순환출자의 규제에 관한 고찰

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Korean commercial law does not stipulate any direct terms regulating Cross-shareholding. It just regulates mutual shareholding. Even in that case, the law prohibits the shareholding within parent-subsidiary structure but limits the rights to vote between companies that are not in parent-subsidiary relationship. The reason why the law regulates mutual investment not cross shareholding is that it is problematic to get rid of the cross shareholding practice.
Sub-prime issue in the US hugely affected global stock markets in a way of declining the value of mutually shared stocks so that mutual shareholding companies are burdened by the loss from share valuation. In this respect, companies of mutual ownership are requested the duty to explain to the existing shareholders why they need mutual shareholding.
In order to use cross shareholding effectively, it is necessary to respond to the criticism from institutional investors. The cross shareholding companies should prove that the method is not an inefficient use of capital against the interest of shareholders since major shareholders in most listed large corporations are currently institutional investors. If this proves, there will be possible ways to use the mutual shareholding for developing companies instead of wasting huge cost to get rid of the practice of cross shareholding.
The circular shareholding does exist within Korean corporations and it is not that simple to get rid of it without considering the business practice. When investors request companies for the duty to explain, the companies should fulfill the duty, which will, in turn, be an appropriate respond to institutional investors with fiduciary responsibility. When the corporations hold shareholders’ meeting they send a muster notice including information disclosure, which will be expected as the first step. Regarding the location of the disclosure, debates remain but the companies must have this attitude to exchange opinions with investors based on the information disclosure.

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