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    인센티브 및 패널티를 적용한 죄수의 딜레마 해소 방안에 관한 연구 = A Study on Resolving Prisoner’s Dilemma Using Incentives and Penalties

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    https://www.riss.kr/link?id=A106489167

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    다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract) kakao i 다국어 번역

    This paper considers the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a dilemma in the game, an incentive model to encourage to confess and a penalty model for being imposed when not confessing are introduced, respectively. Then, the conditions are characterized under which incentive or penalty involved in the game’s payoffs can make the game rational without a dilemma on both the personal and social perspectives, by taking the payoff values as variables with the incentive and penalty factors. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting values of incentive and penalty are inversely proportional to each other, and thus, obtaining one of these amounts can provide the other. Simple examples are shown to interpret the theoretical verifications of our models, and randomly generated data based simulation results investigate the tendency of incentive and penalty and the resulting game values for a variety of instances. These results can provide a framework on resolving the dilemma by artificially putting incentive or penalty, although it is careful to apply more generalized real world games.
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    This paper considers the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a ...

    This paper considers the Prisoner’s Dilemma Game in which there exists a dilemma that the best response is that both players are to confess, but doing not confess can give a higher gain to the both players in a social perspective. To resolve such a dilemma in the game, an incentive model to encourage to confess and a penalty model for being imposed when not confessing are introduced, respectively. Then, the conditions are characterized under which incentive or penalty involved in the game’s payoffs can make the game rational without a dilemma on both the personal and social perspectives, by taking the payoff values as variables with the incentive and penalty factors. Furthermore, it turns out that the resulting values of incentive and penalty are inversely proportional to each other, and thus, obtaining one of these amounts can provide the other. Simple examples are shown to interpret the theoretical verifications of our models, and randomly generated data based simulation results investigate the tendency of incentive and penalty and the resulting game values for a variety of instances. These results can provide a framework on resolving the dilemma by artificially putting incentive or penalty, although it is careful to apply more generalized real world games.

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    참고문헌 (Reference)

    1 장대철, "오프라인과 온라인 유통업체간 채널 갈등에 의한 죄수의 딜레마와 세금 효과" 한국마케팅학회 23 (23): 93-115, 2008

    2 이민호, "게임이론을 이용한 제조업체의 직접마케팅 진입전략 분석" 한국산업경영시스템학회 32 (32): 168-177, 2009

    3 김주협, "게임이론을 이용한 유한 전략 집합을 갖는 전력제어 알고리즘" 한국항행학회 13 (13): 87-96, 2009

    4 이창환, "게임이론 관점에서 본 개인의 배반이 집단 이익에 미치는 영향" 한국정보과학회 38 (38): 491-496, 2011

    5 Yang, S.-L, "The evolution of cooperation according to decision making methods of strategic coalition in iterated prisoner’s dilemma game" 310-312, 2002

    6 Park, H., "Opponent’s player’s decision modeling in iterated prisoner’s dilemma using reverse engineering technique" 1499-1501, 2013

    7 Kim, K.-H., "Negotiation and Strategy : Economics of Interdependence and Intuition" Yulgokbook Publishing Co 2012

    8 정훈, "Game Theory, Rational Choice Theory, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Some Clarifications" 한국과학철학회 17 (17): 23-51, 2014

    9 McCain, R.A., "Game Theory : A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy" World Scientific 2010

    10 Seo, Y. -G., "Experimental study on cooperative coalition in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game using evolutionary approach" 27 (27): 257-265, 2000

    1 장대철, "오프라인과 온라인 유통업체간 채널 갈등에 의한 죄수의 딜레마와 세금 효과" 한국마케팅학회 23 (23): 93-115, 2008

    2 이민호, "게임이론을 이용한 제조업체의 직접마케팅 진입전략 분석" 한국산업경영시스템학회 32 (32): 168-177, 2009

    3 김주협, "게임이론을 이용한 유한 전략 집합을 갖는 전력제어 알고리즘" 한국항행학회 13 (13): 87-96, 2009

    4 이창환, "게임이론 관점에서 본 개인의 배반이 집단 이익에 미치는 영향" 한국정보과학회 38 (38): 491-496, 2011

    5 Yang, S.-L, "The evolution of cooperation according to decision making methods of strategic coalition in iterated prisoner’s dilemma game" 310-312, 2002

    6 Park, H., "Opponent’s player’s decision modeling in iterated prisoner’s dilemma using reverse engineering technique" 1499-1501, 2013

    7 Kim, K.-H., "Negotiation and Strategy : Economics of Interdependence and Intuition" Yulgokbook Publishing Co 2012

    8 정훈, "Game Theory, Rational Choice Theory, and the Prisoner’s Dilemma: Some Clarifications" 한국과학철학회 17 (17): 23-51, 2014

    9 McCain, R.A., "Game Theory : A Nontechnical Introduction to the Analysis of Strategy" World Scientific 2010

    10 Seo, Y. -G., "Experimental study on cooperative coalition in N-person iterated prisoner’s dilemma game using evolutionary approach" 27 (27): 257-265, 2000

    11 Kim, K, "A prisoner’s dilemma model application to power control for wireless network communication" 670-678, 2008

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    2021-11-25 학술지명변경 외국어명 : Journal of Society of Korea Industrial and Systems Engineering -> Journal of Korean Society of Industrial and Systems Engineering KCI등재
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    2019-12-04 학술지명변경 한글명 : 산업경영시스템학회지 -> 한국산업경영시스템학회지
    외국어명 : Journal of the Society of Korea Industrial and Systems Engineering -> Journal of Society of Korea Industrial and Systems Engineering
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