This study examines the effect of tax planning effectiveness (TPE) on future firm performance. Prior research measuring TPE using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) often relies on rank-transformed variables, which can lead to a loss of information from ...
This study examines the effect of tax planning effectiveness (TPE) on future firm performance. Prior research measuring TPE using Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) often relies on rank-transformed variables, which can lead to a loss of information from the original data. To address this limitation, this study proposes a new TPE measure(TPEN) based on a normalization transformation and compares its utility against the rank-based measure(TPER). I further investigate the impact of TPE, non-tax costs, and corporate governance on future after-tax earnings.
Using a sample of 10,066 firm-year observations from non-financial firms listed on the Korean stock market from 2011 to 2024, I conduct multiple regression analyses. The main empirical findings are as follows. First, my proposed measure, TPEN, consistently shows higher explanatory power for future earnings than TPER. Second, I find that TPE is positively associated with future after-tax earnings, and this positive relationship is strengthened for firms with low cash effective tax rates. Third, non-tax costs are negatively associated with future after-tax earnings. Finally, the moderating effect of corporate governance is complex: low controlling shareholder ownership exacerbates the negative impact of non-tax costs, while high foreign ownership shows no significant moderating effect.
This study contributes to the literature in two main ways. Methodologically, I provide and validate an alternative DEA-based TPE measure that mitigates information loss. Theoretically, I offer a nuanced perspective on the role of corporate governance. By showing that the effect of low controlling shareholder ownership is negative when performance is measured by accounting-based earnings contrary to prior research using market-based measures (i.e., Tobin's Q)—I demonstrate that the implications of agency theory can differ depending on the performance metric, suggesting a divergence between market perceptions of governance and its impact on actual operational outcomes.