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      Crisis Stability and Escalation Control Challenge in South Asia: Pakistan’s Nuclear Development Efforts and Beyond

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      https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A104824900

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      다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

      India by acquiring nuclear capability. Pakistan’s low-level conventional provocation without worrying about retaliation by India thanks to the deterrent ability of nuclear weapons at the strategic level has been a worrisome trend in the region. Recently, the adoption of new doctrines and postures by both states has prompted them to develop more warheads and delivery systems. Thus, the arms race continues, the possibility of a conflict breakout and escalation of crisis heightens, and the overall strategic situation worsens in the region. Yet at the same time, Islamabad’s provocative action has subsided as time goes on and New Delhi’s calculated response seems to be working. Thus, through learning tough experiences that there is not much nuclear weapons can do except deterrence, the two adversaries seem to be gradually restoring the status quo as well.
      What is happening around the Korean Peninsula looks similar to the South Asian region. As a conventionally weaker state, North Korea has been developing more nuclear weapons and strengthening its nuclear arsenal. Important lessons drawn from South Asia are that maintaining crisis stability and escalation control are as important as developing robust deterrence capability and firm resolve. Also, as in the Pakistani case, Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capability would not necessarily provide them decisive tools for their “final victory.” Therefore, besides strong sanctions and steady military readiness, rapprochement through dialogue and confidence building measures will be crucial to keep stability in the region and prevent a crisis getting out of control.
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      India by acquiring nuclear capability. Pakistan’s low-level conventional provocation without worrying about retaliation by India thanks to the deterrent ability of nuclear weapons at the strategic level has been a worrisome trend in the region. Rece...

      India by acquiring nuclear capability. Pakistan’s low-level conventional provocation without worrying about retaliation by India thanks to the deterrent ability of nuclear weapons at the strategic level has been a worrisome trend in the region. Recently, the adoption of new doctrines and postures by both states has prompted them to develop more warheads and delivery systems. Thus, the arms race continues, the possibility of a conflict breakout and escalation of crisis heightens, and the overall strategic situation worsens in the region. Yet at the same time, Islamabad’s provocative action has subsided as time goes on and New Delhi’s calculated response seems to be working. Thus, through learning tough experiences that there is not much nuclear weapons can do except deterrence, the two adversaries seem to be gradually restoring the status quo as well.
      What is happening around the Korean Peninsula looks similar to the South Asian region. As a conventionally weaker state, North Korea has been developing more nuclear weapons and strengthening its nuclear arsenal. Important lessons drawn from South Asia are that maintaining crisis stability and escalation control are as important as developing robust deterrence capability and firm resolve. Also, as in the Pakistani case, Pyongyang’s nuclear and missile capability would not necessarily provide them decisive tools for their “final victory.” Therefore, besides strong sanctions and steady military readiness, rapprochement through dialogue and confidence building measures will be crucial to keep stability in the region and prevent a crisis getting out of control.

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      참고문헌 (Reference)

      1 Panda, Ankit, "Why Pakistan’s Newly Flight-Tested Multiple Nuclear Warhead-Capable Missile Really Matters"

      2 "Viewpoint: India Risks Destabilizing Afghanistan"

      3 "Unease about US-India Deal"

      4 Sanger, David, "U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal"

      5 Kile, Shannon, "Trends in World Nuclear Forces, 2017"

      6 Paul, T. V., "The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World" Oxford University Press 2015

      7 Singh, Kunal, "The South Asia Nuclear Equation"

      8 Betts, Richard, "The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Nations Spread and What Results" Frank Cass 1993

      9 Khan, Feroz, "The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age" Stimson Center 2016

      10 Sagan, Scott, "The Korean Missile Crisis: Why Deterrence Is the Still the Best Option" 96 (96): 72-82, 2017

      1 Panda, Ankit, "Why Pakistan’s Newly Flight-Tested Multiple Nuclear Warhead-Capable Missile Really Matters"

      2 "Viewpoint: India Risks Destabilizing Afghanistan"

      3 "Unease about US-India Deal"

      4 Sanger, David, "U.S. Exploring Deal to Limit Pakistan’s Nuclear Arsenal"

      5 Kile, Shannon, "Trends in World Nuclear Forces, 2017"

      6 Paul, T. V., "The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World" Oxford University Press 2015

      7 Singh, Kunal, "The South Asia Nuclear Equation"

      8 Betts, Richard, "The Proliferation Puzzle: Why Nuclear Nations Spread and What Results" Frank Cass 1993

      9 Khan, Feroz, "The Lure & Pitfalls of MIRVs: From the First to the Second Nuclear Age" Stimson Center 2016

      10 Sagan, Scott, "The Korean Missile Crisis: Why Deterrence Is the Still the Best Option" 96 (96): 72-82, 2017

      11 Khan, Saira, "The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry" Cambridge University Press 2005

      12 Sjapoo, Sajid Farid, "The Dangers of Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons"

      13 Ladwig III, Wlater, "Taking ‘Cold Start’ Out of the Freezer?"

      14 Narang, Vipin, "Strategies of Nuclear Proliferation How States Pursue the Bomb" 41 (41): 2016

      15 Clary, Christopher, "Safer at Sea? Pakistan’s Sea-Based Deterrent and Nuclear Weapons Security" 40 (40): 149-168, 2017

      16 Paul, T. V., "Power vs. Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons" McGill-Queen’s University Press 2000

      17 Panda, Ankit, "Pakistan’s Tests New Sub-Launched Nuclear-Capable Cruise Missile. What Now?"

      18 "Pakistan’s Foreign Policy Betrays Deep Domestic Insecurities"

      19 Hoyt, Timothy, "Pakistani Nuclear Doctrine and the Dangers of Strategic Myopia" 41 (41): 956-977, 2001

      20 Lieven Anatol, "Pakistan: A Hard Country" Public Affairs 2011

      21 Ahmed, Samina, "Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Program: Turning Points and Nuclear Choices" 23 (23): 178-204, 1999

      22 Khan, Zafar, "Pakistan's Nuclear First-Use Doctrine: Obsessions and Obstacles" 36 (36): 2015

      23 Sankaran, Jaganath, "Pakistan's Battlefield Nuclear Policy: A Risky Solution to an Exaggerated Threat" 39 : 2013

      24 Rashid, Ahmed, "Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of America, Pakistan, and Afghanistan" Viking 2012

      25 Panda, Ankit, "Pakistan Pledges a Hot Finish for ‘Cold Start’"

      26 Panda, Ankit, "Pakistan Clarifies Conditions for Tactical Nuclear Weapon Use Against India"

      27 Narang, Vipin, "Nuclear Strategy in Modern Era: Regional Powers and International Conflict" Princeton University Press 2014

      28 Panda, Ankit, "Nuclear Stability, Conventional Instability: North Korea and the Lessons from Pakistan"

      29 Panda, Ankit, "Nuclear South Asia and Coming to Terms with ‘No-First Use’ with Indian Characteristics"

      30 Khalid, Iram, "Nuclear Security Dilemma of Pakistan" 20 (20): 13-33, 2013

      31 Carlin, Robert, "Nuclear North Korea: How Will It Behave?"

      32 Ganguly, Sumit, "Nuclear Crisis Stability in South Asia" 41 (41): 907-924, 2001

      33 Wit, Joel, "North Korea's Nuclear Future: Technology and Strategy"

      34 Bermudeze, Joseph, "North Korea's Development of a Nuclear Strategy"

      35 Kasuri, Khurshid Mahmud, "Neither a Hawk Nor a Dove: An Insider’s Account of Pakistan’s Foreign Policy" Oxford University Press 2015

      36 Sasikumar, Karthika, "Inside Nuclear South Asia" Stanford University Press 2009

      37 Khan, Saad, "India-Pakistan Relations : A Paradigm Shift"

      38 Shah, Saeed, "India and Pakistan Escalate Nuclear Arms Race"

      39 Gady, Franz-Stefan, "India Successfully Tests Prithvi Defense Vehicle, A New Missile Killer System"

      40 Kampari, Gaurav, "How to Normalize Pakistan’s Nuclear Program"

      41 "Full Spectrum Doctrine: Pakistan Test-Fires Nasr Missiles"

      42 Ganguly, Sumit, "Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons" University of Washington Press 2005

      43 Pande, Aparna, "Explaining Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Escaping India" Routledge 2011

      44 Krepon, Michael, "Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia" Stimson Center 2004

      45 Krepon, Michael, "Escalation Control and the Nuclear Option in South Asia" Stimson Center 2004

      46 Khan, Feroz Hassan, "Eating Grass: The Making of the Pakistani Bomb" Stanford University Press 2012

      47 Sanger, David, "Downing North Korean Missile Is Hard. So the US Is Experimenting"

      48 Smith, David, "Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia" Stimson Center 2013

      49 Joeck, Neil, "Deterrence Stability and Escalation Control in South Asia" Stimson Center 2013

      50 McCausland, Jeffrey, "Deterrence Instability and Nuclear Weapons in South Asia" Stimson Center 2015

      51 Kapur, Paul, "Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia" Stanford University Press 2007

      52 Ganguly, Sumit, "Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions Since 1947" Columbia University Press 2001

      53 Naqash, Tariq, "COAS Visits LoC: ‘Violence in IHK by Indian Forces is State-Sponsored Terrorism’"

      54 Kapur, Paul, "Asian Rivalries: Conflict, Escalation, and Limitations on Two-Level Games" Stanford University Press 2011

      55 Haqqani, Husain, "A New Foreign Policy Paradigm"

      56 Ladwig III, Wlater, "A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War Doctrine" 32 (32): 2007

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      학술지 이력

      학술지 이력
      연월일 이력구분 이력상세 등재구분
      2027 평가예정 재인증평가 신청대상 (재인증)
      2021-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (재인증) KCI등재
      2018-01-01 평가 등재학술지 선정 (계속평가) KCI등재
      2017-12-01 평가 등재후보로 하락 (계속평가) KCI등재후보
      2013-01-01 평가 등재학술지 유지 (등재유지) KCI등재
      2011-08-22 학회명변경 영문명 : Research Institute On National Security Affairs -> Research Institute for National Security Affairs KCI등재
      2011-08-18 학술지명변경 한글명 : 영문학술지(KJSA) -> The Korean Journal of Security Affairs
      외국어명 : 미등록 -> The Korean Journal of Security Affairs
      KCI등재
      2010-01-01 평가 등재학술지 선정 (등재후보2차) KCI등재
      2009-01-01 평가 등재후보 1차 PASS (등재후보1차) KCI등재후보
      2007-01-01 평가 등재후보학술지 선정 (신규평가) KCI등재후보
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      학술지 인용정보

      학술지 인용정보
      기준연도 WOS-KCI 통합IF(2년) KCIF(2년) KCIF(3년)
      2016 0.42 0.42 0.37
      KCIF(4년) KCIF(5년) 중심성지수(3년) 즉시성지수
      0.32 0.24 0.744 0
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