Much progress has been made in an effort to improve accounting standards and strengthen the oversight of corporate financial reporting in the years following the 1997 financial crisis. The government decided to introduce the class action lawsuit in th...
Much progress has been made in an effort to improve accounting standards and strengthen the oversight of corporate financial reporting in the years following the 1997 financial crisis. The government decided to introduce the class action lawsuit in the capital market. The class action lawsuit is one of the most effective measures to improve the transparency of corporate accounting, but it may cause many problems due to the low level of reliability of financial reporting for the past periods in Korea.
The Financial Supervisory Commission set the grace period of 2005 and 2006 for companies to revise the fraudulent financial statements of past periods before implementing the Class Action Lawsuit Act in the Capital Market. Many firms voluntarily disclosed fraud and revised financial statements for past periods in the grace period. Investors may be shocked at the voluntary disclosure of fraud. However, they may positively react to the disclosure because it is a signal of improvement in the transparency of the firms. It is an empirical research issue to analyze how the capital market will respond to the voluntary disclosure of past fraud.
This study investigates how the capital market responds to voluntary disclosure of past fraud. Specifically, we examine the reaction of the capital market in the period of the voluntary disclosure. Further, we compare the value relevance of accounting information between fraud firms and other firms.
The results provide that on days 0 and +1 of voluntary disclosure by fraud firms, the capital market negatively responds to the negative cumulated fraudulent amounts even when the unexpected earnings are controlled. The cumulated fraudulent amounts are not associated with annual cumulative abnormal returns and market value in the year of the voluntary disclosure of fraud firms. The results suggest that the capital market negatively responds to the fraud overstating earning in past periods, but it appears shortly after the days of disclosure.
In the analysis on the value relevance of accounting information of fraud firms after voluntary fraud disclosure, the earnings and annual cumulative abnormal returns of fraud firms are not associated even after the voluntary fraud disclosure. In the analysis on the relevance of book value and earnings to the market value, however, the book value of all firms has a positive coefficient, while the earnings variable has a positive coefficient only in other firms. The adjusted determinant coefficients of other firms is found higher than those of voluntary fraud disclosure firms, which shows different relevance of earnings between fraud firms and other firms. The findings suggest that investors are not satisfied with the level of transparency of financial statements of the voluntary fraud disclosure firms even after the voluntary fraud disclosure. An alternate explanation is that the coefficient of earning variable of the voluntary fraud disclosure firms is insignificant because many fraud firms report net loss in the year.
The results suggest that the capital market was affected shortly after the disclosure of fraud and the reliability of the accounting information of the firms did not recover even after disclosing past fraud.