Intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger : the problem of original method and phenomenon of phenomenology

목차 (Table of Contents)

• CONTENTS
• Acknowledgements = Ⅴ
• Introduction
• 1. Remarks on the current status of the problematic = 1
• 2. The ontological formulation of the issues in controversy between Husserl and Heidegger necessarily precludes their non-partisan "phenomenological" exploration = 3
• 3. "Intentionality" in Husserl's and Heidegger's formulations of phenomenology comprises the focus of the present study. The philological and philosophical reason for this focus = 4
• 4. Design of the treatise = 7
• 5. The contrast of the present study of intentionality in Husserl and Heidegger with Bernet's treatment of the problem = 9
• Part One Husserl's Phenomenological Account of Intentionality
• Introduction to Part One
• 6. Preliminary considerations = 15
• Chapter One : Husserl's Phenomenological Method
• 7. Introductory remarks = 17
• 8. Husserl's initial "critical" uncovering of lived-experiences = 19
• 9. Phenomenological reflection is not determined by the interiority of its object ; the reflective "seeing of essences" = 21
• 10. The essence of the lived-experiences of the appearance, manner of appearing, and perception of something transcendent = 22
• 11. The essence of the lived-experiences of the appearance, manner of appearing, and perception of something immanent = 24
• 12. The methodological transition from the critical uncovering of the essences of lived-experiences to their phenomenologically pure apprehension = 26
• 13. Summary and transition = 29
• Chapter Two : The Intentionality of Logical Significance and Material Ontological Meaning
• 14. Introductory remarks = 32
• 15. The intentionality of logical signification : the analytic status of the essence of logical categories and their intuition = 33
• 16. The epistemic essence of logical signifying : empty and fulfilled intentions = 35
• 17. The non-logical intentionality of synthetic cognition : its importance for the psychological $${\rm E}$$$$\pi $$$$o$$$$\chi $$$${\eta '}$$ and reduction = 36
• 18. Actional and non-actional modes of intentionality = 38
• 19. The phenomenological clarification of the intentionality of synthetic cognition : the essential correlation between positing and positum manifested in the objective presentation of the experience of perceptual objects = 39
• 20. Summary and transition = 42
• Chapter Three : The intentionality of Psychologically Pure Consciousness
• 21. Introductory remarks = 44
• 22. The Phenomenological $${\rm E}$$$$\pi $$$$o$$$$\chi $$$${\eta '}$$ of positional consciousness and the uncovering of it psychologically pure residuum = 44
• 23. The consitutional essence and eidos of psychically pure consciousness = 47
• 24. The essence and eidos of the non-actional intentionality of the world-horizon and its correlative non-conceptual consciousness = 51
• 25. The intentionality of worldly apperception as the necessary phenomenal background of the intentionality of the cogito = 53
• 26. Summary and transition = 54
• Chapter Four : The Intentionality of Transcendentally Pure Consciousness
• 27. Introductory remarks = 55
• 28. The phenomenologically transcendental bracketing and $${\rm E}$$$$\pi $$$$o$$$$\chi $$$${\eta '}$$ of the intentionality of the world-horizon : the initiation of the transcendental reduction to transcendentally pure consciousness = 56
• 29. The initial appearance of transcendent time to reflection within the natural attitude = 59
• 30. The essence of the psychologically reduced phenomenon of the temporality of succession = 61
• 31. The essence of the psychologically reduced phenomenon of the time consciousness of succession = 62
• 32. The psychological essence of the temporality and time consciousness of simultaneity = 63
• 33. The eidetic overcoming of the essential horizonal limitation of phenomenological reflection on the essence of the psychologically reduced phenomenon of time : the immanent manifestation and intuitive ideation of ideas in the kantian sense = 65
• 34. The methodological uncovering of the object and subject poles of intentionality = 66
• 35. the phenomenologically transcendental bracketing and $${\rm E}$$$$\pi $$$$o$$$$\chi $$$${\eta '}$$ of the time in which the intentionality of the world-horizon appears = 67
• 36. Summary and conclusion = 71
• Part Two Heidegger's Phenomenological Account of Intentionality
• Introduction to Part Two
• 37. Preliminary considerations = 81
• Chapter Five : Heidegger's Concept of Phenomenology
• 38. Introductory remarks = 82
• 39. Heidegger's unfolding of the formal structure of the question about the meaning of being ; the provisional account of the related 'objects' of ontology : the being of entities and the meaning of being as such = 83
• 40. Unfolding the formal structure of the being question leads to the priority of investigating the being of the questioner = 85
• 41. The provisional account of the being of the questioner (Dasein) following clues provided by the formal structure of the question about tue meaning of being ; emergence of the task of fundamental ontology = 86
• 42. Heidegger's clarification of phenomenology within the context of the existential analytic : the preliminary concept of phenomenology = 89
• 43. The formal concept of phenomenon : its ordinary and phenomenological signification = 92
• 44. The concrete envisaging of the formal and deformalized concepts of phenomenon ; the phenomenological relevance of the ordinary concept of phenomenon = 95
• 45. The need for phenomenology's methodological mediation has its basis in the thematic 'objects' of ontology ; the reciprocal relation of phenomenology and ontology as philosophy's way of determining and treating its 'object' = 96
• 46. Clarification of the mode of knowing operative in the preliminary concept of phenomenology : the a priori cognition of phenomenological reduction, construction and destruction = 98
• 47. Summary and transition = 101
• Chapter Six : The Phenomenological Inquiry into the Being of Intentionality
• 48. Introductory remarks = 103
• 49. Heidegger's characterization of Hesserl's understanding of intentionality as the structure of lived-experiences = 104
• 50. Heidegger's characterization of the way the a priori of intentionality is brought into relief from its exemplary ground in Husserl's understanding of intentionality : the transcendental and eidetic reductions = 106
• 51. The failure of Husserl's phenomenology to investigate the being characters of the intentional = 107
• 52. The return of Husserl's phenomenology to the idea of a theory of reason : its resultant inability to determine the being of lived-experiences in an original way = 109
• 53. Husserl's phenomenological understanding of the 'natural attitude' is only a semblance of man's natural way of being : its neglect of the necessary posing of the being question = 111
• 54. The inquiry into the being of intentionality requires the phenomenon of intentionality to be made into a problem = 112
• 55. The erroneous 'objectivizing' of intentionality = 114
• 56. The erroneous 'subjectivizing' of intentionality = 115
• 57. The manifestation of the natural meaning of the phenomenon of intentionality overcomes the problem of the subject-object relation, and points to the problem of transcendence = 117
• 58. The understanding of being implicit in the phenomenon of the natural meaning of intentionality = 117
• 59. The intentionality discovery of entities is founded in the disclosedness of the being of entities = 118
• 60. Summary and transition = 120
• Chapter Seven : Being in the World Manifests Dasein's Original Transcendence
• 61. Introductory remarks = 122
• 62. Perceptual knowing is a founded mode of being-in-world ; the foundation of epistemology in the ontology of presence-at-hand = 123
• 63. Summary of the phenomenal results of Heidegger's analyses thus far which lead him to recast both phenomenology's basic field of research and the method by which it proceeds = 125
• 64. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's existential way of being the 'there' : the equiprimordial existentialia of the disclosedness of the unitary phenomenon of being-in-the-world = 126
• 65. Disposition as the existentiale of the disclosive of the 'that-it-is' of Dasein's way to be = 127
• 66. Original understanding as the existentiale disclosive of the preconceptual understanding of being manifested by Dasein's way to be = 129
• 67. Projection as an existentiale manifested by original understanding = 130
• 68. The understanding's appropriation of itself ; interpretation (Auslegung) = 132
• 69. The projective unity of the phenomenal connection between the fore-structure of understanding and the 'as' structure of interpretation (Auslegung) ; the existentiale of meaning as the formal existential framework of intelligibility as such = 134
• 70. The ontic and ontological basis of the circular manifestation of the structure of Dasein's interpretative understanding ; the grounding of the ontological projecting of the existential interpretation guiding the existential analytic of fundamental ontology in the existentiell being of Dasein = 135
• 71. The problem of transcendence and being-in-the-world = 137
• 72. The transcendence of Dasein surpasses entities, and not the subject = 139
• 73. World as the 'toward which' of transcendence and the origin of both in freedom = 141
• 74. Summary and transition = 143
• Chapter Eight : The Temporal Meaning of Transcendence
• 75. Introductory remarks = 146
• 76. The ordinary understanding of time in terms of a sequence of nows ; the manifestation of time in the phenomenal mode of semblance = 147
• 77. The datable structure of expressed time emerges on the basis of Dasein's relation to things, and not its thematic consciousness of time designations = 148
• 78. The origin of time designations (datability) in the modes of Dasein's existence ; transcendence as the 'there' of the uttered characters of time = 149
• 79. The unity of original time ; its manifestation in the ecstatic unity of the temporalization of temporality = 150
• 80. The analogical manifestation of the ecstatic horizon of the temporalization of temporality ; world as the ecstematic unity of the ecstatic horizons of temporality = 153
• 81. Heidegger's exhibition of the unoriginal and derivative status of the intentionality of consciousness = 154
• 82. The ontic transcendence of intentionality manifests a semblance of the phenomenon of original transcendence = 155
• 83. Summary and conclusion = 156
• Part Three The Confrontation of Husserl's and Heidegger's Accounts of Intentionality
• Introduction to Part Three
• 84. Preliminary considerations = 165
• Chapter Nine : The Phenomenological Method : Reflective or Hermeneutical?
• 85. Introductory remarks = 167
• 86. Thematization of Husserl's account of the 'necessity' motivating phenomenology's return to the matters themselves = 167
• 87. Thematization of Heidegger's account of the 'necessity' motivating phenomenology's return to the matters themselves = 169
• 88. Thematization of the phenomenal discrepancy in Husserl's and Heidegger's account of the necessity of the phenomenological return = 171
• 89. Thematization of the philosophical 'orientation' guiding Husserl's understanding of phenomenology = 172
• 90. Thematization of the philosophical 'orientation' guiding Heidegger's understanding of phenomenology = 174
• 91. The "Heideggerian" prerogative of a reflectively understood phenomenological method = 176
• 92. The "Husserlian" prerogative of a reflectively understood phenomenological method = 178
• 93. An attempt to mediate the methodological returns of the phenomenologies of Husserl and Heidegger : the isomorphism which emerges with respect to these returns when their "foreshortened" understandings of each other are taken into account = 184
• 94. The limit of the methodological isomorphism between the hermeneutical and reflective returns of phenomenology : the problem of reckoning with the divergent "matters themselves" of intentionality uncovered by each return = 186
• 95. Transition = 187
• Chapter Ten : Intentionality : An Original or Derived Phenomenon?
• 96. Introductory remarks = 189
• 97. Thematization of Husserl's account of the exemplary field which yields the intentional essence of both actionally and non-actionally modified lived-experiences = 190
• 98. Thematization of Heidegger's account of the unoriginal phenomenal status of intentionality : his critique of Husserl's "epistemological" narrowing of this phenomenon and his subsequent unfolding of the natural meaning of intentionality = 191
• 99. The emergent heteromorphism of Husserl's and Heidegger's account of the 'matter itself' of intentionality = 193
• 100. The 'Heideggerian' prerogative of the unoriginal phenomenal status of intentionality = 194
• 101. The 'Husserlian' prerogative of the original phenomenal status of intentionality = 197
• 102. Phenomenology's most self-understanding cannot be at once hermeneutical and reflective = 203
• 103. The necessity of attempting to mediate the issue of the phenomenological originality of intentionality : the non-partisan "opening-up" of the phenomenon of intentionality within the hermeneutical and reflective methodological prerogatives = 205
• 104. The hermeneutical prerogative and the non-actional dimension of intentionality = 205
• 105. Two phenomenally distinct "sights" are at issue within the hermeneutical prerogative : the ontico-ontological and explicitly ontological hermeneutical circles = 207
• 106. The transcendental distinction determinative of, yet unaccounted for, by the hermeneutical circle = 209
• 107. The reflective prerogative of phenomenology and the problem of a concealed ontology = 210
• 108. Working out the issue of ontology and phenomenology requires a decision regarding the originality of the phenomenon of intentionality = 212
• Part Four Discussion of the Conclusions
• Introduction to Part Four
• 109. Preliminary considerations = 217
• Chapter Eleven : Gadamer's Assessment of the Controversy between Husserl and Heidegger
• 110. Introductory remarks = 220
• 111. The immanentism inherent in Husserl's and Heidegger's foundational approaches to phenomenology according to Gadamer = 221
• 112. Gadamer's account of Husserl's unwarranted concept of immanence = 222
• 113. The philological and philosophical problems inherent in Gadamer's account of Huckster's unwarranted concept of immanence = 223
• 114. Gadamer's uncritical reliance on Heidegger's methodological immanentism = 224
• 115. The unthematized epistemic moment of the 'hermeneutical situation' in Heidegger and Gadamer following Heidegger = 226
• 116. The issue of whether Husserl's and phenomenological commitment to the phenomenological ideal of manifestation is determined by an unwarranted commitment to the 'metaphysics of presence' = 228
• 117. Gadamer's philosophical hermeneutics do not escape nor account for the self-referentiality of the transcendentality of Husserl's and Heidegger's formulations of phenomenology = 229
• Chapter Twelve : Ricoeur's Attempted Rapprochement Between Phenomenology and Hermeneutics
• 118. Ricoeur's thesis of phenomenology and hermeneutics presupposing each other = 231
• 119. Ricoeur's account of Husserl's idealism = 231
• 120. Ricoeur's account of Husserl's alleged idealism has its basis in ontologism and the conflation of the psychological and transcendental reductions = 232
• 121. Ricoeur's restriction of the essential character and scope of phenomenological reflection = 234
• 122. Ricoeur's uncritical reliance of Heidegger's distinction between 'interpretation' and 'understanding' renders problematical his account of the opposition between idealistic phenomenology and its hermeneutic critique = 235
• 123. Ricoeur's account of the opposition between Auslegung and description, and the need for their dialectical mediation, is based in his unwarranted restriction of phenomenological intuition and description = 236
• Chapter Thirteen : Mohanty's Account of the Complementarity of Descriptive and Interpretive Phenomenology
• 124. Introductory remarks = 239
• 125. Mohanty's account of the structural isomorphism between the theory of consciousness and the theory of Dasein = 240
• 126. Mohanty's account of the complementarity of Heidegger's methodological Auslegung and Husserl's intentional explication is philologically questionable = 241
• 127. Mohanty's account of the phenomenological basis for the self-critical complementarity of transcendental reflection and the hermeneutical circle = 243
• 128. Mohanty's account of the dialectic of 'reflection and reflected upon' is itself grounded in transcendental reflection. The consequent phenomenologically reflective basis of the 'circularity' of the hermeneutical circle = 244
• Chapter Fourteen : Crowell's Account of Husserl's and Heidegger's Divergent Interpretations of Phenomenology's Transcendental Character
• 129. Crowell's account of Husserl's and Heidegger's agreement regarding phenomenology's basic character = 246
• 130. Crowell's account of the basic opposition between Husserl's and Heidegger's interpretations of phenomenology's basic transcendental character = 248
• 131. Taking into account Heidegger's methodological immanentism yields transcendental reflection as the Arche and Telos of the 'showing itself from itself' of 'that which is' = 249
• Chapter Fifteen. Landgrebe's Critique of Husserl's Theory of Phenomenological Reflection
• 132. Introductory remarks = 251
• 133. Landgrebe's account of the important distinction between psychological and phenomenological reflection = 252
• 134. Landgrebe's account of Husserl's phenomenologically reflective uncovering of the absolute being of transcendental subjectivity = 253
• 135. The full sense of the intentionality of transcendental subjectivity transcends Husserl's reflectively immanent characterization of its absolute being according to Landgrebe = 254
• 136. Landgrebe's argument against Husserl's representational theory of phenomenological reflection = 255
• 137. Landgrebe's account of the two senses of transcendental subjectivity : the reductively uncovered 'absolute' in Husserl's sense and the anonymous pre-reflective 'place' where the absolute is experienced = 256
• 138. The lack of phenomenal justification for Landgrebe's characterization of the status of the 'reflected upon' intentional object = 257
• 139. Landgrebe's misleading formulation of the centrality of the distinction between psychological and phenomenological reflection = 258
• 140. The pre-transcendental basis for the 'motivation' of phenomenological reflection in Husserl's critique of the empiricistic formulation of 'inner perception' = 259
• 141. Landgrebe's critique of the intentional status of the 'reflected upon' in Husserl's theory of phenomenological reflection presupposes the eidetic reduction accomplished by phenomenology's methodical reflections = 260
• 142. The eide of the succession of the intentionality of temporality and time-consciousness are not successive in Husserl's analyses = 262
• 143. Landgrebe's phenomenologically inappropriate characterization of the intentionality of temporal succession as successive is at the root of his misguided critique of Husserl's phenomenological theory of reflection = 264
• Table of Abbreviations = 265
• Notes = 267
• Selected Bibliography = 291
• Index = 295