미국법상 Poison Pill에 의한 경영권 방어의 적법성 판단 기준으로서의 강화된 경영판단의 법칙 = The Enhanced Business Judgment Rule As a Standard to Determine the Validity of Poison Pill Under the U.S. Law

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

In the early 1980s, the U.S. courts began to question whether the business judgment rule was appropriate as a standard to determine the validity of a board`s defensive measures to a hostile takeover. In a series of cases involving the adoption of defensive measures, the U.S. courts applied an enhanced scrutiny standard (so-called enhanced business judgment rule) to probe the decisional procedures and the information relied upon by the board, as well as the reasonableness of the director`s decision. Since the l980s, and the decision of the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v, Household International, Inc., it has been well-settled that boards of directors may adopt Poison Pills as defensive measures to a hostile takeover. Furthermore, the successful use of Poison Pills and a classified board to enforce the board of directors` determination to stay independent, demonstrated the ability of an incumbent board of directors to combat a hostile takeover under certain circumstances. Consequently, one of the developments in takeover tactics has been to circumvent Poison Pills by conducting a proxy contest to replace the target board of directors with directors who will redeem the Poison Pill. To combat this tactic, companies (especially those without staggered boards) have inserted in their Poison Pills so-called dead-hand provision or no-hand provision. However, two 1998 Delaware cases-Carmody v. Toll Brothers and Quickturn Design Systems v. Shapiro invalidated dead-hand as well as no-hand provisions. Last year, Korean government submitted to the Congress the Proposal for Amendment to the Commercial Law to Adopt ``Poison Pill System`` in Korea. The purpose of this Article is to contribute to establishment of a standard to determine the validity of the Poison Pill in Korea by introducing the so-called Enhanced Business Judgment Rule under the U.S. laws.

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