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    A Game-theoretic Approach to the Interactions between the Mayor and the Council under the Asymmetric Information

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104724159

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    We made game theory-based interaction models between the mayor and the council. Among the mayor-council relationship typologies we analyzed the strong mayor form and the equivalent mayor-council form in the models.
    First, under equivalent mayor-council form, as the conflict or bargain is more evenly matched in terms of the difference in costs, the propensities to spend need to be greater. Under strong mayor form, as the conflict or bargain becomes evenly matched, the council increases his propensity to spend, while the mayor may increase or decrease his outlay or effort depending on cost conditions. A player's expected probability to win under public information is the same as his expected probability to win under two-sided asymmetric information.
    Second, under strong mayor form, the council's expected propensity to spend is equal to or smaller than the expected propensity to spend under equivalent mayor-council form, and the mayor's propensity to spend may be greater or smaller than that under equivalent mayor-council form.
    번역하기

    We made game theory-based interaction models between the mayor and the council. Among the mayor-council relationship typologies we analyzed the strong mayor form and the equivalent mayor-council form in the models. First, under equivalent mayor-counci...

    We made game theory-based interaction models between the mayor and the council. Among the mayor-council relationship typologies we analyzed the strong mayor form and the equivalent mayor-council form in the models.
    First, under equivalent mayor-council form, as the conflict or bargain is more evenly matched in terms of the difference in costs, the propensities to spend need to be greater. Under strong mayor form, as the conflict or bargain becomes evenly matched, the council increases his propensity to spend, while the mayor may increase or decrease his outlay or effort depending on cost conditions. A player's expected probability to win under public information is the same as his expected probability to win under two-sided asymmetric information.
    Second, under strong mayor form, the council's expected propensity to spend is equal to or smaller than the expected propensity to spend under equivalent mayor-council form, and the mayor's propensity to spend may be greater or smaller than that under equivalent mayor-council form.

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    We made game theory-based interaction models between the mayor and the council. Among the mayor-council relationship typologies we analyzed the strong mayor form and the equivalent mayor-council form in the models.
    First, under equivalent mayor-council form, as the conflict or bargain is more evenly matched in terms of the difference in costs, the propensities to spend need to be greater. Under strong mayor form, as the conflict or bargain becomes evenly matched, the council increases his propensity to spend, while the mayor may increase or decrease his outlay or effort depending on cost conditions. A player's expected probability to win under public information is the same as his expected probability to win under two-sided asymmetric information.
    Second, under strong mayor form, the council's expected propensity to spend is equal to or smaller than the expected propensity to spend under equivalent mayor-council form, and the mayor's propensity to spend may be greater or smaller than that under equivalent mayor-council form.
    번역하기

    We made game theory-based interaction models between the mayor and the council. Among the mayor-council relationship typologies we analyzed the strong mayor form and the equivalent mayor-council form in the models. First, under equivalent mayor-counc...

    We made game theory-based interaction models between the mayor and the council. Among the mayor-council relationship typologies we analyzed the strong mayor form and the equivalent mayor-council form in the models.
    First, under equivalent mayor-council form, as the conflict or bargain is more evenly matched in terms of the difference in costs, the propensities to spend need to be greater. Under strong mayor form, as the conflict or bargain becomes evenly matched, the council increases his propensity to spend, while the mayor may increase or decrease his outlay or effort depending on cost conditions. A player's expected probability to win under public information is the same as his expected probability to win under two-sided asymmetric information.
    Second, under strong mayor form, the council's expected propensity to spend is equal to or smaller than the expected propensity to spend under equivalent mayor-council form, and the mayor's propensity to spend may be greater or smaller than that under equivalent mayor-council form.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 임헌만, "기초의회와 자치단체장의 정책역할에 관한 연구 -재정상황과 정책역할간 관계를 중심으로-" 한국정부학회 18 (18): 397-424, 2006

    2 "http://www.icma.org/upload/bc/attach/%7B15534A3F-D37C-48A2-9061-81F9B9E8F3D0%7Dfog2006web.pdf"

    3 "http://www.icma.org/main/bc.asp?bcid=656&hsid=1&ssid1=17&ssid2=22"

    4 Dowrick, Steve, "Von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles" 17 (17): 251-260, 1986

    5 Baye, Michael, "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates" 81 : 363-380, 1994

    6 Svara, James H., "The Roles of the City Council and Implications for the Structure of City Government" 91 (91): 5-23, 2002

    7 Fudenberg, Drew, "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look" 74 : 361-366, 1984

    8 Zhu, Kevin, "Strategic Decisions of New Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information" 34 : 643-675, 2003

    9 Dixit, Avinash, "Strategic Behavior in Contests" 77 : 891-898, 1987

    10 Skaperdas, Sergio, "Risk Aversion in Contests" 105 : 951-962, 1995

    1 임헌만, "기초의회와 자치단체장의 정책역할에 관한 연구 -재정상황과 정책역할간 관계를 중심으로-" 한국정부학회 18 (18): 397-424, 2006

    2 "http://www.icma.org/upload/bc/attach/%7B15534A3F-D37C-48A2-9061-81F9B9E8F3D0%7Dfog2006web.pdf"

    3 "http://www.icma.org/main/bc.asp?bcid=656&hsid=1&ssid1=17&ssid2=22"

    4 Dowrick, Steve, "Von Stackelberg and Cournot Duopoly: Choosing Roles" 17 (17): 251-260, 1986

    5 Baye, Michael, "The Solution to the Tullock Rent-Seeking Game when R > 2: Mixed-Strategy Equilibria and Mean Dissipation Rates" 81 : 363-380, 1994

    6 Svara, James H., "The Roles of the City Council and Implications for the Structure of City Government" 91 (91): 5-23, 2002

    7 Fudenberg, Drew, "The Fat-Cat Effect, the Puppy-Dog Ploy, and the Lean and Hungry Look" 74 : 361-366, 1984

    8 Zhu, Kevin, "Strategic Decisions of New Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information" 34 : 643-675, 2003

    9 Dixit, Avinash, "Strategic Behavior in Contests" 77 : 891-898, 1987

    10 Skaperdas, Sergio, "Risk Aversion in Contests" 105 : 951-962, 1995

    11 Nti, Kofi O., "Rent-Seeking with Asymmetric Valuations" 98 : 415-430, 1999

    12 Malueg, David A., "Rent Seeking with Private Values" 119 : 161-178, 2004

    13 Lee, Myung Suk, "Relationship Between Congress and Bureaucracy : A Game Theoretic Approach" 39 (39): 137-164, 2000

    14 Hillman, Arye L., "Politically Contestable Rents and Transfers" 1 : 17-39, 1989

    15 Bulow, Jeremy L., "Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and complements" 93 (93): 488-511, 1985

    16 Leiniger, Wolfgang, "More Efficient Rent Seeking-A Munchhausen Solution" 75 : 43-62, 1993

    17 Harsanyi, John C., "Games with Incomplete Information Played by Bayesian Players" 14 (14): 159-182, 1967

    18 Yonhap News, "Ex-post Talks about the Recall Poll of the Hanam City. 13 December"

    19 The Joong Ang Daily, "Even Not Opened Recall Poll of the Jeju Governor"

    20 Van Damme, Eric, "Endogenous Stackelberg Leadership" 28 : 105-129, 1999

    21 Shogren, Jason F., "Endogenous Risk and Protection Premium" 31 : 241-256, 1991

    22 Hurley, Terrance M., "Effort Level in a Cournot Nash Contest with Asymmetric Information" 69 : 195-210, 1998

    23 Tullock, Gordon, "Efficient Rent Seeking. in : Toward a Theory of the Rent Seeking Society" Texas A & M University Press 97-112, 1980

    24 Svara, James H., "Effective mayoral leadership in council-manager cities: Reassessing the facilitative model" 92 (92): 157-172, 2003

    25 Kim, Yong-Mi, "Do Council-Manager and Mayor-Council Types of City Governments Manage Information Systems Differently? An Empirical Test" 26 (26): 119-134, 2003

    26 ICMA, "Council-Manager Form of Government"

    27 Baik, K. H., "Contests with Spying" 11 : 441-451, 1995

    28 Svara, James H., "Complexity in Political-Administrative Relations and the Limits of the Dichotomy Concept" 28 (28): 121-139, 2006

    29 Hurley, Terrance M., "Asymmetric Information Contests" 14 : 645-665, 1998

    30 Reinganum, Jennifer, "A Two Stage Model of Research and Development with Endogenous Second-Mover Advantages" 3 : 275-292, 1985

    31 Bernardo, Antonio E., "A Theory of Legal Presumptions" 16 : 1-49, 2000

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