1979년 한국 신군부의 12·12쿠데타와 미국의 관망정책 = The 12·12 Coup d état of the New Military Faction in Korea and the U.S. Government s Wait-and-See Policy in 1979

국문 초록 (Abstract)

미국 카터행정부는 12·12군사쿠데타 발생에 대하여 적극적 개입의 미국내 여론에도 불구하고 한국 군부 내 국수적 민족주의적 저항과 한국민의 제2의 이란화 가능성을 염려하여 ‘불개입 자세’를 취했다. 미국은 이쿠데타에 조성된 사태의 역전을 강하게 시도할 만큼 비용을 지불할 준비가 되어있지 않았으며, 한국의 내부적 군권쟁탈 문제가 그들에게 그럴만한 가치가 있는지에 대해 확신이 없었다. 따라서 미국은 현상유지에 만족하여 신군부세력을 군의 실권세력으로 받아들이고 현실적으로 인정한 것으로 볼 수 있다. 신군부가 고도로 조직화되어 있어 정권 수행능력을 갖추고 있으며 무엇보다도 친미적 정향을 띠고 있는 것으로 평가하였던 것이다. 또한 미국은 동북아에서 자신들의 핵심이익인 안보·경제적 이익을 수호해 줄 수 있는 측면을 감안했을 때 불개입적 ‘관망(wait and see)’정책을 추구했던 것으로 해석된다. 미국의 이러한 불관여정책, 즉 ‘신중한 불개입’ ‘관망’정책은 신군부 병력이 특별한 저항 없이 쿠데타 상황을 종료하고 궁극적으로 성공하게 하는 데 결정적 역할을 하였다. 신군부에 대한 뚜렷한 세력 경쟁자가 없는 상황에서 미국의 관망 정책은 결국 강자를 선택하는 결과가 되었다. 뿐만 아니라, 미국정부의 이러한 정책은 ‘최소비용에 의한 최대효과’를 지향했으며 또한 ‘대세편승적 승자승 논리’에 바탕을 두었다고 볼 수 있다. 결론적으로, 미국은 ‘안보·안정’적인 기존 정책노선에 충실했다고 할 수 있다.

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Right after the coup took place in Seoul on Dec. 12, 1979, the Carter administration of the United States was alleged to maintain a policy of non-intervention, contrary to the American public opinion, for fear of possible resistance from the chauvinistic Korean military and of a possible second Iranization of the Korean people. In this context, nobody was certain whether the United States was ready to pay the cost for its attempt to turn the tables here or whether the political leaders in Washington found it worthwhile to pay attention to the power struggle within the Korean military. This assumption leads naturally to the conclusion that the U.S. leaders apparently did not want to intervene in the political upheaval in Korea to such an extent as to further affect the reality. Satisfied with the status quo, the United States’ leadership seemed to have recognized the new Korean military leadership as the de facto power holders. It is evident that Washington took a wait-and-see approach to carefully watch the new military group in Korea, regarding it as a highly organized powerful group with the ability to take care of state affairs on its own, as a pro-Washington organization, and as a group with potential to safeguard and protect security and economic interests of the United States in Northeast Asia. Washington s decision to adopt a non-intervention policy, or a careful wait-and-see approach, turned out to be decisively conducive to the new military group in Korea putting an end to the upheaval without remarkable resistance and pulling off a successful coup in the end. Washington s wait-and-see approach resulted in supporting the stronger side in a situation where the new military leadership had no rival to compete with. Besides, it also seems that Washington sought to achieve the largest effect with the minimum cost based on the logic of jumping on the bandwagon by rooting for the top dog. As it turned out, the United States toed the line for security and stability not to cause trouble by intervening in the upheaval in Korea.

목차 (Table of Contents)

• Ⅰ. 서론 Ⅱ. 박정희 서거 직후 한국사회의 이행 열기와 미국의 관망 입장 Ⅲ. 12·12쿠데타 성공과 미국의 대세편승 Ⅳ. 한국 군부 내의 역쿠데타 시도와 미국의 거부 Ⅴ. 병력통제권 관련 한미갈등과 신군부의 대미로비 Ⅵ. 결론 참고문헌

참고문헌 (Reference)

1 권영기, "전두환 경질 누가 알렸나" (10) : 1989

2 "월간조선"

3 이삼성, "미국의 대한정책과 한국민족주의:광주항쟁· 민족통일· 한미관계" 한길사 1993

4 "문홍구 예비역중장의 증언 (9)"

5 "동아일보"

6 "The Washington Post, Dec. 19, 1979"

7 Fowler, James, "The United States and South Korean Democratization" 114 (114): 1999

8 Oberdorfer, Don, "The Two Koreas : a Contemporary History" Basic Books 1997

9 "The New York Times, Nov. 19. 1979"

10 "The New York Times, Dec. 4. 1979"

11 "The New York Times, Dec. 19. 1979"

12 "The New York Times, Dec. 16. 1979"

13 "The New York Times, Dec. 15, 1979"

14 "The New York Times"

15 Kamiya, Fuji, "The Korean Peninsula After Park Chung Hee" 20 (20): 1980

16 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to USDEL Secretaty Flash, White House Flash 0000, Amembassy Seoul Flash"

17 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to Amembassy Seoul, Priority, Subject: Weekly Status Report - Korea"

18 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to Amembassy Seoul, Priority"

19 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to Amembassy Seoul, Niact, Immediate"

20 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to Amembassy Seoul, Niact, Immediate"

21 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to Amembassy Seoul, Immediate"

22 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to Amembassy Seoul, Immediate"

23 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to Amembassy Seoul"

24 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to Amembassy Seoul"

25 "Telegram from Secstate Washdc to AmEmbassy Seoul, Immediate"

26 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Washdc, Immediate"

27 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, Immediate, NODIS 791218"

28 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, Immediate, 1859, NODIS"

29 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, Immediate"

30 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, Immediate"

31 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, Immediate"

32 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, Immediate"

33 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, Immediate"

34 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, Immediate"

35 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, 8001"

36 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc, 791207"

37 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc Immediate"

38 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc"

39 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc"

40 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc"

41 "Telegram from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc"

42 Gleysteen, William H, "Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence: Carter and Korea in Crisis" Brookings Institution Press 1999

43 Wickham, John A, "Korea on the Brink: From the 12/12 Incident to the Kwangju Uprising. 1979-1980" National Defense University Press 1999

44 Vance, Cyrus, "American Foreign Policy for the Pacific Nations" 7 (7): 1980

45 박원곤, "1979년 12.12 쿠데타와 카터 미 행정부의 대응: 도덕외교의 타협" 한국국제정치학회 50 (50): 81-102, 2010

46 "12·12, 5·18 재수사 검찰수사기록 (6)"

47 대한민국 재향군인회, "12· 12, 5· 18 실록"

48 "(1) 별책부록 5·18 사건수사기록"