감사인에 대한 감리 제재가 감사인의 감사품질에 미치는 영향

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구에서는 우리나라의 회계감독 제도인 감사보고서 감리와 관련하여 감사인에 대해 부과하는 제재가 감사인의 전반적인 감사품질에 미치는 영향을 분석하였다. 2012년부터 2019년까지 한국거래소 유가증권 및 코스닥 시장에 상장된 12,004개 기업/연도를 대상으로 한 실증분석 결과 감리 제재는 Non-Big 4 감사인의 감사품질 개선에 유의한 영향을 미치는 것으로 나타났다. Big 4 감사인에 대해서는 제재가 감사품질에 영향을 미치지 않았으나, 신규 감사업무 금지와 같은 높은 수위의 제재를 받은 경우에는 Big 4 감사인도 감사품질이 유의하게 개선되었다. 본 연구는 감사인에 대한 감리 제재가 감사인의 전반적인 감사품질에 미치는 영향을 국내에서 최초로 분석하였다는 점에서 학문적인 공헌점이 있다. 또한, 감사인의 규모에 따라 제재의 영향이 차별적으로 발생하는 것을 나타낸 실증분석 결과는 감리의 실효성 제고를 위한 제재 수준과 감사인의 품질관리 개선에 대한 정책적인 시사점을 제공할 것으로 기대된다.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• 목 차
• Ⅰ. 서 론 ·························································································1
• Ⅱ. 제도적 배경과 연구 가설 ·····························································4
• 2.1 우리나라의 감리제도 ·································································4
• 2.2 선행연구 및 연구 가설 ·······························································6
• Ⅲ. 연구방법론 ·············································································14
• 3.1 관심변수의 측정 ·····································································14
• 3.2 감리 제재와 감사품질 실증모형 ················································15
• 3.3 감리 제재와 감사시간 실증모형 ················································19
• 3.4 표본설정 ················································································21
• Ⅳ. 실증분석 결과 ·········································································23
• 4.1 기술통계량 및 상관관계 분석 ···················································23
• 4.2 다중 회귀분석 결과 ·································································28
• 4.2.1 감리 제재가 감사품질에 미치는 영향 ·····································28
• 4.2.2 감리 제재가 감사시간에 미치는 영향 ·····································34
• 4.3 추가분석 ················································································38
• Ⅴ. 결 론 ·······················································································41
• Ⅵ. 부 록 ·······················································································42
• Ⅶ. 참고문헌 ··················································································43