Tax Farming: The Effects of Contracting Out Delinquent Tax Collection on the Tax Collection Performance of County Governments in the U.S. = 체납세금징수 민간위탁의 지방재정성과에 미치는 영향력에 관한 실증적 연구: 미국 카운티 정부를 중심으로

국문 초록 (Abstract)

본 논문은 지방정부의 체납세금징수 민간위탁이 지방재정의 효율성을 향상시켜줄 수 있을 것인가에 대한 질문을 하기 위해 미국 카운티 정부를 대상으로 실증적 연구를 실행하였다. 이론적 바탕으로는 공공선택론, tax farming, 대리인 이론 등을 근거한 기존 연구들의 문헌연구를 통해 카운티정부의 체납세금을 민간위탁하는 것이 세금 징수의 효율을 높일 가능성이 있다는 가설을 세웠다. 본 가설을 검증하기 위해 각 1997년과 2002년에 수집된 미국 345개 카운티의 통합 데이터를 바탕으로 합동횡단분석(pooled cross sectional regression)을 실시하였다. 분석 결과에 따르면 한 카운티의 체납세금징수를 민간위탁하는 것은 지방정부 세입(revenue)의 효율성을 저하시키는 것으로 나타났다. 이러한 연구 결과는 지방정부의 체납세금 징수를 민간위탁하는 것이 재정적인 관점에서 효율적이지 않음에도 불구하고 많은 지방정부들이 다양한 공공서비스에 대한 민간위탁을 실시하고 있는 것에 대해 의구심을 제기하고 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Is contracting out a county’s delinquent tax collection more efficient than making public employees responsible for it? Based on the public choice theory, existing literature on the history of tax farming, and the theory of agency, we hypothesize that contracting out a county’s delinquent tax collection is likely to increase tax collection efficiency. To test our hypotheses, a pooled cross-sectional analysis was conducted using the merged data of 345 counties in the United States from 1997 and 2002. The empirical results show that outsourcing a county’s delinquent tax collection statistically reduces property tax revenue per dollar of financial management expenditure. The outsourcing also reduces the total tax revenue per dollar of financial management expenditure, but not at a statistically significant level. These findings raise the question of why county governments use private debt collectors even though outsourcing delinquent taxes is not efficient from a financial perspective.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. Introduction
• Ⅱ. Literature Review and Theoretical Framework
• Ⅲ. Tax Collection Performance and Measurement Issues
• Ⅳ. Hypotheses and Model
• Ⅴ. Empirical Results
• Ⅵ. Conclusion
• References
• Abstract

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