회계 부정 지적 기업의 경영자 보상과 정보비대칭에 관한 연구 = A Study on CEO Compensation and Information Asymmetry on Enforced Firms

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

The reporting of accounting irregularities and similar problems for many firms are related to the portion of firms and economic in general about the reliability of financial statements and the influence on shareholders. The understanding of circumstance and motivation for accounting irregularities is very important and should be studied in advanced for preventing this problems in the future.
This paper has tried to test whether CEO cash compensation and information asymmetry can be the variables that decide to enforced or not by adding financial factors as a motivation and circumstance for accounting irregularities. In the results of T-test on the difference of related variables between enforced firms and non-enforced, the enforced firms’ average shows lower than non-enforced firms’ on CEO cash compensation variable. Also, p-value is statistically significant in blow 5% significant level. It means that a firm which shows lower CEO cash compensation has a high possibility for being enforced. The more information asymmetry firm, the more possibility of being enforced on asymmetry variable which is statistically significant in blow 1% significant level.
In the result of logistic regression analysis which tests what is the financial variable related to accounting irregularities, CEO cash compensation, information asymmetry, return on equity, financial leverage, and the ratio of transaction of person with a special relationship are the variables which are related to the accounting irregularities.
The empirical results of this paper can be contributed to regularity’s policy which selects enforced firms by testing the relationship between accounting irregularities and CEO compensation and information asymmetry as a motivation. Although this research analyzed CEO compensation only for the accounting irregularities, it can be showed better results when adding the structure of CEO compensation with equity compensation.

국문 초록 (Abstract)

기업들의 회계부정 행위는 재무제표의 신뢰성과 주주 및 기업, 경제 전반에 악영향을 미치게 된다. 이러한 회계부정행위가 발생되는 환경과 동기에 대한 연구는 미래에 예상되는 사태를 효과적으로 방지하기 위하여 필연적으로 선행되어야 한다.
본 연구는 회계부정에 대한 환경과 동기로 기존 선행연구들에서 밝힌 재무적 특성변수에 부가하여 경영자 현금보상과 정보비대칭 문제가 표본감리 대상을 선정할 때 유용한 정보인지를 감리지적기업을 대상으로 검증하고자 하였다.
감리지적기업과 감리비지적기업 사이에 관련변수들의 차이에 대한 t-검증결과, 경영자 현금보상 변수에서 감리지적기업이 감리비지적기업보다 평균이 낮게 나타났으며, 통계적으로 유의하였다. 이는 감리 직전연도의 경영자 현금보상이 낮은 기업일수록 감리지적을 받을 가능성이 높다는 것을 의미한다. 또한 정보비대칭이 큰 기업일수록 감리지적의 가능성이 높은지를 검증한 결과, 감리지적기업이 감리비지적기업보다 높았으며, 통계적으로 유의하였다. 이는 정보비대칭이 큰 기업일수록 감리지적 가능성이 높다는 것을 의미한다.
회계부정에 관계되는 재무변수들이 무엇인지를 분석한 로지스틱 회귀분석 결과, 경영자 현금보상, 정보비대칭, 자기자본수익률, 레버리지비율과 특수관계자와의 거래비율 변수가 회계부정을 유발하는 관련변수임을 확인할 수 있었다.
본 연구의 실증적 증거는 경영자 현금보상과 정보비대칭 정보가 경영자들이 위법행위를 수행하는 동기와 관련되어 있음을 입증함으로써 감리지적기업 대상을 선정하는 관계당국의 정책에 기여할 것으로 기대된다. 본 연구에서는 경영자 현금보상변수만을 고려하여 분석하고 있지만, 지분보상을 비롯한 경영자보상 구조와의 관계를 분석하면 감리지적여부의 예측모형을 보다 더 정교하게 할 것으로 예측된다.

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 박재영, "이익조정유형과 경영자 성과보수와의 관련성에 관한 연구" 한국국제회계학회 (30) : 35-59, 2010

2 지성권, "이익유연화와 경영자 보상" 한국국제회계학회 (27) : 217-246, 2009

3 김문철, "내부자거래와 이익조정" 한국회계학회 35 (35): 1-37, 2010

4 최관, "감리대상기업의 감리선정기준 개발에 관한 연구" 금융감독원 2001

5 손성규, "감리대상기업 선정을 위한 모형의 개발" 금융감독원 2001

6 Goel, A., "Why do Firms Smoothing Earnings?" 76 : 151-192, 2003

7 Hemmelberg, G., "Understanding the Determinants ofManagerial Ownership and the Link Between Ownership and Performance" 53 : 353-384, 1999

8 Jensen, M. C., "Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Cost andOwnership Structure" 3 : 305-360, 1976

9 Duru, A. I., "The Relevance of Firm' Accounting and MarketPerformance for CEO Compensation" 17 : 107-118, 2001

10 Black, F., "The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities" 81 : 637-654, 1973

11 Meulbroek, L., "The Efficiency of Equity Linked Compensation: Understanding theFull Cost of Awarding Executive Stock Option" 30 : 5-30, 2001

12 Dechow, P., "The Effect of Restructuring Charges onExecutives' Cash Compensation" 69 : 138-156, 1994

13 Healy, P. M., "The Effect of Bonus Schemes on Accounting Decisions" 7 : 85-107, 1985

14 Hall, B. J., "Stock Option for Undiversified Executives" 33 : 3-42, 2002

15 Defond, M. L., "Smoothing Income in Anticipation of Future Earnings" 23 : 115-139, 1997

16 Jensen, M. C., "Paying People to Lie: the Trust aboud the Budgeting Process" 9 : 379-406, 2003

17 Erickson, M, "Is there a Link between ExecutiveEquity Incentives and Accounting Fraud" 44 : 113-143, 2006

18 Denis, D., "Is there a Dark Side to Incentive Compensation?" Purdue University 2005

19 Richardson, V. J., "Information Asymmetry and Earnings Management; SomeEvidence" 15 : 325-347, 2000

20 Defond, M. L., "Incidence and Circumstances of Accounting Errors" 66 : 643-655, 1991

21 Erickson, M., "How much will Firms Pay for Earnings that do not exit?Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings" University of Chicago 2006

22 Moeller, S. B., "How do Diversity of Opinionand Information Asymmetry Affect Acquirer Returns?" 20 : 2047-2078, 2007

23 Dechow, P., "Executive Incentives and Horizon Problem" 14 : 51-89, 1991

24 Klinger, S., "Executive Excess 2002: CEOs Cook the Books, Skewer the Rest of us, Ninth Annual CEOCompensation Survey"

25 Rajgopal, S., "Empirical Evidence on the Relation Between StockOption Compensation and Risk Taking" 33 : 145-171, 2002

26 Dye, R. A., "Earnings Management in an Overlapping Generation's Model" 26 : 127-139, 1988

27 Jones, J., "Earnings Management during Import Relief Investigations" 29 : 193-228, 1991

28 Somnath. D, "Cash Flow Volatility, IncomeSmoothing and CEO Cash Compensation" 2009

29 Kirschengeiter, "Can Big Bath and Earnings Smoothing Co-Exist asEquilibrium Financial Reporting Strategies?" 40 (40): 761-796, 2002

30 Hanlon, M., "Are Executives Stock Options Associatedwith Future Earnings?" 36 : 3-43, 2003

31 Holthausen, R. W, "Annual Bonus Schemes and theManipulation of Earnings" 19 : 29-74, 1995

32 Truman, B., "An Explanation for Accounting Income Smoothing" 26 : 127-139, 1988

33 Goldman, E., "An Equilibrium Model of Incentive Contracts in thePresence of Information Manipulation" 80 : 603-626, 2006

34 Beasley, M. S, "An Empirical Analysis of the Relation between the Board of DirectorComposition and Financial Statement Fraud" 71 : 443-465, 1996

35 Gaver, J., "Additional Evidence on Bonus Plans and IncomeManagement" 19 : 3-28, 1995

36 DeAngelo, L. E., "Accounting Numbers as Market Valuation Substitutes: A Study ofManagement Buyouts of Public Stockholders" 61 : 400-420, 1986

37 Elayan, F. A., "Accounting Irregularities, ManagementCompensation Structure and Information Asymmetry" 48 : 741-760, 2008