시장통달자의 집단성향을 고려한 고객도움행동 촉진 방안 연구 = A Helping Incentive System to Collectivistic Market Mavens

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

Research in marketing finds many episodes of market mavens` helping other customers. However, most research has studied market mavens` influential function in the introductory stage of new product diffusion process. Consequently, very little is known about the market mavens` helping behavior mechanism in non introductory market situations. In this paper, we try to understand market maven`s helping behavior mechanism and find better way to stimulate market maven`s helping behavior. We investigate optimal incentive scheme for market maven of diverse collectivist consumer tendencies via game-theoretic modeling. Especially, we focus on the following two type of incentives often observed in the real world: performance-based bonus and cost-subsidy. We focus on the following issues: How do market mavens of high (low) level of collectivist consumer tendencies behave as possible market helpers?, What incentive level and structure is recommendable for marketers to stimulate market mavens of high (low) level of collectivist consumer tendencies to help other customers? We focus on the impact of market mavens` collectivist tendencies on the optimal incentive structure for marketers to stimulate market mavens to help other customers. So we consider two players in the game, a marketer and a market maven. Our model is of complete information game type. In our model, the marketer is the Stackelberg leader and the market maven is the follower. Our model is of two stages in a single period. Variables in the model are as following table. Π U g θ a a2 ζ2 aζ aη p firm`s profit market maven`s utility consumers` purchase potential in the reach of market maven market maven`s collectivist tendency helping level cost of helping firm`s cost for cost-sharing of aζ market maven`s actual benefit of firm`s cost-sharing performance based bonus to market maven price Stages of the game are as follows. Stage 1: Marketer sets cost-subsidy level(ζ), performance-based bonus level(η), and price of the service(p). Stage 2: Market maven sets helping effort level(a). Market maven gets cost-subsidy(aζ) immediately but gets performance-based bonus(aη) after performance verification. Since our model is a dynamic game, we try to find a subgame perfect equilibrium to derive useful implications. In order to obtain the subgame perfect equilibrium, we solve the problems using backward induction. In the backward induction process, we solve the problems backward from stage 2 to stage 1. By completely knowing follower`s optimal reaction to the leader`s potential actions, we can fold back the game tree backward. Equilibrium of each decision variable of the game is as following table. Decision Variable Equilibrium Firm`s decision variables p ^{*} = {1} over {26} (7+7g+2 theta ), zeta ^{*} = {1} over {26} =(1+g+4 theta ), eta ^{*} = {1} over {26} (3+3g-14θ) Market maven`s decision variable α^{ *}= { 1} over {13 }(1+g+4θ) Firm`s profit II ^{ *}= { 1} over {52 }(7+7+g ^{ 2} +4Fθ+8θ ^{ 2}+14g+4gθ ) Market maven`s utility U^{ *}=1-e ^{ - {ν } over {338 }(2+2g ^{ 2} -75θ+6θ ^{ 2}+ 4g+263gθ) } Our findings are as follows: (1) The higher gets the collectivist consumer tendency level of market mavens`, the higher portion of cost-subsidy is required relative to that of rewards in the equilibrium., (2) As the collectivist consumer tendency level of market mavens` increase, service firm had better increase total incentive in early stage but decrease in late stage. So, the optimal level of total incentive for the market maven makes inverted U shape along the collectivist consumer tendency level., (3) The service firm may acquire greater surplus through stimulating market mavens` helping behaviors when they have higher collectivist consumer tendencies. One of the major contributions of this study is that the current study firstly suggests some specific managerial implications for marketers in a service setting how to stimulate market mavens to help other consumers by using performance-based bonus and cost-subsidy especially under consideration of the impact of collectivist consumer tendencies of them.

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