This article attempts to analyze the politics of rivalry reconciliation through the lenses of alliance schisms, domestic-international politics links and threat perception gaps. The diplomatic documents recently declassified by the U.S. National Archi...
This article attempts to analyze the politics of rivalry reconciliation through the lenses of alliance schisms, domestic-international politics links and threat perception gaps. The diplomatic documents recently declassified by the U.S. National Archives and Records Administration show that the United States played a bigger role than what was assumed before in the process of reconciliation efforts by the two Koreas in the early 1970s. It appears that President Park Chung Hee at first did not show much interest in North-South talks, but eventually was convinced and coaxed by U.S. into North-South rapprochement. In the early stage, threat perception gaps between the leaders of the United States and South Korea drove wedge between the two. In the due process, President Park discovered the utility of reconciliation process for domestic purposes and used it to bolster his grip of power.