Personnel economics

목차 (Table of Contents)

• [volume. vol.1]----------
• CONTENTS
• Acknowledgements = ix
• Introduction / Edward P. Lazear ; Robert McNabb = xi
• PARTⅠ THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS
• A Basics
• 1. Gary S. Becker(1962), 'Investment in Human Capital : A Theoretical Analysis', Journal of Political Economy, 70(5, Part2), October, 9-49 = 5
• 2. Stephen A. Ross(1973), 'The Economic Theory of Agency : The Principal's Problem', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 63(2), May, 134-9 = 46
• 3. Joseph E. Stiglitz(1975), 'Incentives, Risk, and Information : Notes Towards a Theory of Hierarchy', Bell Journal of Economics, 6(2), Autumn, 552-79 = 52
• 4. Edward P. Lazear(1979), 'Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?', Journal of Political Economy, 87(6), 1261-84 = 80
• 5. Bengt Holmstrm(1979), 'Moral Hazard and Observability', Bell Journal of Economics, 10(1), Spring, 74-91 = 104
• 6. Eugene F. Fama(1980), 'Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm', Journal of Political Economy, 88(2), April, 288-307 = 122
• 7. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower(1986), 'Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations', American Economic Review, Papers and Proceedings, 76(2), May, 235-9 = 142
• B Tournaments
• 8. Edward P. Lazear and Sherwin Rosen(1981), 'Rank-Order Tournaments as Optimum Labor Contracts', Journal of Political Economy, 89(5), October, 841-64 = 149
• 9. Sherwin Rosen(1986), 'Prizes and Incentives in Elimination Tournaments', America Economic Review, 76(4), September, 701-15 = 173
• 10. Edward P. Lazear(1989), 'Pay Equality and Industrial Politics', Journal of Political Economy, 97(3), 561-80 = 188
• C Measurement
• 11. Edward P. Lazear(1986), 'Salaries and Piece Rates', Journal of Business, 59(3), July, 405-31 = 211
• 12. George P. Baker(1992), 'Incentive Contracts and Performance Measurement', Journal of Political Economy, 100(3), June, 598-614 = 238
• 13. Margaret A. Meyer(1994), 'The Dynamics of Learing with Team Production : Implications for Task Assignment', Quartely Journal of Economics, CIX, November, 1157-84 = 255
• PARTⅡ THEORETICAL ISSUES : PUZZLES, ANALYSIS AND ANSWERS
• 14. H. Lorne Carmichael(1988), 'Incentives in Academics : Why Is There Tenure?', Journal of Poitical Economy, 96(3), June, 453-72 = 285
• 15. Charles Kahn and Gur Huberman(1988), 'Two-sided Uncertainty and "Up-or-Out" Contracts', Journal of Labor Economics, 6 (4), October, 423-44 = 305
• 16. Eugene Kandel and Edward P. Lazear(1992), 'Peer Pressure and Partnerships', Journal of Political Economy, 100(4), August, 801-17 = 327
• 17. Canice J. Prendergast(1995), 'A Theory of Responsibility in Organizations', Journal of Labor Economics, 13(3), July, 387-400 = 344
• 18. Sherwin Rosen(1992), 'The Military as an Internal Labor Market : Some Allocation, Productivity, and Incentive Problems', Social Science Quarterly, 73(2), June, 227-37 = 358
• PARTⅢ THE JOB
• 19. Edward P. Lazear(1992), 'The Job as a Concept', in William J. Bruns, Jr. (ed), Performance Measurement, Evaluation, and Incentives, Chapter 7, Boston, MA : Harvard Business School Press, 183-215 = 371
• 20. George Baker, Michael Gibbs and Bengt Holmstrom(1994), 'The Internal Economics of the Firm : Evidence from Personnel Data', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CIX, November, 881-919 = 404
• 21. Michael L. Wachter and Randall D. Wright(1990), 'The Economics of Internal Labor Markets', Industrial Relations, 29(2), Spring, 240-62 = 443
• 22. Robert Gibbons and Michael Waldman(1999), 'A Theory of Wage and Promotion Dynamics Inside Firms', Quarterly Journal of Economics, CXIV(4), November, 1321-58 = 468
• 23. Oliver E. Williamson, Michael L. Wachter and Jeffrey E. Harris(1975), 'Understanding the Employment Relation : the Analysis of Idiosyncratic Exchange', Bell Journal of Economics, 6(1), Spring, 250-78 = 506
• PARTⅣ PERSONNEL STRATEGY
• 24. Casey Ichniowski, Kathryn Shaw and Giovanna Prennushi(1997), 'The Effects of Human Resource Management Practices on Productivity : A Study of Steel Finishing Lines', American Economic Review, 87(3), June, 291-313 = 537
• 25. Richard B. Freeman and Edward P. Lazear(1995), 'An Economic Analysis of Works Councils', in Joel Rogers and Wolfgang Streeck(eds), Works Councils : Consultation, Representation, and Cooperation in Industrial Relations, Chapter 2, Chicago and London : University of Chicago Press, 27-50 = 560
• 26. Julio J. Rotemberg(1994), 'Human Relations in the Workplace', Journal of Political Economy, 102(4), August, 684-717 = 584
• 27. Raaj Kumar Sah and Joseph E. Stiglitz(1986), 'The Architecture of Economic Systems : Hierarchies and Polyarchies', American Economic Review, 76(4), September, 716-27 = 618
• 28. Rene M. Landers, James B. Rebitzer and Lowell J. Taylor(1996), 'Rat Race Redux : Adverse Selection in the Determination of Work Hours in Law Firms', American Economic Review, 86(3), June 329-48 = 630
• Name Index = 651
• [volume. vol.2]----------
• CONTENTS
• Acknowledgements = vii
• An Introduction by the editors to both volumes appears in Volume Ⅰ
• PARTⅠ PIECE RATE PAY
• 1. Edward P. Lazear(2000), 'Performance Pay and Productivity', American Economic Review, 90(5), December, 1346-61 = 3
• 2. Beth J. Asch(1990), 'Do Incentives Matter? The Case of Navy Recruiters', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, Special Issue, February, 89S-106S = 19
• 3. Sue Fernie and David Metcalf(1999), 'It's Not What You Pay it's the Way that You Pay it and that's What Gets Results : Jockey's Pay and Performance', Labour, 13(2), June, 385-411 = 37
• 4. Charles Brown(1990), 'Firms' Choice of Method of Pay', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, Special Issue, February, 165S-182S = 64
• PARTⅡ PROFIT SHARING AND TOURNAMENT PAY STRUCTURES, OTHER INCENTIVE SCHEMES
• 5. Robert Drago and Gerald T. Garvey(1998), 'Incentives for Helping on the Job : Theory and Evidence', Journal of Labor Economics, 16(1), January, 1-25 = 85
• 6. Tor Eriksson(1999), 'Executive Compensation and Tournament Theory : Emprical Tests on Danish Data', Journal of Labor Economics, 17(2), April, 262-80 = 110
• 7. Charles R. Knoeber and Walter N. Thurman(1994), 'Testing the Theory of Tournaments : An Empirical Analysis of Broiler Production', Journal of Labor Economics, 12(2), April, 155-79 = 129
• 8. Daniel M.G. Raff and Lawrence H. Summers(1987), 'Did Henry Ford Pay Efficiency Wages?', Journal of Labor Economics, 5(4, Part 2), October, S57-S86 = 154
• 9. Jonathan S. Leonard(1987), 'Carrots and Sticks : Play, Supervision, and Turnover', Journal of Labor Economics, 5(4), Part 2, October, S136-S152 = 184
• 10. David G. Blanchflower and Andrew J. Oswald(1988), 'Profit-Related Pay : Prose Discovered?', Economic Journal, 98(392), September, 720-30 = 201
• 11. Robert McNabb and Keith Whitfield(1998), 'The Impact of Financial Participation and Employee Involvement on Financial Performance', Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 45(2), May, 171-87 = 212
• PARTⅢ EXECUTIVE COMPENSATIONS
• 12. Michael C. Jensen and Kevin J. Murphy(1990), 'Performance Pay and Top-Management Incentives', Journal of Political Economy, 98(2), April, 225-64 = 231
• 13. Robert Gibbons and Kevin J. Murphy(1990), 'Relative Performance Evaluation for Chief Executive Officers', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, Special Issue, February, 30S-51S = 271
• 14. Brian G.M. Main, Alistair Bruce and Trevor Buck(1996), 'Total Board Remuneration and Company Performance', Economic Journal, 106, November, 1627-44 = 293
• 15. Jonathan S. Leonard(1990), 'Executive Pay and Firm Performance', Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 43, Special Issue, February, 13S-29S = 311
• Name Index = 329