South Korea's sunshine policy, 1998-2002 : domestic imperatives and private interests

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The end of the Cold War has brought both uncertainty and opportunity for states interested in designing their own security policies. Alternative methods, other than military solutions, should be exploited to prevent insecurity and instability.
This study is concerned with South Korea's security approach towards North Korea in the post-Cold War era and in particular how South Korea can use non-military tools to prevent military conflict in the Korean Peninsula and to build mutual confidence between the two Koreas in the long-run. This thesis also presents an analysis of both the need and the opportunity for South Korea to adopt a comprehensive economic engagement strategy towards North Korea in the post-Cold War era in order to achieve these goals.
It argues that South Korea's implementation of economic engagement with North Korea requires its policy-makers' strong policy-making will for an active and consistent engagement posture. Then, this study demonstrates the important role of President Kim Dae-jung's strong causal beliefs about the necessity of engagement measures to address the post-Cold War North Korean security problems on the Kim Dae-Jung government's policy-making in favour of comprehensive engagement with North Korea.
This study presents the model of 'business-track diplomacy' to test a state's utilisation of economic engagement strategy as security policy. This model provides ways to think around security issues and alternative security options which go beyond the traditional military containment approach to security in international relations (IR). Moreover, this study presents a new belief perspective that illuminates the South Korea's North Korea policy-making process, which had previously been dominated by military issues and essentially required an international structure perspective, centred on US influence. Thus, the belief approach contributes to the field of foreign policy analysis (FPA) for South Korea by proving the importance of its decision-makers' policy beliefs and by going beyond the conventional international structure approach.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Introduction = I
• 1. The theoretical framework:Beliefs and economic engagement policy = 12
• 1.1 Global security conceptions = 13
• 1.1.i Political realism and the Cold War era = 13
• 1.1.ii International security agenda after the Cold War = 15
• 1.1.ii.a Domestic instability and the limitations of military power = 15
• 1.1.ii.b Economic engagement as an alternative security approach = 18
• 1.2 Economic interdependence and national security = 20
• 1.2.i Literature review on the relationships between economic interdependence and national security = 20
• 1.2.ii Types of economic security policy = 24
• 1.3 Business-track diplomacy = 28
• 1.3.i Prerequisites of business-track diplomacy = 31
• 1.3.i.a Economic capability = 31
• 1.3.i.b Policy-making will = 32
• 1.3.ii Policy-making will and foreign policy analysis (FPA) = 34
• 1.4 Theoretical approaches in FPA = 35
• 1.4.i International system approach = 35
• 1.4.ii Domestic level approaches = 36
• 1.5 Defining the beliefs approach = 40
• 1.5.i Basic assumptions of the beliefs approach = 41
• 1.5.ii Three types of impact of beliefs on foreign policy = 43
• 1.5.ii.a Beliefs as road-maps = 44
• 1.5.ii.b Beliefs as information screens = 45
• 1.5.ii.c Beliefs as decision-making rules = 49
• 1.5.iii Shortcomings and methodological concerns of the beliefs approach = 50
• 1.6 Methodological framework on South Korean policy-making towards North Korea:International system approach towards a synthetic approach = 53
• Conclusion = 57
• 2. Conceptualising the North Korean security problems in the 1990s = 59
• 2.1 Military security policy of the Korean Peninsula during the Cold War era = 60
• 2.1.i Division of Korea = 60
• 2.1.ii The security environment of Korean Peninsula in the Cold War period = 61
• 2.1.ii.a International security structure = 62
• 2.1.ii.b Inter-Korean competition during the Cold War = 66
• 2.1.ii.c. The impact of military security on the domestic politics of the two Koreas = 68
• 2.2 Military tensions on the Korean Peninsula in the post-Cold War period = 72
• 2.2.i Nuclear crisis = 72
• 2.2.ii Continued military tensions and instability on the Korean Peninsula = 79
• 2.3 The causes of military crises:North Korea's total insecurity in the 1990s = 81
• 2.3.i North Korea's loss of major allies = 81
• 2.3.ii North Korea's economic insecurity = 85
• 2.3.ii.a Food sector = 85
• 2.3.ii.b Energy sector = 88
• 2.3.ii.c Trade sector = 90
• 2.3.iii North Korea's survival strategies = 94
• 2.3.iii.a Pyongyang's 'southern' and tongmibongnam policy = 94
• 2.3.iii.b Pyongyang's military provocation and brinkmanship = 99
• 2.3.iv North Korea's economic insecurity:vulnerability and opportunity = 102
• 2.4 Post-Cold War South Korean security and North Korea = 104
• 2.4.i North Korean threats = 105
• 2.4.i.a South Korea and military threat = 105
• 2.4.i.b South Korea and political and social threats = 107
• 2.4.ii Security strategy = 112
• Conclusion = 114
• 3. South Korean policy change:Consistent engagement with North Korea under the Kim Dae-jung government = 116
• 3.1 Roh Tae-woo and Kim Young-sam governments' policies towards North Korea = 116
• 3.1.i Recognition of the importance of the economic engagement approach = 116
• 3.1.ii Limited engagement policy:Jeongkyungyeonkae principle = 120
• 3.1.iii Domestic politics:sources of inconsistent economic engagement policy = 126
• 3.2 Active and consistent engagement with North Korea under the Kim Dae-jung government = 132
• 3.2.i Economic cooperation = 132
• 3.2.ii Socio-cultural exchanges = 140
• 3.2.iii Internationalisation of the engagement approach towards North Korea = 144
• Conclusion = 148
• 4. The impact of international and domestic factors on Kim-Dae-jung government's policy shift = 150
• 4.1 External factors = 151
• 4.1.i North Korean factor = 151
• 4.1.i.a Continuation of tongmibongnam policy and military aggressiveness = 151
• 4.1.i.b Signs of North Korea's stability and economic reform = 155
• 4.1.ii US factor = 157
• 4.1.ii.a Soft-landing policy = 157
• 4.1.ii.b Difficulties in execution of the engagement policy towards North Korea = 158
• 4.1.iii Japan factor = 165
• 4.1.iii.a Support for the soft-landing policy = 165
• 4.1.iii.b Japan's immobilism and US-Japan security arrangement = 166
• 4.2 Domestic factors = 171
• 4.2.i Democratisation = 171
• 4.2.ii Financial crisis = 174
• 4.2.iii Ruling party and 'shared government' = 176
• 4.2.iv Opposition party = 178
• 4.2.v Media = 181
• 4.2.vi Business community = 183
• Conclusion = 185
• 5. Impact of President Kim Dae-jung's beliefs on North Korea policy = 188
• 5.1 Origin of Kim Dae Jung's "sunshine policy" = 188
• 5.1.i Kim Dae Jung's "three-stage unification plan" in the Cold War era = 189
• 5.1.ii Recognition of the three-stage unification plan in the 1990s = 193
• 5.1.iii Sunshine policy as a "causal belief' = 195
• 5.1.iii.a Establishing the framework for the sunshine policy = 196
• 5.1.iii.b Use of the term "sunshine policy" and the logic of historical analogy = 198
• 5.2 Kim Dae Jung government's sunshine policy = 202
• 5.2.i Views on North Korea and the international security environment = 202
• 5.2.ii Flexible reciprocity:operational strategies = 209
• 5.3 Control over the decision-making system = 215
• 5.3.i Structure of the National Security Council (NSC) = 215
• 5.3.ii The behaviour of related ministries on North Korea Policy = 218
• Conclusion = 221
• 6. Case study of Hyundai Group's North Korea business:Centred on the Mt. Kumgang project = 223
• 6.1 Mt. Kumgang project before the Kim Dae-Jung government = 224
• 6.2 Actor's will of launching the Mt. Kumgang project = 226
• 6.2.i Hyundai Group and Chairman Chung Ju-young = 227
• 6.2.ii North Korea's business will = 230
• 6.2.iii Kim Dae-Jung government = 233
• 6.3 Impact of Mt. Kumgang tourism on engagement with North Korea = 238
• 6.3.i Enlargement of inter-Korean cooperation = 238
• 6.3.i.a Private sector = 238
• 6.3.i.b Public sector = 242
• 6.3.ii The effect on public support for engagement policy = 244
• 6.3.iii Confidence-building between the two Korean governments = 248
• 6.4 Financial crisis of the Mt. Kumgang project = 251
• 6.4.i Hyundai Group's financial woes and disintegration = 252
• 6.4.ii Profitability of Mt. Kumgang tourism = 255
• 6.4.iii Efforts to save Mt. Kumgang tourism = 257
• 6.4.iii.a Hyundai Asan's requests = 257
• 6.4.iii.b South and North Korean governments' efforts = 260
• 6.5 South Korea's limited economic capability for pursuing business-track diplomacy = 263
• Conclusion = 270
• Conclusion = 272
• Reference list = 287