Do citizens effectively punish responsible incumbents, after their communities experience catastrophic violent events? The literature on retrospective voting suggests mixed answers to this question. This article investigates the role that floods, as a...
Do citizens effectively punish responsible incumbents, after their communities experience catastrophic violent events? The literature on retrospective voting suggests mixed answers to this question. This article investigates the role that floods, as a form of periodical exogenous shock, play in shaping voting decisions. We construct a dataset using county-level data from 2000 to 2020 and use the two-way fixed effects model to analyze the relationship between flood damages and electoral support for incumbents in Korean presidential elections(2002-2017). Presidents are not responsible for floods in Korea. We show that voters punish the incumbent for flood damages and that the Conservative incumbent experiences more remarkable punishment. Even citizens vulnerable to flood risk failed to punish the person in charge, thereby causing flood defense budget losses. Our results provide more sophisticated evidence about natural disasters and consequent blind retrospection.