신 브레튼우즈의 탄생? 1970년대 이후 국제금융의 글로벌 거버넌스: 한계와 전망

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In order to understand the ongoing discussion about the re-regulation of international finance and a possible new Bretton Woods we have to ask at least two questions to history. Why was the first Bretton Woods system abandoned in the early 1970s and why did economic goals diverge internationally in a way that it took nearly 40 years to begin a serious discussion about a follow up framework to BW1? We look post Bretton Woods "non system" from the perspective of the thesis of the trilemma of financial policies.
The trilemma of financial policies means that it is not possible for a country to achieve open capital accounts, fixed exchange rates, as well as sovereign monetary and fiscal policy at the same time. At best, it is possible to achieve two of the three goals of financial policies at the same time. Under the condition of the free flow of capital, which proliferated since the end of BW1 and became the orthodoxy since the 1980s, governments have the choice to stabilize the currency or maintain sovereign fiscal and monetary policies. In the first case, their monetary and fiscal policies merely react to the in and outflow of capital. In the latter case, the government can use monetary and fiscal policies to govern the economy and let the exchange rate adjust to the in and outflow of capital. Different entities have dealt with this challenge in a different way and, thus, chosen different sides of the "trilemma triangle". The US has been the most enthusiastic supporter of free flow of capital while maintaining an autonomous monetary policy to stimulate the domestic economy in case of an economic downturn. On the other hand, the US lets the US Dollar freely float and does not intervene into the currency markets.
The EU countries also opened their capital accounts and even wrote the free flow of capital into the draft of the Lisbon treaty, the surrogate constitution of the EU. Different from the US, the EU established a regional system of fixed exchange rate within the European Union (ERM) in 1979 that led to the introduction of a single currency, the euro, in 1999. Exchange rates have been a major concern of European countries so far while they surrendered an autonomous monetary and fiscal policy. Interestingly, there is a divergence concerning the position in the "trilemma triangle" even within the EU. Britain has followed a US approach and stayed outside the euro zone while continuing to stimulate the economy through interest rates policies and fiscal stimuli when necessary. Japan until today has remained committed to sovereign fiscal and monetary policies while intervening into the foreign exchange market (managed floating) and maintains relatively closed for financial capital from foreigners. Emerging markets like China, India and Korea have leaned either towards the European model or towards the Japanese one.
The trilemma of financial policies has so far been used to explain the limits of national policy decision. In my research, I expand the trilemma theory to the international sphere. The trilemma of the new global governance of international finance consists of the incompatibility between the interests of financialized countries, export oriented, and domestic market oriented countries within the G20. I will show in my research that countries within the G20 take different sides on the "trilemma triangle", which creates conflicting preferences for distinct goals and forms of international cooperation.