인터넷 서비스 플랫폼과 경쟁정책 - 애플과 구글의 사례를 중심으로 = Internet Service Platforms and Competition Policy - Focused on Apple and Google Cases

다국어 초록 (Multilingual Abstract)

One of the most recent and hottest issues in the ICT industry today undoubtedly concerns the importance of platforms. While intense inter-platform competition with economy of scope causes conflict of interests with former business partners, it also has a great potential of efficiency and may enhance consumer welfare. Thus, in competition policy and enforcement, just like any other industry, we should balance such efficiency with the bottleneck power of platforms. Of course, it is a very thorny issue that must take complicated and dynamic characteristics of the industry into consideration. Nevertheless, we cannot hesitate to resolve its complexities, as ICT platforms sustain a complex ecological structure through close and highly correlative connections. As platforms serve as the central link between such co-dependent connections, businesses which control these platforms can control the entirety of the related industry. Taking our current stage of accelerating digital convergence into consideration, the market conduct of ICT platforms which has established its customer base in a related or adjacent market is enough to attract the attention of competition authority.
This article reviews recent antitrust cases on ICT platforms, especially focusing on Apple and Google. Interestingly, the two cases related to the most innovative platforms show how traditional antitrust rules can play a role in old games with new toys while also providing somewhat tricky challenges.

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