경영자소유지분이 부채만기와 대리인비용에 미치는 영향 = The Effect of Managerial Ownership on Corporate Debt Maturity Structure and Agency Costs

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

This study extends Data et al.’s (2005) study by rigorously examining the relation between managerial stock ownership and corporate debt maturity decisions. Datta et al. (205) reason that as managerial ownership declines, there will be less alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. They also reason that, in this situation, managers choose a smaller proportion of short-term debt since issuing short-term debt leads to frequent monitoring from stakeholders. In their study, Datta et al. (2005) show that the higher the managerial ownership, the larger the proportion of short-term debt. This study hypothesizes that the impact of managerial ownership on corporate debt maturity varies between agent-led and owner- controlled firms. Specifically, we test whether, for agent-led firms, as managerial ownership increases, the alignment of interests with shareholders increases, increasing the proportion of short-term debt. In contrast, we also test whether, for owner-controlled firms, there is an inverse relation between managerial ownership and the proportion of short-term debt. This study contributes to the literature on corporate debt maturity from the perspective of ownership structure. This study also extends Datta et al.’s (2005) study by reexamining the relation between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity in the different types of ownership structure.
This study also hypothesizes that the impact of managerial ownership on agency costs varies between agent-led and owner- controlled firms. We predict that, for agent-led firms, as managerial ownership increases, the alignment of interest between managers and external shareholders due to a larger proportion of short-term debt increases, decreasing agency costs. In contrast, we predict that, for owner-controlled firms, as managerial ownership increases, the alignment of interest between managers and external shareholders due to a smaller proportion of short-term debt become lower, increasing agency costs. Datta et al. (2005) argue that as managerial ownership increases, managers choose the larger proportion of short-term debt, thereby increasing an alignment of interest between managers and external shareholders. They do not, however, provide evidence on the relation between managerial ownership and agency costs. Furthermore, we complement Datta et al.’s (2005) study by considering agency costs in the determination of corporate debt maturity.
Using the sample of non-financial firms listed on the Korean Exchanges (KRX) between 2005 and 2011, this study examines the relation between managerial ownership and corporate debt maturity. Specifically, this study investigates the role of managerial ownership in the debt maturity decisions using a pooled OLS regression controlling for leverage, asset maturity, growth opportunities, the investment-grade dummy, abnormal earnings, stock volatility, firm size, and regulation industry dummy. For the entire sample firms, we find an insignificant relation between managerial ownership and the proportion of short-term debt. We also find that, for the subsample of owner-controlled firms, managerial ownership is insignificantly related to the proportion of short-term debt, while, for the subsample of agent-led firms, the relation is a positive and significant. Notably, for the subsample of agent-led firms, the proportion of short-term debt increases by about 8.48% as managerial ownership increase from median to 95 percentile. The increased managerial ownership is not only important statistically, but has also economical significance.
Furthermore, regarding the relation between managerial ownership and agency costs, we find consistent results with previous findings. This study uses the inverse of expense ratios and asset turnover ratios as proxy for agency costs. We expect that if managerial ownership increases and thus agency costs declines, the coefficient on managerial ownership will be negative. In regression models...

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 연구는 2005∼2011년까지 7년 동안 한국거래소에 상장된 비금융기업을 대상으로 경영자소유지분이 부채만기와 대리인비용에 미치는 영향을 검증한다. 이는 경영자소유지분이 감소할수록 외부 이해관계자들로부터의 빈번한 모니터링을 회피하기 위해 장기부채를 선호할 것이라는 가설을 검증하기 위한 것이다. 특히 본 연구는 경영자소유지분과 부채만기 사이의 관계는 기업의 소유와 경영의 분리 여부에 따라 다를 것이라는 가설을 검증한다. 이는 전문경영자기업이 다수를 차지하고 있는 미국과 달리 소유경영자기업이 많은 한국기업의 소유구조를 반영하기 위함이다. 실증분석을 통해서 소유경영자기업에서는 경영자소유지분과 단기부채비중 사이에 뚜렷한 관계가 존재하지 않지만 전문경영자기업에서는 경영자소유지분과 단기부채비중 사이에 유의한 양(+)의 상관관계가 존재함을 발견하였다. 이러한 결과는 전문경영자기업의 경우 경영자소유지분이 높아질수록 대리인 비용이 감소하여 단기부채비중이 증가하게 될 가능성이 높음을 시사한다. 또한 앞의 결과에 대한 강건성 분석 차원에서 경영자소유지분과 대리인비용 사이의 관계도 검증한다. 그 결과 소유경영자기업에서는 경영자소유지분이 높을수록 대리인비용이 뚜렷하게 증가하는 반면, 전문경영자기업에서는 경영자소유지분이 높을수록 대리인비용이 감소하는 증거를 발견하였다. 따라서 미국시장과 마찬가지로 국내 시장에서도 경영자소유지분이 증가할수록 단기부채 사용이 높아지며 이러한 패턴은 소유경영자기업보다는 전문경영자기업에서 보다 뚜렷한 현상이라고 할 수 있다

참고문헌 (Reference)

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