When the IMF foreign exchange crisis occurred in 1997, the Korean government promoted restructuring of the financial industry by raising large-scale public funds. In this process, insolvent banks were liquidated through various methods such as purchas...
When the IMF foreign exchange crisis occurred in 1997, the Korean government promoted restructuring of the financial industry by raising large-scale public funds. In this process, insolvent banks were liquidated through various methods such as purchase and assumption (P&A), capital injection, and purchase of non-performing loans. The restructuring funds invested at this time were raised through bonds issued by the Korea Deposit Insurance Corporation, etc. with the consent of the National Assembly, which ultimately resulted in the burden of taxpayers. Therefore, minimizing the social and economic costs brought about by bank insolvency is the main task of supervisory authorities and resolution authorities. Based on this premise, this study uses various methodologies to estimate the size of the initial resolution cost for resolving financial insolvency that may occur under an extreme crisis scenario, and aims to derive policy implications in responding to financial insolvency. In addition, in preparation for consensual unification based on mutual cooperation between North and South Korea from a long-term perspective, a plan to establish a financial insolvency resolution system in North Korea after unification was proposed to minimize unification costs that may arise due to insolvency of North Korean commercial banks. The summary contents of each detailed paper by topic are as follows.
The first chapter measured the initial resolution costs to liquidate an insolvent bank under an extreme financial crisis scenario based on a stress test methodology. To this end, the possibility of worsening capital adequacy of banks under historical scenarios such as the IMF financial crisis was predicted using quantitative methods. In addition, the initial resolution costs required to normalize the management of banks that do not meet supervisory standards were estimated. As a result of the analysis, under extreme scenarios such as the IMF financial crisis, the BIS capital ratio, an indicator of capital adequacy, fell below 8% for some banks, and the initial resolution cost that had to be provided to the banking industry to normalize this was up to 0.4 trillion won. If the insolvency standard was raised to the BIS capital ratio of 10%, the cost increased to 3.9 trillion won. However, self-rescue efforts for insolvent banks must be made prior to investing such resolution costs, and if these efforts fail, it is desirable for the financial authorities to intervene at the end. Meanwhile, if the industry subject to analysis is expanded to include non-banking sectors, the amount of resolution costs required is expected to increase further. Therefore, financial authorities should strengthen proactive monitoring of the soundness of financial companies through periodic implementation of stress tests based on scenarios, and advance the financial system by institutionalizing this to prevent financial company insolvency in advance. In addition, it is necessary to increase the trust of financial consumers and market participants in the financial safety net by sufficiently expanding the resolution fund in preparation for emergencies.
The second chapter constructed a BIS capital ratio prediction model by using capital adequacy data, which is used as a standard for bank supervision, and major financial data that are highly correlated with it. Through simulation techniques, we estimated the probability that this indicator, estimated by the prediction model, would fall short of the regulatory standards of the supervisory authority. Predicting insolvency through simulation techniques makes it easy to change the definition of insolvency depending on the situation, and can be used to confirm the timing of initial insolvency and tail-risk based on the change trends in bank financial and management data rather than scenarios. As a result of the analysis, two banks were identified whose BIS capital ratio fell below 10.5% (11.5% for systemically important banks (D-SIBs)), and the cumulative default probability from the 1st quarter of 2023 to the 4th quarter of 2024 was from 0.01% to 0.05%. The amount of resolution costs required to raise the BIS capital ratio of the two predicted banks to the regulatory level was calculated to be KRW 81.1 billion and KRW 171.1 billion, respectively. Meanwhile, as a result of estimating the simulation distribution of the BIS capital ratio under a stress situation, the distribution appeared to shift to the left during a crisis, and the BIS capital ratio fell below the regulatory level in 7 banks. The cumulative default probability of the 7 banks ranged from a highest of 0.71% to a lowest of 0.01%, and the default probabilities of the two banks (bank 7 and bank 12) whose default probability was above 0 even in normal times were increased 0.66%p and 0.11% respectively. The total initial resolution cost was expected to be around 1.5 trillion won, which is six times of the estimated normalization cost of 252.2 billion won in normal time. When a bank becomes insolvent, government support is inevitable to normalize it. In particular, if an extreme systemic risk such as an IMF financial crisis or a global financial crisis occurs, the amount of government support is likely to expand to an astronomical scale. In order to prevent such situations and minimize government support, it is important to identify and prevent bank risk factors in advance. To this end, financial authorities and resolution authorities need to improve their risk analysis capabilities through quantitative reviews such as stress tests and insolvency simulations. There is a need to develop a contingency plan that can respond to financial insolvency in a timely manner, and to sufficiently accumulate insolvency resolution funds, such as the deposit insurance fund, in advance.
The third chapter discusses the treatment of non-performing loans in North Korean commercial banks that have been operated under state control in preparation for the unification of North and South Korea and the establishment of a system for efficient liquidation of these banks. Cooperation between South and North Korea has recently stalled due to changes in the international situation surrounding the Korean Peninsula and the North Korean nuclear issue. However, if the conditions for inter-Korean cooperation improve in the future, such as easing tensions between North and South Korea and stabilizing the situation in neighboring countries, discussions on unification of the Korean Peninsula will begin in earnest. Reviewing measures to integrate and stabilize the financial systems of North and South Korea is in line with measures to minimize unification costs that must be invested in the process of North-South unification. Accordingly, this study examines the problems in handling old debt claims of East German banks during the German unification process and the experience of handling non-performing loans of state-owned commercial banks in transition countries such as China and Vietnam. In addition, the method of resolving insolvent financial institutions in the United States and Japan, which was institutionalized in Korea, was also reviewed. During the unification process of North and South Korea, non-performing loans held by North Korean banks are handled using specialized non-performing loan processing organizations operated in countries in transition, such as China and Vietnam, and in Korea. At this time, it is necessary to prevent problems such as the non-performing loan acquisition agency pursuing excessive profits. In addition, for the insolvent bank resolution system, it is desirable to temporarily separate the financial systems of North and South Korea and gradually establish Korea's current system as part of building a financial infrastructure.