Usage-Dependent Information Systems Design : 김진수

국문 초록 (Abstract)

컴퓨터 시스템의 효율적 사용을 위해서는 컴퓨터시스템에서 흔히 발견할 수 있는 사용빈도의 불규칙한 현상(예를 들면 80-20 rule)을 정확하게 모형화(modeling)하여 컴퓨터시스템 설계에 올바르게 적용하여야 한다. 본 연구에서는 이와같은 모형화를 위 하여 Simon-Yule 모델을 이용한 소위 사용빈도처리 모델(Usage process model)을 개발 하였으며 개발된 모델의 타당성및 유용성 검증을 위하여 사용빈도 불규칙(Unevenness) 현상의 대표적 예인 자기구성 순차적 검색 휴리스틱스(Self-Organizing Linear Search Heuristics:SOLSH)의 실행능력 평가에 적용하였다. 분석적, 실험적 결과에 따르면 제 시된 모델의 타당성및 유용성이 기존의 다른 모델에 비해 우수함이 입증되었으며 20여 년에 걸쳐 논란의 대상이었던 SOLSH 상호간의 실행능력 평가에 관한 문제 또한 해결하 였다. 더욱이, 분석적, 실험적 결과에 의해 인공지능의 한분야인 계속적 음성 인식시스 템(Continuous Speech Recognition Systems)을 위한 자기 구성 메카니즘(Self-orgnizi ng mechanism)을 개발하였다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The global nuclear nonproliferation regime (the NPT regime), based on the NPT, the
IAEA, the UN, and the NSG, tends to rely on the supply-side strategic options such as export controls, diversion controls, and punitive sanctions. However, in spite of its remarkable achievements, the NPT regime reveals its limitations in halting nuclear proliferation. In this situation, the demand-side strategy, based on the strategic bargaining for reducing the aspirations of a proliferator for nuclear weapons, emerges as an alternative to nuclear nonproliferation, The North Korean case of nuclear proliferation (from mid 199 1 to December 1995) is an exemplary one which showed the potential of the demand-side strategy. As the NPT regime failed to fully dissuade North Korea from going nuclear, the U.S. and South Korea stroke several bargaining deals with North Korea in order to denuclearize the Korean
Peninsula. North Korea tried to protect or promote its national interests by using its nuclear proliferation option as bargaining leverage. Meanwhile, the U.S. and South Korea adopted diverse strategic options which could affect the incentives and disincentives of North Korea for nuclear weapons.
North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. as bargaining parties faced a variety of
uncertainties which they had to cope with in order to enhance the procedural or
substantive rationality of their strategic choices. In the strategic bargaining to resolve the North Korean nuclear dispute, the patterns of uncertainty management (uncertainty ignoring, uncertainty reduction, uncertainty accommodation, and uncertainty overlooking) influenced the strategic choices of North Korea, South Korea, and the U. S.(conceding strategy, demanding strategy, and compromising strategy). Moreover, the patterns of uncertainty management also affected the bargaining outputs (conflict, cooperation, and capitulation) by influencing the combination of strategic choices of bargaining parties. Uncertainty as a critical variable had a significant impact on the dynamicity of the strategic nuclear bargaining.
This research has significance in three dimensions. In theoretical terms, this research contributes to developing the managerial approach to uncertainty which is newly emerging because of the limitations of the analytic approach to uncertainty. In practical terms, this research helps the understanding of the nuclear incentives, bargaining strategies, and bargaining tactics of North Korea as a nuclear proliferator. In policy terms, this research shows the weaknesses of the supply-side options of the NPT regime, especially the IAEA nuclear inspections and the UN sanctions. Meanwhile, this research reveals the limitations and potential of the demand-side strategic options which can be selected within or beyond the NPT regime.
Index Words: Analytic approach, Conflict, Cooperation, Diversion controls,
Export controls, IAEA, Managerial approach, NPT, NPT regime, North Korea, Nuclear Incentives, Nuclear nonproliferation, Nuclear proliferation, Punitive sanctions, Strategic choice, Supply-side strategy, UN, UN Sanctions, Uncertainty, Uncertainty management,