Institutional Power and Digital Platforms: A Literature Investigation of Regulatory Challenges and Adaptive Governance = Institutional Power and Digital Platforms: A Literature Investigation of Regulatory Challenges and Adaptive Governance

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Purpose: The rapid rise of platform firms ranging from app-based ecosystems to multi-sided digital intermediaries has challenged existing assumptions about market structure, competitive dominance, and regulatory design. This present study examines how platform dominance emerges, why conventional antitrust frameworks struggle to confront it, and which regulatory approaches are being articulated across jurisdictions. Research design, data and methodology: Using a narrative synthesis of economic theory, institutional analysis, competition policy scholarship, and comparative regulatory studies, this study extracts recurrent patterns regarding value capture, network effects, behavioral lock-in, bargaining asymmetry, and systemic risk. Results: The findings suggest that platform dominance is structurally reinforced through feedback loops-data accumulation, algorithmic preference shaping, switching costs, and market enclosure. Traditional antitrust logic emphasizing price effects and output constraints fails to grasp these dynamics. Regulatory concepts now emerging are more relational: structural separation, interoperability mandates, algorithmic transparency, behavioral conduct rules, and data governance. Conclusions: All in all, platform regulation demands a paradigm shift from static market protection to institutional oversight focused on power symmetries, dependency risks, and democratic accountability. Effective governance will require adaptive design, phased intervention, and legitimacy grounding, echoing lessons from broader organizational reform literature where power reshaping must be sequenced and intelligently narrated.