 판단 기준 재정립과 임상시험심사위원회의 역할
배현아 ( Hyun A Bae ) 한국의료윤리학회 2011 한국의료윤리학회지 Vol.14 No.1
Vulnerability typically has been understood in terms of the ability to give or withhold informed consent and the likelihood of being misled, mistreated, or otherwise taken advantage of in research. The re-conceptualization of vulnerability from something that emerges primarily from membership in a specific population to a reality that emerges from characteristics of persons or the environment in which research is conducted also can inform IRB(Institutional Review Board)s` interpretation and application of the regulations and guidelines on clinical trials. Vulnerability should be evaluated by IRBs, which have the responsibility of identifying those persons who may require additional protections. This article argues that the widespread and inconsistent use of the concept of vulnerability in Korea has hindered the development of substantive ethical guidance and concrete regulations. It is argued, furthermore, that in order to protect patient welfare and justice, the category of vulnerability should be specified at the time at which a subject consents to participate in medical research.
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