네이버-다음 동의의결(2014년)과 수직적 거래제한의 경쟁효과 = The Consent Agreement in Naver-Daum Case (2014) and the Analysis of Competitive Effects of Vertical Restraints

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Advertisers put up their online advertisements through advertisement agencies. Internet portal service providers restricted the number of advertisers that agencies could attract from other competing agencies. In the consent agreement of Naver-Daum (2014), the restrictions imposed on advertisement agencies by Internet portals were under KFTC investigation. This article provides economic rationality behind such vertical restraints and explains why an Internet portal wants to put those restrictions on its own agencies in order to expand its market shares.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

인터넷 검색 키워드광고 시장에서 광고주들은 광고대행사를 통해 인터넷 포털에 광고를 게재한다. 인터넷 포털 사업자들은 자신들의 광고대행사 간에“키워드 광고대행사 간광고주 이관제한”정책을 시행하여, 광고대행사들이 다른 광고대행사로부터 이전받을 수있는 광고주 수와 규모에 일정한 제약을 부과하였다. 본 논문에서는 공정위의 2014년 네이버-다음 동의의결을 광고주 이관제한정책을 중심으로 소개하고, 광고주 이관제한정책이가지는 경쟁효과를 분석한다.

참고문헌 (Reference)

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