The purpose of this study is to examine if kantian constructivism after Rawls can be an alternative to moral skepticism. For this I review and compare the three kinds of kantian constructivism which Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Onora O’Neill, and Christine ...
The purpose of this study is to examine if kantian constructivism after Rawls can be an alternative to moral skepticism. For this I review and compare the three kinds of kantian constructivism which Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Onora O’Neill, and Christine M. Korsgaard present as comprehensive moral theories. And I examine if each of them can resolve the dilemmas of constructivism and thereby obtain the objectivity of value in trying to justifying moral value. Furthermore I investigate which position the three kinds of kantian constructivism take on the problem of ontological relevance in trying to obtaining the objectivity of value. This investigation shows how difficult it is to establish constructivism as a comprehensive moral theory. This difficulty arise from the fact that they could not carry out the tasks of constructing normativity while not lapsing into indeterminancy or relativism and of maintaining the objectivity of value while avoiding the ontological relevance. In the face of that difficulty the three kantians attempt to set the limits to constructivism, to weaken the objectivity of value, or to treat the existence of moral value as trivial. It is, however, ineffective in resolving that difficulty.